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Advisor: Professor Craig R MacPhee 
This dissertation comprises three separate essays on international trade and foreign direct 
investment. We present the gravity model with Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) 
estimation to investigate the effect of transportation costs on trade, the effect of RTAs on intra- 
and extra-regional trade in developing RTAs and the role of institutions on FDI in ASEAN. 
The second chapter is a review of the log of gravity model and econometric specification. PPML 
approach applied to the gravity model is initially suggested Silva and Tenreyro (2006). They have 
shown that the log-normal gravity equation suffers from three problems: the bias created by the 
logarithmic transformation, the failure of the homoscedasticity assumption, and the way zero 
values are treated. They show that the proposed PPML estimation technique being capable of 
solve those problems. 
In the first essay, we study the effect of new measures of transport performance on international 
trade among 15 counties in southern and eastern Africa and on the international trade of those 
countries with six other regions in the world. The results indicate that a 10 percent reduction in 
transport costs increase trade volumes by about 10 percent. We also find that coefficients for each 
of seven transport performance do not differ significantly across years. Our results indicate that 
intra-regional trade of the SEA countries has higher sensitivity to distance and to transport 
performance than the worldwide trade of those countries. In addition there is no indication that 
the trade of landlocked SEA countries has higher sensitivity to the transport performance than the 
trade of coastal SEA countries.  
  
 
 
In our second essay, we investigate the effects of RTAs on world and regional trade patterns, 
concentrating on data for the 12 RTAs covering 1981-2008. The effects of RTAs are captured by 
dummies that reflect intra-bloc trade and import extra-bloc trade and export extra-bloc trade 
separately. We find considerable variation in the trade effects associated with different 
arrangements. Also our finding indicates that the result for pooled regression and the result for 
individual regressions are different.  
In the third essay, we investigate the impact of institutional ‗quality‘ on bilateral FDI in ASEAN 
covering 1995 - 2005. We found that security of transactions and contracts and the quality of 
public governance have a strong relation to increase FDI inflow in ASEAN countries. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
International trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) are main factors of the driving forces for 
economic growth. The coefficients estimated by many of the cross-section and time-series studies 
for the period running 1970 through 1984 suggest that the growth of real GDP rises by about 0.2 
percent points for every 1 percentage point increase in the growth rate of international trade (Van 
den Berg & Lewer, 2006). Analysis based on the new data set suggests that over the period the 
1950 –1998 periods, countries that liberalized their trade regimes experienced average annual 
growth rates that were about 1.5 percentage points higher than before liberalization (Waczing & 
Welch, 2008).  
This thesis is a collection of three separate essays on international trade and foreign direct 
investment. In particular, this dissertation consists of three applications of the gravity-model 
using the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) technique to estimate the impact of 
transportation costs on international trade, the trade effects of regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
on intra- and extra-regional trade in developing RTAs and the role of institutions on foreign direct 
investment in ASEAN.  
In the next chapter, we conduct a review of the gravity model and econometric specification. The 
PPML approach applied to the gravity model was initially suggested by Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006). They have shown that the log-normal gravity equation suffers from three problems: the 
bias created by the logarithmic transformation, the failure of the homoscedasticity assumption, 
and the way zero values are treated. They showed that the proposed PPML estimation technique 
being capable of solving those problems. 
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In chapter three, we study the effect of new measures of transport performance on international 
trade among 15 counties in southern and eastern Africa and on the international trade of those 
countries with six other regions in the world. We find that most of the transport variables and 
distance have similar negative effects on trade. The results indicate that a 10 percent reduction in 
transport costs increases trade volumes by about 10 percent. Our results are substantially smaller 
in absolute terms than those found elsewhere in the literatures. We also find that coefficients for 
each of seven transport performance measures do not differ significantly across years. Our results 
indicate that intra-regional trade of the SEA countries has higher sensitivity to distance and to 
transport performance than the worldwide trade of those countries. Whether there is no indication 
that the trade of landlocked SEA countries has higher sensitivity to the transport performance 
than the trade of coastal SEA countries depends on the specific transport measure used. In 
addition, we find that estimates with country and time fixed effects performed better in terms of 
explained variance. 
In chapter four, we investigate the effects of RTAs on world and regional trade patterns, 
concentrating on data for the 12 RTAs covering 1981-2008. The effects of RTAs are captured by 
dummies that reflect intra-bloc trade and import extra-bloc trade and export extra-bloc trade 
separately. Our first finding is that not all of the RTAs succeed in giving arise to intra-bloc trade 
creation. Some RTAs namely SAPTA, GCC, PAFTA, and WAEMU are found to have negative 
intra-bloc effects. Our second finding is that of these 12 RTAs in the sample, 7 show import trade 
diversion while most of the export extra-bloc trade dummies are not statistically significant. The 
third major conclusion is that three of five African RTAs in the sample have generated intra-bloc 
trade. Fourth, the results for the pooled regression and the results for individual regressions are 
different and the standard errors from the pooled regression are much smaller. Finally our results 
confirm that the basic variables of the gravity model show expected signs with high statistical 
significance. 
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In chapter five, we investigate the impact of institutional ‗quality‘ on bilateral FDI in ASEAN 
covering 1995 - 2005. The detailed Institutional Profile database is used to highlight the main 
institutions that matter. We found that security of transactions and contracts are closely related to 
increase FDI inflow in ASEAN countries. This means that security of traditional property rights, 
law on bankruptcies, the security of transactions, the protection of intellectual property, lender 
guarantees: banking system (mortgages etc), existence and observance of labor legislation and 
measures, and labor inspectorate and labor courts—all are important institutions attracting FDI.  
In addition, the results indicate that good public governance has a positive relationship with FDI 
inflows. This category of institutions covers transparency, corruption control, efficiency of 
administration, and independence of the justice system. However we also find a negative 
relationship between some good institutions and FDI. 
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Chapter 2 
The Log of Gravity Model 
2.1 Log of Gravity Model 
Economists have found that forces similar to gravity influence the volumes of international trade 
among countries. The gravity model of trade is based on the idea that the volume of bilateral trade 
is positively related to country‘s size as measured by income levels, and negatively related to the 
distance between them. Specifically, the gravity equation posits that the value of the volume of 
trade (which can be bilateral, imports or exports) between country i and j,    , is (Rivera-Batiz 
and Oliva, 2003, section 3.6):  
(1) Positively related to both countries‘ sizes as measured by income level    and   , and 
(2) Negatively related to the distance     between the trading partners, which serves as a proxy 
for many trade resistance factors, including transport and communication costs. 
The name gravity model derives from the following formula‘s resemblance to Newton‘s law1 
    = A
     
   
,  
where A is a constant,    and    are the income levels of countries i and j, and     is the distance 
between the countries.     is a measure of bilateral trade, such as the exports from countries i to j.  
The gravity model
2
 was first introduced by Tinbergen (1962). Anderson (1979) was the first 
attempt to provide theoretical foundations of the gravity model. Later scholars have tried to 
                                                          
1 The theory of gravitational forces in physics tells us that the gravitational attraction exerted on an object by a body, 
such as the earth, declines with the distance between the object attracted and the center of the attracting body. Also the 
gravitational attraction increases with the mass of the attracting body. Furthermore, the theory tells us that gravitational 
force act on both bodies involved. For instance, the earth attracts the moon and the moon also attracts the earth. These 
considerations have been enshrined in Isaac Newton‘s law of universal gravitation. Newton‘s law states that every 
particle in the universe attracts every other particle with a force that is proportional to the product of their masses, and 
inversely proportional to the square of the distance between the particles (Rivera-Batiz & Oliva, 2003). 
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demonstrate that the gravity model can be derived from various trade theory models. Bergstrand 
(1985) developed a gravity model based on the Armington assumption of product differentiation 
by national origin. Bergstrand (1989) developed a gravity model with monopolistic competition. 
Deardorff (1998) showed that gravity equations can be derived in a very general setting that is 
independent of any particular trade model. Oguledo and MacPhee (1994) derived a gravity model 
from a linear expenditure system. Evenett and Keller (2002) examined whether the Heckscher-
Ohlin theory and an increasing returns model can account for the gravity equation. Harrigan 
(2003) reviewed the literature on gravity and the volume of trade. Recently Helpman et al. (2008) 
developed a gravity model in the context of firm heterogeneity. 
In its simplest form, the stochastic version of the gravity equation for trade is used in empirical 
studies as follows:  
    =      
     
     
     
      
      ,        (2-1) 
where    and    are two countries‘ GDP,    and    are two countries‘ population,     is the 
distance between two countries,     is an error factor and   ,   ,   ,   ,    and    are unknown 
parameters. 
Taking logarithms of both sides of equation (2-1), the multiplicative form (2-1) of the basic 
gravity model changes to a log linear form:  
ln (   )= ln (  ) +    ln (  ) +    ln (  ) +    ln (  ) +    ln (  ) +    ln (   ) + ln (   )     (2-2) 
Recently Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004) showed that the traditional 
specification of the gravity model suffers from omitted variable bias, as it does not take into 
account the effect of relative prices on trade patterns. They note that bilateral trade intensity not 
only depends on bilateral trade costs (affected by spatial distance, language differences, trade 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2
 Bergeijk and Brakman (2010) made a good review of the gravity model in international trade. 
6 
 
 
 
restrictions and so on), but also on weighted multilateral trade cost indices (reflecting the prices 
of import-competing goods in the importing country and export opportunities in the exporting 
country).  
As shown by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004), a country-specific fixed-
effects specification of the gravity model is in line with the theoretical concerns regarding the 
correct specification of the model and yields consistent parameter estimates for the variables of 
interest. These country-specific-fixed-effects absorb all other time-invariant factors that affect 
international trade volumes. In particular, when bilateral exports grow faster than GDP, the extent 
to which total exports grow faster than GDP is an individual country fixed effect, not a country-
pair fixed effect. This suggestion is consistent with Matyas (1997) who noted that the correct 
econometric representation of the gravity model is in the form of a triple-index model; time fixed 
effect, importer fixed effect and exporter fixed effect. The time fixed effect makes it possible to 
monitor common business cycles or globalization trends over the whole sample.  
Later, Cheng and Wall (2005) showed that a country-pair fixed effect model (FE) is preferred to a 
country fixed effect model (XFE). However, Cheng and Wall (2005) also showed that the 
differences of coefficients of both models are small. The main reason for this is that the standard 
errors from the XFE model are much larger.  
This dissertation will follow Matyas (1997) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), using the 
form of a triple-index model.  
The log-normal fixed effects specification of the basic gravity model is as follows: 
ln(   )= ln(  ) +   ln(  ) +   ln(  ) +   ln(  ) +   ln(  ) +   ln(   ) +   +  +  + ln(   )  (2-3) 
where    is the fixed effect of the importing country (importer dummy),    is the fixed effect of 
the exporting country (exporter dummy) and t is the time fixed effect. We will apply this 
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estimation procedure as well. We will use equation (2-3) with additional target variables to 
examine policies such as the effects of transport costs (chapter 3), regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) (chapter 4), and institutions (chapter 5).  
2.2 Econometric Specification 
2.2.1 Problems with the Specification of the Gravity model 
In an influential paper, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) have focused critically on the traditional 
econometric approach to its estimation, raising serious concerns about bias, and showing that the 
extent of this bias could be large. They have shown that the log-normal gravity equation suffers 
from three problems: the bias created by the logarithmic transformation, the failure of the 
homoscedasticity assumption, and the way zero values are treated. These problems normally 
result in biased and inefficient estimates.  
(1) The logarithmic transformation has an effect on the nature of the estimation process, 
since the log-normal model generates estimates of ln(   ) but not of    . Jensen‘s inequality 
implies that E(ln(   ))   lnE(   ), that is, the expected value of the logarithm of a random 
variable is different from the logarithm of its expected value. 
(2) The log-normal model is based on the assumption that the error terms exhibit 
homoscedasticity
3
. 
(3) The log-normal model cannot deal with zero-valued trade flows since the logarithm of 
zero is undefined. By tradition, the most common ways to deal with this problem are to drop the 
pairs with zero trade
4
 or use     + 1 as the dependent variable. But zero-valued flows may be the 
result of rounding errors and using     + 1 lacks a theoretical justification. Furthermore, the logs 
of     + 1 are large negative numbers. Thus this approach confers unduly large weights on the 
                                                          
3
 In this dissertation, it is remarkable to observe that heterogeneous factors may influence bilateral trade (chapter 3 and 
4) or investment (chapter 5). For instance, an exporting country would export different amounts of a certain good to 
two countries, even if GDP‘s of these two countries are identical and they have the same distance from the exporter.  
4
 This approach clearly results in biased parameter estimates since the trade between two countries could be null 
because of their economic, culture and geographic features. As argued by Coe and Hoffmaister (1999), ―omitting those 
observations represent a non-random screening of the data that may lead to biased or inconsistent estimates,‘   
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adjusted zero-valued observation. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) avoid this problem by expressing 
the dependent variable in levels instead of logs. 
Accordingly, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) propose the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood 
(PPML) estimation technique and assess its performance using Monte Carlo simulations of the 
aggregated trade flows collected for 136 countries comparing OLS on ln(   ), OLS on ln(    + 1), 
ET-Tobit
5
 on ln(     ) and NLS
6
.  Siliverstovs and Schumacher (2009) confirm the 
performance of the PPML in comparison to the traditional estimation method using both the 
aggregated trade flows and the trade flows broken down by 25 three-digit ISIC Rev.2 industries 
as well as for manufacturing as a whole.  
2.2.2 Poisson Estimation 
We adopt the Silva and Tenreyro (2006, p47) specification in equation (14) of their paper. 
E[         ] =   (    ) = exp(    ) = exp[ln (  ) +   ln (  ) +   ln (  ) +   ln (  ) +   ln (  ) + 
  ln (   ) +    +   + t]           (2-4) 
Now by applying the Poisson specification to the fixed effects specification of the gravity model 
of trade (see Woodridge, 2002, section 19.2). 
Pr[           ] = 
                     
   
     
,       = 0,1,…  where      is T factorial  (2-5) 
Note that the Poisson model assumes equidispersion, the conditional variance of     is equal to 
 (    ).  
Var (        ) = E[        ] =  (    ).       (2-6) 
Then   can be estimated by means of maximum likelihood. The log-likelihood function is the 
sum of the appropriate log probabilities, interpreted as a function of  . 
                                                          
5 Tobit of Eaton and Tamura (1994).  
6 Non-linear least square. 
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Log L( ) =             
 
   
 
    ) +    (    ) – log    !]    (2-7) 
The first order conditions of maximizing log L( ) with respect to   are given by 
               
 
   
 
    )]     =      
 
   
 
       = 0     (2-8) 
where      =     –          ). 
Since (2-4) implies that E(   |   ) = 0, we can interpret (2-8) as the sample moment conditions 
corresponding to the set of orthogonality conditions E(      ) = 0. As a result, the estimator that 
maximizes (2-7) is generally consistent under condition (2-4), even if     given     does not have 
a Poisson distribution.  
A pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PML) estimator based on equation (2-8) gives the same weight 
to all observations. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest that this is because under the assumption 
of equation (2-6), all observations have the same information on the parameters of interest as the 
additional information on the curvature of the conditional mean coming from observations with 
large (    ) is offset by their larger variance.  
The estimator defined by equation (2-8) is numerically equal to the Poisson pseudo-maximum-
likelihood (PPML) estimator. Since all that is needed for this estimator to be consistent is the 
correct specification of the conditional mean, that is, E[         ] = exp(    ). Therefore, the data 
do not have to be Poisson at all and the dependent variable can be zero.  
In sum, the PPML version of the gravity model does not face the problems outlined in the above 
section. First the linking function is log-linear (   ) instead of log-log (ln   ). Second, in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity Poisson regression estimates are consistent and more efficient than 
the traditional gravity estimations. Third, because of its multiplicative form the Poisson 
estimation provides a natural way to deal with zero-valued trade flows. 
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2.2.3 The implementation of the PPML estimator 
This paper employs standard STATA econometric programs. The dependent variable is expressed 
in levels. The independent variables, except dummy variables, are used in logarithmic form. 
Within STATA11 (StataCorp., 2009), the PPML estimation can be executed using the following 
command: 
poisson         ln(  )  ln(  )  ln(  )  ln(  )  ln(   )                                 , robust 
All inference is based on a White robust covariance matrix estimator.  
The research in this dissertation uses the PPML estimation to investigate the effect of 
transportation costs on trade (chapter 3), the effect of RTAs on intra- and extra-regional trade in 
developing RTAs (chapter 4) and the role of institutions on FDI in ASEAN (chapter 5). In the 
gravity model community, since the PPML estimator by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) has been 
developed recently, it has not been used much compared to the traditional estimatiors. 
Kepaptsoglou, Karlaftis and Tsamboulas (2010) reviewed the empirical literature on gravity 
models analyzing the effects of FTAs on trade undertaken in the last decade (1999-2009). They 
find that with over 55 papers published within the last decade, there are only two papers using the 
PPML technique.  
2.2.4 Expectation and Interpretation 
Expectations for all explanatory variables would be indicated as follows.    and    would have 
positive coefficients, since the positive correlations between GDP and export country and import 
country are expected. Coefficient on     would be expected to be negative, given that greater 
distances increase transportation costs.  
   and    would possibly be positive or negative, depending on whether the dominant effect is an 
absorption effect or economies of scale. On one hand, a large population may certainly indicate a 
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big domestic market and large resource endowment, so that the bigger absorption effect of this 
domestic market causes less reliance on international trade transactions. In this case, a negative 
sign would be justified (Oguledo & MacPhee, 1994). On the other hand, a large domestic market 
allows the advantages of economies of scales to be fully exploited. It follows that opportunities 
for trade with foreign partners in a wide variety of goods will increase, and the expected sign of 
this coefficient would be positive (Kien & Hashimoto, 2005).  
The parameter estimates on the   ,   ,   ,    and     can be interpreted as importer total income 
elasticity, exporter total income elasticity, importer total population elasticity, exporter total 
population elasticity and distance elasticity, respectively. 
Suppose that        is a continuous explanatory variable. The impact of a marginal change in        
upon the expected value of     (keeping all other variables constant) is given by 
              
      
 = exp (      β )           (2-9) 
which has the same sign as the coefficient   . Then from equation (2-4), equation (2-9) can be 
converted into a semi-elasticity. 
    = 
              
      
 
 
            
 =  
                 
      
      (2-10) 
For example, in equation (2-4),    is that on average percentage change in     induced by a 1% 
change in    holding other factors constant. In fact this represents elasticity. 
For a dummy variable, we can compare the conditional means of    , given       =0 and given 
      = 1, keeping the other variables constant. 
                     
  
                     
  
 =         ,         (2-11) 
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where    
  denotes the vector    , excluding its k-th element. 
For example, assuming the parameter estimate   , the interpretation requires a simple 
transformation, [(exp(  )-1)*100%]
7
. For example assume that      is the coefficient estimate of 
the RTA dummy variable and negative. This can be interpreted that two members trade 
[(exp(     )-1)*100%] less than the amount they trade without the RTA.  
2.3 Specification Tests 
2.3.1 RESET test (Ramsey 1969) 
We perform a RESET test (Ramsey, 1969) to check the adequacy of the estimated models with 
and without fixed country and time effects. Under the null hypothesis of no misspecification, the 
coefficient on the additional regressor is zero. In the case of fixed effect, the implementation is as 
follows: 
(1) Run poisson     on  ln(  )  ln(  )  ln(  )  ln(  )  ln(   ) ln(    )                           , 
robust 
(2) Predict     and generate    
 
 
(3) Run poisson     on  ln(  )  ln(  )  ln(  )  ln(  )  ln(   )                                
 
 , 
robust 
(4) Test the significance of    
 
 (This is equivalent to a t-test on    
 
.) 
In the case without fixed effects, we follow the above implementation by excluding          .  
  
                                                          
7 Halvorson and Palmquist (1980) initially showed a derivation of the formula. 
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2.3.2 Chow tests 
We perform a Chow test to check whether coefficient sizes of a target variable are the same 
across time periods. Under the null hypothesis, the sizes of a regression coefficient are the same 
across years. For instance, years are cover from year1 to year10. The implementation is as 
follows: 
(1) Run poisson     on  ln(  )  ln(  )  ln(  )  ln(  )   ln(   )   ln(    )                          
ln(  )*y1  ln(  )*y2   ln(  )*y2   ln(  )*y2    ln(   )*y2    ln(    )*y2      *y2    *y2    
             *y2 …… ln(  )*y10   ln(  )*y10   ln(  )*y10   ln(  )*y10    ln(   )*y10    
ln(    )*y10      *y10    *y10                 *y10 ,  robust 
(2) Test the coefficient of ln(    )*y2  = ln(    )*y3 = ln(    )*y4 = ln(    )*y5 = ln(    )*y6 
= ln(    )*y7 = ln(    )*y8 = ln(    )*y9 = ln(    )*y10 
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Chapter 3 
International Trade and Transportation Costs in Southern and Eastern Africa 
3.1 Introduction 
Transportation costs are one of the main components of trade costs
8
 and are cited as an important 
determinant of the volume of trade
9
. The cost of transportation in international trade can be 
defined as all shipping expenses of internationally traded good from origin point to destination 
place. Transport costs are important because they reduce the gains from trade. Radelet and Sachs 
(1998) showed that countries with lower transport costs have more manufactured exports and 
more overall economic growth than countries with higher transport costs. They found that 
doubling shipping cost is associated with slower annual growth by 1.5 percentage points. Limao 
and Venables (2001) found that an increase in international transport costs of 10 percent could 
reduce the volume of trade by about 20 percent.  
Transport costs have become relatively more important as an impediment to international trade 
since trade liberalization has run its course. World Trade Organization (WTO, 2004) comments: 
―the effective rate of protection provided by transport cost is in many cases higher than that 
provided by tariffs‖. Hummels (2007) reviewed the literature on transportation cost and tariffs. 
He estimated that transport expenditures on the median good were half as much as tariff duties for 
U.S. imports in 1985, equal to tariff duties in 1965 and were three times higher than tariffs by 
2004. A study of the World Bank (2001)
10
 showed that for 168 out of 216 trading partners of the 
                                                          
8 Anderson & Wincoop (2004) found that (170% is calculated from 2.7 = 1.21*1.08*1.06*1.07*1.14*1.03*1.55*) trade 
costs (170%) include all costs incurred in getting a good to a final user other than the marginal cost of producing the 
good itself, such as transportation costs (21%) (Both freight costs (11%) and transit costs (9%)), tariffs and nontariff 
barriers (8%), information costs barrier (6%), language barrier (7%), costs associated with the use of different 
currencies (14%), Security barrier (3%), and wholesale and retail distribution costs (55%). Number in the parenthesis is 
the tax equivalent of trade costs for industrialized countries.  
9 The empirical results, studying among several OECD countries between the late 1950s and the late 1980s, suggest 
that 67% of the growth of world trade can be explained by income growth, 25% by tariff-rate reductions, and 8% by 
transport-cost declines (Baier & Bergstrand, 2001). 
10 Data refer to 1998 from U.S. Bureau of Census. 
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United States, transport costs barriers outweighed tariff barriers. Note that the United States is 
actually a notable outlier in that it pays much less for transportation than other countries. 
Moreover, transport costs vary across regions. Freight costs in developing countries are on 
average 70 percent higher than in developed countries
11
 (UNCTAD, 2003). Hummel (2007) noted 
that in 2000 transportation expenditures per dollar of trade for major Latin American countries 
were 1.5 to 2.5 times higher than for the United States. 
Despite the increased recognition of the importance of transport costs in international trade, most 
empirical gravity trade research uses distance as a proxy for transportation costs. This is due to 
lack of availability of direct transport cost data. Also the negative association of distance and 
trade is perhaps the most remarkable correlation in the gravity model. 
However, recent studies show that distance may not be a good proxy for transport costs. For 
instance Grossman (1998) argues that for plausible values of transport costs, the estimated 
coefficient on the distance variable in gravity trade equations should be considerably smaller than 
is typically reported. Limao and Venables (2001)
12
 found that distance alone explained only 10 
percent of the variation of transport costs. Kuwamori (2006)
13
 indicated that using distance as the 
only proxy for transport costs was insufficient and underestimates the impact of distance on 
transport costs. Furthermore, commodity level exercises in Kuwanmori‘s paper (2006) shown that 
impact varies across commodities. Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2007)
14
 found that 
distance was not a good proxy for transportation costs. Clark (2007)
15
 argued that trade and 
production activities are found to drop rapidly over the first third of the distance scale, rise over 
                                                          
11 Freight costs by region (percentage of import value), 2001: World 6.1 %, Developed Countries 5.1%, Developing 
Countries 8.7%, Africa 12.7%, Latin America 8.6%, Asia 8.4% and Pacific 11.7% (UNCTAD, 2003). 
12 Limao and Venables (2001) estimated the transport cost equation using CIF/FOB measures calculated from the 
IMF‘s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOT) for the year 1990 covering 103 countries. 
13 Kuwanmori (2006) estimated the transport cost using 
       
   
 from Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines for 
the period from 1991 to 1996. 
14 Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann D. (2007) used data on Spanish export to Poland and Turkey in 2003. 
15 Clark (2007) investigates the relationship between distance and both the extent of trade and foreign production. He 
uses the data on industries which are identified through their use of the Offshore Assembly Provisions in the US tariff 
code. 
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the middle portion of the scale, reach a peak in the final third of the scale, and decline thereafter. 
This implies that transport costs will not always increase monotonically with distance. Thus, 
these studies suggest that using distance as a proxy for transport costs should be reconsidered. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. A review of Africa‘s transport cost is 
presented in next section. Section 3.3 presents the specification of the gravity model for 
international trade. Section 3.4 describes the data. Section 3.5 presents the empirical results and 
section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Review of Measurement of International Transport Costs 
There is no single source of data that provides a definitive picture of bilateral costs of transport. 
One source of data which matches partner reports of trade is from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). This data set contains the ratios of carriage, insurance, and freight (CIF) to free on 
board (FOB) values. The ratio yields a difference equal to transport costs
16
. However, these data 
are subject to many serious problems which have been successively mentioned by scholars. For 
instance, the IMF data are of extremely low quality and rely on extensive imputation. Second, as 
aggregate data they are subject to compositional effects that mask the true time series in transport 
costs. Shifts in the types of good traded, or the sets of partners with whom a country trades, will 
affect measured costs even if the unit cost of shipping remains unchanged. These compositional 
effects are likely to be quite important – trade in manufactured goods has grown much more 
rapidly than bulk trade (agricultural and mining products) (Hummels, 2000). Third, since the 
FOB value is measured alongside the ship at the exporting country it excludes costs incurred by a 
land-locked country in transiting its neighbors (Amjadi & Yeats, 1995). Geraci and Prewo (1977) 
were among the first to question the usefulness of these ratios as a proxy of transportation costs. 
                                                          
16 Transport and insurance charges for exports between country i and country j =
            
     
. These ratios have been 
used by several authors to assess the effect of transportation costs on trade; see (Hummels & Lugovskyy, 2006). Even 
UNCTAD‘s Review of Maritime Transport relies heavily on IMF CIF/FOB ratios to calculate ad valorem shipping 
costs on a worldwide basis.  
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Recently Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) directly investigated whether these data are usable. 
They found that the IMF CIF/FOB ratios are error-ridden in levels, and contain no useful 
information for time-series or cross-commodity variation. However, there are alternative sources 
for these ratios. For instance Martinea-Zarzoso (2005) used CIF/FOB rations obtained from the 
International Transport Data Base
17
. Kuwanmori (2006) used the data from Foreign Trade 
Statistics of the Philippines. 
In addition to the IMF CIF/FOB ratios, the US import Waterborne Databank has been used by 
Sanchez, Hoffmann, Micco, Pizzolitto, Sgut & Wilmsmeier (2003) and Clark, Dollar and Micco 
(2004). Limao and Venables (2001) used shipping company quotes for the cost of transporting a 
standard container (40 feet) from Baltimore (USA) to 64 destinations. Martinez-Zarzoso and 
Suarez-Burguet (2005) used data on maritime and overland transport of the ceramic sector 
obtained from interviews held with Spanish logistics operators. Nowak-Lehmann, Herzer, 
Martinez-Zarzoso, and Vollmer (2007) created a transport cost index consisting of two 
components: (1) the actual distance via available sea routes (not great circle distance) between 
departure port and arrival port
18
 and (2) A freight cost index
19
. Jacks and Pendakur (2010)
20
 use 
data on transport cost from the United Kingdom and her trading partners. In so far as we know, 
however, there has been no previous information available on the transport performance among 
the countries of southern and eastern Africa and among those countries and other regions. 
  
                                                          
17 Data were provided by Jan Hoffmann while he was working for the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
18 http://www.maritimechain.com/port/port_distance.asp (Free access). This website provides data on distance in 
nautical miles and time taken (number of days). 
19 Found in Busse (2003). Average ocean freight and port charges per short ton of imports and exports cargo  
20 This paper has not clarified how the transport cost of the United Kingdom and her trading partners was constructed.   
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3.3 New Measures of Transport Performance 
The new variables in this study measure several aspects of transport performance documented in 
a forthcoming report for the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility of the World Bank. 
The data are price, time and variability while estimates of the value of time and the implicit cost 
of variability were made using the data in a logit model of choice among transport corridors and 
sub-corridors. The logit model is presented in Kent and Cook (2007) and their applications to the 
data are described in Nathan Associates (2010). These data were also used in compound variables 
to formulate more comprehensive measures of transport costs discussed below. 
(1) Price 
Price is the average explicit charge for transporting a standard 40-foot container between major 
shipping points for each country and region. Price for trade of coastal countries is the sum of the 
explicit charges for export through the nearest major port plus the import charges for clearing the 
nearest port of the destination country. For landlocked countries, the price included explicit 
charges for land transport of containers to and from major shipping points as well as overseas 
shipment charges where applicable. Whenever alternative corridors or modes such as rail and 
truck were available, average charges were calculates using weights based on recent traffic 
history.  
(2) Time  
Time elapsed in the transport of goods is measured in hours and includes loading at the origin, 
transfer between modes, border crossing, en route activities such as vehicle weight controls, port 
processing and handling, customs procedures, and maritime shipping whenever applicable. For 
coastal countries transit time is calculated from shipper reports as the length of time from the 
point of origin through the nearest major port and clearing the port in the destination country. 
Transit time for landlocked countries is the weighted average of time for corridor transit by land 
and any applicable overseas shipments through export and import ports. 
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(3) Variability in transport time (varhrs and varpct) 
Variability in transport time is measured by calculating the average of the absolute deviations 
from the mean transit time to find a measure of variability in hours (varhrs). Since this measure of 
variability is highly correlated with the average time, we divided variability in hours by the mean 
time to obtain a percentage measure of variability (varpct).  For the coastal countries the 
variability is calculated as the time-weighted average of the deviations for both ports and 
shipping. For the landlocked countries the variability is based on deviations for land 
transportation plus overseas shipping where applicable.  
(4) Transport Cost (Cost 1) 
To develop more comprehensive measures of transport performance, we estimated the cost to 
shippers as the sum of the explicit freight charge plus an estimated value of the transit time. The 
cost is the price as defined above plus the transit time multiplied by $9, which is the revealed 
value of time from the logit model estimated for the region.   
(5) Transport Cost (Cost 2) 
The cost of variable transit time was estimated to be $2 per hour (Nathan Associates, 2010) and 
this permitted us to formulate another transport performance variable that we call Cost 2. This 
variable is the sum of the price, the value of time, and the product of the average variability in 
hours and two dollars. 
(6) Hassle Index (has) 
A hassle variable was created in order to see if there were negative trade effects from bureaucratic 
impediments. This variable quantified the paperwork and delay in the import and export process 
that exists in the countries at the beginning and end of each transport corridor. This variable is 
constructed from data in the Doing Business indices of the World Bank
21
. The number of days of 
import processing and the number of days for export processing for both countries from the data 
in the Doing Business are added together. 
                                                          
21
 www.doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings/. 
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The data on price, time, and variability were obtained through interviews with freight forwarders 
in 15 countries of southern and eastern Africa: Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. They were asked for averages for each corridor and sub-
corridor and each transport mode between major shipping points. In some cases overland 
transport costs were based on listed freight rates for road or rail transport in a given year. Where 
price was not available for the land portion of the corridor in a given year, the price was 
interpolated from the data in other years. Rail price indices were also created for certain countries 
based on shipper reports. These observations were checked for reliability by comparing them with 
selected interviews of transporters and with published data from the Port Management 
Association of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA) (2006), Giersing (2006), and the East 
African Community (2007). The same trade data were used to weight the price, time and 
variability observations for each corridor and mode when more than one was used in shipping 
between any two points. Freight forwarders did not distinguish among far flurry ports in the same 
region (say Baltimore or Long Beach in North America). Therefore, the transport performance 
measures for the external trade of southern and eastern Africa were reported only for trade with 
six regions: East Asia, Europe, Middle East, North America, South America, and South Asia. 
Respective ports were Hong Kong, Rotterdam (The Netherlands), Suez (Egypt), Baltimore (the 
U.S. state of Maryland), Santos (Brazil), Nhava Shiva (India).  
Table 3-1 reports correlation matrixes for distance and six transport performance variables. We 
find high correlation in many pairs of variables. Therefore we test each of seven transport 
performance variables and distance separately. 
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Table 3-1: Correlation Matrix for distance and six transport performance variables 
 Distance Price Time Varpct Varhrs Cost1 Cost2 Hassle  
Distance 1.0000        
Price 0.1189 1.0000       
Time 0.4679 0.6208   1.0000      
Varpct -0.2329 0.0629 -0.0099 1.0000     
Varhrs 0.2631 0.5650 0.8523 0.4664 1.0000    
Cost1 0.7854 0.3799 0.7593 -0.1030 0.5735 1.0000   
Cost2 0.3201 0.8420 0.9264 0.1663 0.8890 0.6426 1.0000  
Hassle -0.5835 0.1314 -0.1424 0.2575 0.0066 -0.4010   -0.0009 1.0000 
Source: Authors‘ calculation 
3.4 Gravity Model of Trade 
The estimated import gravity model equation has the following form: 
     = f (   ,    ,    ,    ,       ,      ,        ,         ,      ,       ,       ,    ) 
(3-1) 
where  
     is imports from country/region j by country/region i in year t,  
    is gross domestic product of importer in year t,  
    is gross domestic product of exporter in year t, 
    is population size of importer in year t,  
    is population size of exporter in year t, 
       is dummy variable for common language country i and country j, 
      is dummy variable for common border between country i and country j, 
      is distance between country i and country j, 
         is tariff rate of importer county i in year t,  
        ,      ,       ,        are dummy variables for country i and country j that share 
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membership affinities in year after entry into force
22
, namely Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (1996), East African Community (2001), Southern African Customs Union 
(2008), and Southern African Development Community (2005), respectively, 
    are alternative variables for transport or distance listed as follows:  
         is variability in shipment time in hours, 
         is percent variability in shipment time,  
        and          are cost of transport as defined above, 
       is distance which is direct-line miles between major ports of entry, 
       is average transit time defined above, 
        is average charge for shipping a 40-foot container defined above, 
      is hassle index defined above. 
We estimate various specifications of equation (3-1). We provide estimations for pooled data over 
10 years and individual years, 15 SEA countries, landlocked SEA countries, and coastal SEA 
countries over 10 years. Since transport variables were highly correlated, we consequently 
entered them separately into alternative regressions. 
3.5 Data 
3.5.1 Import Data 
We use bilateral import value into SEA countries and other six regions from Direction of Trade 
Statistics (DOT) – International Monetary Fund (IMF) which is our main database. Some missing 
IMF data are replaced by the COMTRADE. Both sources contain information in millions of 
nominal US dollars. The data covers the period from 1998 to 2008. The six regions consist of 
                                                          
22 Year in parenthesis is the year after entry into force. 
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East Asia, Europe, Middle East, North America, South America and South Asia
23
. Zero import 
observations represent about 11 percent of the sample. 
3.5.2 Data for other control variables 
The data on GDP, GDP per capita, and population size are from World Economic Outlook 
Database – IMF. Language data are from the Wikipedia website (http://en .wikipedia.org/wiki). 
Information on preferential trade agreements is from the Regional Trade Agreements Information 
System (RTA-IS), World Trade Organization (WTO). Data for tariffs are from the United 
Nations TRANIS data, World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) Database. 
We report the summary statistics for all variables in table 3-2 
  
                                                          
23 East Asia: Hong Kong; Macro; China; Japan; Korea, Dem. Rep., Korea, Rep.; Mongolia; Taiwan. 
Europe: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom. 
Middle East: Algeria; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Cyprus; Djibouti; Egypt; Georgia; Iran, I.R. of; Iraq; Israel; 
Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Lebanon; Libya; Mauritania; Morocco; Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; 
Sudan; Syrian Arab R.; Tajikistan; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; United Arab Emirates; Uzbekistan; Yemen, 
Republic of. 
North America: Canada; United States; Mexico 
South America: Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Ecuador; Guyana; Paraguay; Peru; Suriname; Uruguay; 
Venezuela 
South Asia: Afghanistan; Bangladesh; India; Maldives; Nepal; Pakistan; Sri Lanka 
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Table 3-2: Summary Statistics  
Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Imports in millions of $US. 7,383.944 42,338.66 0 64,9428.4 
Importer Population (millions) 
Importer GDP of $US (billions) 
Exporter Population (millions) 
Exporter GDP of $US (billions) 
246.0452 
1,799.979 
246.5163 
1,799.324 
438.7541 
4,105.308 
438.5485 
4,105.592 
1.572 
0.595 
1.572 
0.595 
1,585.24 
21,414.7 
1,585.24 
21,414.7 
Language 
Adjacency 
Importer‘s Tariff 
Importer Landlocked 
0.485714 
0.152381 
12.47622 
0.42857 
0.49985 
0.35943 
6.05182 
0.49492 
0 
0 
2.7291 
0 
1 
1 
41 
1 
COMESA 
EAC 
SACU 
SADC 
0.17143 
0.01039 
0.00519 
0.14026 
0.37692 
0.10141 
0.07189 
0.34729 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Distance in direct-line b/w ports (Miles) 
Price of shipping 40-foot container in $US 
Time in transit (hours) 
Variability as percent of mean time 
Variability of transit time in hours 
Transp.Cost1 incl.time is $US 
Transp.Cost2 incl.time and variability 
Hassle Index 
3,134.043 
7,045.395 
882.2415 
222.6821 
1,957.677 
34,478.58 
17,136.44 
141.5667 
2,366.254 
4,730.321 
656.9624 
79.37049 
1,755.647 
28,340.17 
11,364.78 
46.24092 
110 
284 
24 
40 
58 
770 
926 
25 
11,220 
23,539 
2961 
864 
10,058 
124,203 
51,877 
250 
Number of Observation 4620 
Source: Authors‘ calculation 
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3.6 Results 
We check the adequacy of the estimated models with and without fixed country and time effects 
by performing a RESET test (Ramsey, 1969). We report the regressions with fixed effects in table 
3-3 and without fixed effects in appendix A3-1. The p-values of RESET tests are reported at the 
bottom of each table. We find that regressions with fixed effects performed better in terms of 
explained variance. In five of eight cases without fixed effects, the test rejects the hypothesis that 
the coefficient on the test variable is 0.00. This means that the model estimated without fixed 
effects is inappropriate. In the fixed effect regression, only two cases are rejected by a RESET 
test. However the coefficients of transport performance variables are not different from one 
another. This study follows the results from the estimated models with fixed country and time 
effects.  
Overall the model explains a high proportion – higher than 90 percent – of the total variation of 
imports. Most of the basic-gravity-model-variables are significant with expected signs namely 
importer‘s population, importer‘s GDP, exporter‘s GDP, common language. RTA variable is 
significant and positive, only EAC while SACU is significant and negative implying that EAC 
and SACU agreement seems to have increased and decreased trade among its members, 
respectively. The effects of the landlocked dummy were associated with higher trade. 
We find that most of the transport variables and distance have similar negative effects on trade. 
Six of eight transport performances are significant and negative namely distance, transport price, 
transport time, variability in transport time in hours, cost1 and cost2. In the case of percentage 
variability in transport time, the result indicates is positive, not significant and misspecification in 
both regressions with and without fixed effect.  
The coefficients of the transport variables, which are elasticities, are -1.045, -0.630, -1.027, -0.377, -
1.063, and -0.965, respectively. Of six significant transport variables, cost2 is the most 
comprehensive measure of transport performance among the new estimates used for this study 
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and it has highly significant expected negative effects on trade flows. The coefficient on cost2 is -
1.063 suggesting that a 10.00 percent decrease in cost2 is associated with a 10.63 percent increase 
in trade. The effects of distance and some of the transport performance variables are very similar 
namely transport time, cost1 and cost2 which are around 1.00 in absolute terms. In comparison 
with other studies, Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann D. (2007) surveyed the literature
24
 
and concluded that ―a 10 percent reduction in transport costs increases trade volumes by more 
than 20 percent.‖ Their results are substantially larger in absolute terms than those found in the 
present study.  
There are two possible explanations for the difference between our results and others. The first is 
that the PPML estimator reduces the size of our transport coefficients. According to Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006), the traditional estimator for the gravity model exaggerates the size of the 
coefficients. The second involves measurement of the value of transport costs. As described 
above in section 3-2, most previous studies used CIF/FOB ratios as a proxy for transport costs. In 
sum our pooled sample between SEA countries and six regions over 1998 – 2008 strongly 
confirms the importance of transport variables. We find the elasticity of trade flows with respect 
to transport costs of about -1.00.  
In the case of hassle index, the results indicate positive effect in both regression with and without 
fixed effect and the p-values of RESET tests show that regressions without fixed effects 
performed better.  
  
                                                          
24
 (Limao & Venables, 2001); (Micco & Perez, 2002); (Clark, Dollar, & Micco, 2004); (Egger, 2005); (Combes & 
Lafourcade, 2005); (Martinez-Zarzoso & Suarez-Burguet, 2005) 
27 
 
 
 
Table 3-3: Gravity model regression with measures of transport performance (Panel 1999-2008)  
 Distance Transport 
price 
Transport 
time 
Variability 
in percent 
Variabilit
y in hours 
Cost 1  Cost 2  Hassle 
Index 
Importer‘s 
Population 
1.269 
(0.820) 
1.224 
(0.677) 
2.738*** 
(0.741) 
2.365** 
(0.740) 
3.014*** 
(0.726) 
2.548*** 
(0.730) 
2.314*** 
(0.688) 
1.056 
(0.976) 
Importer‘s GDP 0.697*** 
(0.183) 
0.381** 
(0.124) 
0.269* 
(0.131) 
0.265 
(0.142) 
0.228 
(0.128) 
0.273* 
(0.130) 
0.287* 
(0.121) 
0.728*** 
(0.220) 
Exporter‘s 
Population 
1.527* 
(0.665) 
0.0329 
(0.784) 
0.768 
(0.787) 
0.738 
(0.803) 
1.027 
(0.790) 
0.572 
(0.765) 
0.399 
(0.750) 
1.401 
(1.003) 
Exporter‘s GDP 0.447** 
(0.151) 
0.697*** 
(0.161) 
0.603*** 
(0.172) 
0.596*** 
(0.166) 
0.563*** 
(0.161) 
0.622*** 
(0.173) 
0.628*** 
(0.160) 
0.479** 
(0.182) 
Language 0.237*** 
(0.0579) 
-0.0782 
(0.146) 
-0.664*** 
(0.163) 
-0.434** 
(0.157) 
-0.308* 
(0.149) 
-0.464** 
(0.163) 
-0.233 
(0.145) 
0.431*** 
(0.0715) 
Adjacency -0.850*** 
(0.143) 
1.977*** 
(0.179) 
1.486*** 
(0.158) 
2.315*** 
(0.174) 
1.883*** 
(0.172) 
1.769*** 
(0.167) 
1.721*** 
(0.165) 
0.408*** 
(0.110) 
Importer‘s Tariff 0.00511 
(0.0427) 
0.00413 
(0.0521) 
0.0127 
(0.0579) 
0.00452 
(0.0578) 
0.00728 
(0.0549) 
0.00918 
(0.0578) 
0.0114 
(0.0531) 
0.0216 
(0.0637) 
Importer 
Landlocked 
2.149* 
(0.917) 
1.618* 
(0.718) 
2.321** 
(0.795) 
2.366** 
(0.782) 
2.776*** 
(0.775) 
2.573*** 
(0.771) 
2.264** 
(0.735) 
1.481 
(1.065) 
COMESA 0.629** 
(0.202) 
-0.125 
(0.219) 
-0.376* 
(0.189) 
-0.519 
(0.277) 
-0.508* 
(0.229) 
-0.396* 
(0.192) 
-0.382* 
(0.187) 
0.626* 
(0.250) 
EAC 2.889*** 
(0.261) 
1.623*** 
(0.287) 
1.133*** 
(0.260) 
1.710*** 
(0.336) 
1.561*** 
(0.285) 
1.493*** 
(0.261) 
1.513*** 
(0.258) 
4.405*** 
(0.296) 
SACU -5.619*** 
(0.623) 
-6.168*** 
(0.287) 
-6.162*** 
(0.542) 
-6.168*** 
(0.544) 
-6.027*** 
(0.547) 
-6.036*** 
(0.546) 
-6.065*** 
(0.555) 
-5.029*** 
(0.577) 
SADC 1.304*** 
(0.191) 
-0.030 
(0.172) 
-0.0722 
(0.147) 
0.0486 
(0.168) 
0.0229 
(0.157) 
-0.0141 
(0.162) 
-0.0413 
(0.162) 
3.195*** 
(0.182) 
Distance -1.045*** 
(0.0755) 
       
Transport Price  -0.630*** 
(0.072) 
      
Transport Time   -1.027*** 
(0.0871) 
     
Variability in 
percent 
   0.0657 
(0.0675) 
    
Variability in 
hours 
    -0.377*** 
(0.0696) 
   
Cost 1       -1.063*** 
(0.0995) 
  
Cost 2        -0.965*** 
(0.0938) 
 
Hassle Index        0.587* 
(0.257) 
Constant -2.223 
(3.618) 
0.639 
(3.329) 
-4.884 
(3.211) 
-10.27** 
(3.296) 
-9.829** 
(3.298) 
-0.407 
(3.322) 
0.123 
(3.262) 
-13.85** 
(4.992) 
Number of Obs. 4620 3900 3900 3900 3900 3900 3900 3900 
Pseudo R-sq 0.986 0.930 0.935 0.925 0.928 0.933 0.933 0.981 
RESET test p-
values 
0.5175 0.1069 0.0168 0.0001 0.4726 0.2207 0.2608 0.0004 
IMPORTER – FIXED EFFECT, EXPORTER – FIXED EFFECT and  TIME  FIXED EFFECT 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01 and ***p<0.001  
28 
 
 
 
We ran each of seven transport performance variables for each year. Overall, the cross-section 
regressions coefficients of transport performance in each year do not differ from the pooled 
estimation. The coefficients of transport performance that are significant with the expected sign in 
the pooled regression remain significant with the expected sign in the cross-section regressions. 
We tested each transport performance variable to see whether trade follows the same size of a 
regression coefficient for each year (1999 – 2008). We found that coefficients for each of seven 
transport performance variables do not differ across years in Chow tests (Table 3-4). We present 
the regression results for each of seven transport performance variables for each year in the 
appendix. 
Table 3-4: Chow Test for Each Transport Performance whether trade follow the same size 
of a regression coefficient for each year (1999 – 2008)  
Variable The Null Hypothesis: Import value follows that same size of a regression 
coefficient across years (1999-2008) 
 Chi2 Prob > Chi2 Interpretation 
ln_price 3.71 0.9294 Fail to reject the null H. Do not differ significantly 
ln_time 5.22 0.8143 Fail to reject the null H. Do not differ significantly 
ln_varpct 2.33 0.9851 Fail to reject the null H. Do not differ significantly 
ln_varhrs 5.95 0.7452 Fail to reject the null H. Do not differ significantly 
ln_cost1 4.26 0.8933 Fail to reject the null H. Do not differ significantly 
ln_cost2 6.72 0.5669 Fail to reject the null H. Do not differ significantly 
ln_hassle 0.77 0.9998 Fail to reject the null H. Do not differ significantly 
Source: Authors‘ calculation 
In order to see if intra regional trade is affected more by distance and other transport variables, 
the regressions were reported for bilateral trade among only the countries of SEA. In every 
regression in table 3-5, transport performance variables are significant and negative, with the 
exception of the hassle index. In comparison of the results with the worldwide regressions, we 
find that on average coefficients of the intra-SEA regressions are higher than ones of the whole 
sample. This implies that intra trade of the SEA countries has higher sensitivity to distance and to 
transport performance. 
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Table 3-5: Gravity model regression with measures of transport performance (SEA 1999-2008)  
 Distance Transport 
price 
Transport 
time 
Variability 
in percent 
Variability 
in hours 
Cost 1  Cost 2  Hassle 
Index 
Importer‘s 
Population 
-3.611** 
(1.275) 
-1.907 
(1.378) 
-3.184* 
(1.368) 
-2.544 
(1.337) 
-3.343* 
(1.370) 
-2.207 
(1.362) 
-2.308 
(1.357) 
-2.614* 
(1.273) 
Importer‘s GDP 0.619*** 
(0.152) 
0.434* 
(0.172) 
0.531*** 
(0.156) 
0.431** 
(0.163) 
0.551*** 
(0.154) 
0.477** 
(0.167) 
0.490** 
(0.165) 
0.472** 
(0.172) 
Exporter‘s 
Population 
6.775** 
(2.120) 
7.579** 
(2.437) 
6.941** 
(2.403) 
7.393** 
(2.516) 
6.715** 
(2.404) 
7.383** 
(2.415) 
7.285** 
(2.409) 
6.737** 
(2.277) 
Exporter‘s GDP 0.573* 
(0.272) 
0.544 
(0.283) 
0.525* 
(0.263) 
0.504 
(0.300) 
0.529* 
(0.261) 
0.546* 
(0.275) 
0.548* 
(0.273) 
0.580* 
(0.295) 
Language -2.739*** 
(0.390) 
-1.129*** 
(0.244) 
-1.367*** 
(0.200) 
-1.525*** 
(0.291) 
-1.266*** 
(0.204) 
-1.100*** 
(0.227) 
-1.072*** 
(0.227) 
-1.697*** 
(0.269) 
Adjacency 0.327* 
(0.134) 
1.039*** 
(0.135) 
0.940*** 
(0.126) 
0.940*** 
(0.107) 
0.788*** 
(0.122) 
1.064*** 
(0.126) 
1.053*** 
(0.125) 
1.177*** 
(0.137) 
Importer‘s Tariff 0.204* 
(0.0999) 
0.266** 
(0.103) 
0.219* 
(0.0987) 
0.231* 
(0.0995) 
0.207* 
(0.0971) 
0.258* 
(0.102) 
0.254* 
(0.102) 
0.218* 
(0.105) 
Importer 
Landlocked 
-3.577** 
(1.386) 
-1.143 
(1.459) 
-4.654** 
(1.536) 
-1.446 
(1.447) 
-4.370** 
(1.518) 
-1.992 
(1.461) 
-2.144 
(1.458) 
-2.930 
(1.971) 
COMESA -1.322*** 
(0.228) 
0.169 
(0.277) 
-0.0257 
(0.252) 
0.395 
(0.211) 
0.351 
(0.257) 
0.0578 
(0.260) 
0.0826 
(0.259) 
-0.0908 
(0.223) 
EAC 0.958*** 
(0.230) 
1.986*** 
(0.250) 
1.214*** 
(0.229) 
2.663*** 
(0.282) 
1.513*** 
(0.241) 
1.763*** 
(0.238) 
1.755*** 
(0.237) 
2.189*** 
(0.244) 
SACU -4.456*** 
(0.621) 
-3.938*** 
(0.552) 
-3.970*** 
(0.502) 
-4.075*** 
(0.546) 
-4.027*** 
(0.485) 
-3.864*** 
(0.545) 
-3.848*** 
(0.543) 
-3.999*** 
(0.555) 
SADC 0.173 
(0.137) 
0.308 
(0.163) 
0.0198 
(0.144) 
0.213 
(0.149) 
-0.0294 
(0.141) 
0.220 
(0.160) 
0.192 
(0.159) 
0.394* 
(0.159) 
Distance -1.429*** 
(0.124) 
       
Transport Price  -0.574*** 
(0.112) 
      
Transport Time   -1.259*** 
(0.139) 
     
Variability in 
percent 
   -2.331*** 
(0.345) 
    
Variability in 
hours 
    -1.205*** 
(0.121) 
   
Cost 1       -0.891*** 
(0.132) 
  
Cost 2        -0.938*** 
(0.128) 
 
Hassle Index        2.115 
(2.966) 
Constant 9.178 
(5.667) 
-6.812 
(7.374) 
2.121 
(6.447) 
4.807 
(7.862) 
3.809 
(6.401) 
-2.270 
(7.095) 
-1.204 
(7.018) 
-17.30 
(15.07) 
Number of Obs. 2310 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2310 
Pseudo R-sq 0.901 0.893 0.904 0.893 0.907 0.897 0.899 0.882 
IMPORTER – FIXED EFFECT, EXPORTER – FIXED EFFECT and  TIME  FIXED EFFECT 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01 and ***p<0.001 
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In addition, the coefficients of basic gravity-model variables in the intra-SEA regressions remain 
the same as the worldwide regressions. The effects of the landlocked dummy became associated 
with lower trade in the intra-SEA regressions. This implies that being a landlocked of SEA 
country creates an obstacle to SEA intra-trade.  
Next we divided the SEA sample into the landlocked SEA countries and the coastal SEA 
countries and dropped the landlocked dummy. At first glance, we found that five of eight 
transport performance coefficients for the landlocked SEA countries are higher in absolute terms 
than the coefficients for the coastal SEA countries. These results imply that the trade of the 
landlocked SEA countries has higher sensitivity to distance, to transport time, to variability in 
percent, to variability in hours, and to the hassle index than the trade of the coastal SEA countries 
(Table 3-6 and Table 3-7). For instance the coefficient of variability as percent of mean time is -
1.577 for landlocked SEA countries and -1.237 for coastal SEA countries. This result means that 
the trade of the landlocked SEA countries is thirty percent more sensitive to variability as percent 
of mean time than the trade of the coastal SEA countries.  
There are three cases, however where the transport performance has a greater effect on trade of 
the coastal SEA countries, namely price, cost 1 and cost 2. Given that the last two variables are 
more comprehensive measures of transport performance, the results imply that the coastal SEA 
countries have higher elasticities. Perhaps this is due to the availability of more transport 
alternatives. 
Therefore, there is no indication that the trade of landlocked SEA countries has higher sensitivity 
to the transport performance than the trade of coastal SEA countries. It should be noted that even 
though the elasticities are less in some measures, there is a substantial effect on landlocked SEA 
countries because their transport costs are much larger. 
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Table 3-6: Gravity model regression with measures of transport performance (landlocked SEA 1999-2008)  
 Distance Transpor
t price 
Transport 
time 
Variability 
in percent 
Variabilit
y in hours 
Cost 1  Cost 2  Hassle 
Index 
Importer‘s 
Population 
-2.286 
(1.536) 
-0.720 
(1.700) 
-1.445 
(1.701) 
-1.003 
(1.682) 
-1.532 
(1.708) 
-0.768 
(1.698) 
-0.807 
(1.697) 
-1.509 
(1.496) 
Importer‘s GDP 0.731*** 
(0.184) 
0.494* 
(0.210) 
0.534** 
(0.195) 
0.485* 
(0.200) 
0.541** 
(0.191) 
0.527* 
(0.205) 
0.535** 
(0.204) 
0.605** 
(0.211) 
Exporter‘s 
Population 
6.556* 
(2.739) 
7.153* 
(3.427) 
6.578 
(3.417) 
7.085* 
(3.583) 
6.523 
(3.470) 
6.785* 
(3.415) 
6.697* 
(3.413) 
7.186* 
(2.935) 
Exporter‘s GDP 0.201 
(0.252) 
0.107 
(0.291) 
0.109 
(0.298) 
0.0726 
(0.276) 
0.103 
(0.289) 
0.123 
(0.297) 
0.127 
(0.298) 
0.258 
(0.275) 
Language -0.470** 
(0.173) 
-0.544 
(0.321) 
-0.207 
(0.233) 
-0.602* 
(0.285) 
-0.212 
(0.234) 
-0.121 
(0.286) 
-0.0557 
(0.276) 
-1.043*** 
(0.306) 
Adjacency -0.0293 
(0.140) 
1.263*** 
(0.148) 
0.912*** 
(0.147) 
1.176*** 
(0.114) 
0.781*** 
(0.143) 
1.191*** 
(0.150) 
1.167*** 
(0.150) 
1.234*** 
(0.142) 
Importer‘s Tariff 0.0941 
(0.135) 
0.324* 
(0.153) 
0.228 
(0.143) 
0.306* 
(0.145) 
0.213 
(0.142) 
0.303* 
(0.150) 
0.296* 
(0.149) 
0.222 
(0.150) 
COMESA -1.631*** 
(0.270) 
0.381 
(0.290) 
0.200 
(0.266) 
0.690*** 
(0.208) 
0.536 
(0.276) 
0.267 
(0.284) 
0.279 
(0.283) 
0.0875 
(0.233) 
EAC 0.343 
(0.258) 
1.627*** 
(0.334) 
0.309 
(0.322) 
1.923*** 
(0.290) 
0.267 
(0.299) 
1.036** 
(0.347) 
0.889* 
(0.351) 
1.797*** 
(0.284) 
SACU         
SADC -0.198 
(0.157) 
0.161 
(0.199) 
-0.0838 
(0.177) 
0.109 
(0.191) 
-0.115 
(0.175) 
0.755 
(0.193) 
0.0536 
(0.191) 
0.253 
(0.205) 
Distance -2.125*** 
(0.160) 
       
Transport Price  -0.273** 
(0.105) 
      
Transport Time   -1.038*** 
(0.136) 
     
Variability in 
percent 
   -1.577** 
(0.550) 
    
Variability in 
hours 
    -1.071*** 
(0.117) 
   
Cost 1       -
0.710*** 
(0.131) 
  
Cost 2        -
0.796*** 
(0.137) 
 
Hassle Index        -15.48*** 
(3.860) 
Constant 6.500 
(5.837) 
-12.61 
(8.230) 
-7.305 
(7.404) 
-4.648 
(10.40) 
-5.670 
(7.469) 
-8.583 
(8.035) 
-7.610 
(7.972) 
73.86*** 
(20.24) 
Number of Obs. 1386 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1386 
Pseudo R-sq 0.933 0.906 0.917 0.908 0.918 0.910 0.911 0.905 
IMPORTER – FIXED EFFECT, EXPORTER – FIXED EFFECT and  TIME  FIXED EFFECT 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01 and ***p<0.001  
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Table 3-7: Gravity model regression with measures of transport performance (Coastal SEA 1999-
2008)  
 Distance Transport 
price 
Transport 
time 
Variability 
in percent 
Variabilit
y in hours 
Cost 1  Cost 2  Hassle 
Index 
Importer‘s 
Population 
-11.67*** 
(3.001) 
-11.03*** 
(3.073) 
-11.03*** 
(3.073) 
-10.63*** 
(3.028) 
-10.95*** 
(3.063) 
-10.75*** 
(3.029) 
-10.77*** 
(3.030) 
-11.62*** 
(3.012) 
Importer‘s GDP 0.547** 
(0.184) 
0.511** 
(0.196) 
0.511** 
(0.196) 
0.461* 
(0.197) 
0.507** 
(0.195) 
0.486* 
(0.192) 
0.490* 
(0.192) 
0.534** 
(0.182) 
Exporter‘s 
Population 
0.140 
(2.290) 
1.229 
(2.377) 
1.229 
(2.377) 
1.476 
(2.367) 
1.172 
(2.379) 
1.841 
(2.338) 
1.750 
(2.345) 
0.178 
(2.299) 
Exporter‘s GDP 1.086*** 
(0.258 ) 
0.999*** 
(0.261) 
0.999*** 
(0.261) 
0.987*** 
(0.257) 
1.000*** 
(0.258) 
0.974*** 
(0.255) 
0.978*** 
(0.255) 
1.092*** 
(0.259) 
Language -1.354*** 
(0.299) 
-0.887** 
(0.271) 
-1.244*** 
(0.266) 
-1.067*** 
(0.260) 
-1.148*** 
(0.264) 
-1.047*** 
(0.265) 
-1.036*** 
(0.264) 
-1.206*** 
(0.262) 
Adjacency 0.996*** 
(0.204) 
0.975*** 
(0.167) 
0.951*** 
(0.165) 
1.131*** 
(0.179) 
0.926*** 
(0.159) 
0.907*** 
(0.162) 
0.907*** 
(0.159) 
1.211*** 
(0.198) 
Importer‘s 
Tariff 
0.0786 
(0.112) 
0.0987 
(0.112) 
0.100 
(0.114) 
0.101 
(0.113) 
0.0989 
(0.113) 
0.098*** 
(0.113) 
0.0975 
(0.112) 
0.0774 
(0.112) 
COMESA -0.806* 
(0.346) 
0.145 
(0.267) 
0.142 
(0.300) 
-0.0862 
(0.243) 
0.283 
(0.292) 
0.182 
(0.273) 
0.213 
(0.272) 
-0.172 
(0.255) 
EAC 3.063*** 
(0.473) 
3.396*** 
(0.367) 
3.260*** 
(0.406) 
3.944*** 
(0.376) 
3.461*** 
(0.389) 
3.320*** 
(0.378) 
3.362*** 
(0.377) 
3.873*** 
(0.348) 
SACU -3.498*** 
(0.714) 
-3.631*** 
(0.740) 
-3.783*** 
(0.727) 
-3.724*** 
(0.797) 
-3.830*** 
(0.748) 
-3.693*** 
(0.742) 
-3.721*** 
(0.749) 
-3.581*** 
(0.756) 
SADC -0.306* 
(0.142) 
-0.315* 
(0.143) 
-0.406** 
(0.152) 
-0.323* 
(0.148) 
-0.398** 
(0.151) 
-0.362* 
(0.147) 
-0.370* 
(0.147) 
-0.271 
(0.139) 
Distance -0.529* 
(0.243) 
       
Transport Price  -1.076*** 
(0.187) 
      
Transport Time   -0.990*** 
(0.177) 
     
Variability in 
percent 
   -1.237*** 
(0.429) 
    
Variability in 
hours 
    -0.868*** 
(0.157) 
   
Cost 1       -1.267*** 
(0.203) 
  
Cost 2        -1.242*** 
(0.197) 
 
Hassle Index        10.16** 
(3.250) 
Constant 44.37*** 
(12.65) 
42.77** 
(13.22) 
43.32** 
(13.30) 
42.77** 
(13.46) 
43.18** 
(13.27) 
46.51*** 
(13.30) 
46.71*** 
(13.29 ) 
-12.98 
(20.48) 
Number of Obs. 924 840 840 840 840 840 840 924 
Pseudo R-sq 0.940 0.946 0.945 0.944 0.945 0.946 0.946 0.941 
IMPORTER – FIXED EFFECT, EXPORTER – FIXED EFFECT and  TIME  FIXED EFFECT 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01 and ***p<0.001   
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3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter studies the effect of new measures of transport performance on international trade 
among 15 counties in southern and eastern Africa and on the international trade of those countries 
with six other regions in the world. The RESET test indicates estimates with country and time 
fixed effects performed better in terms of explained variance. We find that most of the transport 
variables and distance have similar negative effects on trade. The results indicate that a 10 percent 
reduction in transport costs increases trade volumes by about 10 percent. Our results are 
substantially smaller in absolute terms to those found elsewhere in the literatures. We also find 
that coefficients for each of seven transport performance measures do not differ significantly 
across years 
The PPML estimator indicates that intra-regional trade of the SEA countries has higher sensitivity 
to distance and to transport performance than the worldwide trade. In addition we find that that 
being landlocked of SEA countries show an obstacle to SEA intra-trade but there is no indication 
that the trade of landlocked SEA countries has higher sensitivity to the transport performance 
than the trade of coastal SEA countries.  
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3.8 Appendix 
Table A3-1: Regression with measures of transport performance (Panel 1999-2008) _NO FIXED EFFECT 
 Distance Transport 
price 
Transport 
time 
Variability 
in percent 
Variability 
in hours 
Cost 1  Cost 2  Hassle 
Index 
Importer‘s 
Population 
-0.171*** 
(0.0483) 
-0.172*** 
(0.0562) 
0.045 
(0.0606) 
0.042 
(0.0582) 
0.005 
(0.0589) 
0.012 
(0.0606) 
-0.113* 
(0.0565) 
-0.188*** 
(0.0467) 
Importer‘s GDP 0.851*** 
(0.0304) 
0.994*** 
(0.0293) 
0.843*** 
(0.0367) 
0.882*** 
(0.0355) 
0.829*** 
(0.0362) 
0.899*** 
(0.0345) 
0.885*** 
(0.0304) 
1.042*** 
(0.0403) 
Exporter‘s 
Population 
0.221*** 
(0.0382) 
-0.029 
(0.0578) 
0.073 
(0.0623) 
0.020 
(0.0563) 
0.0072 
(0.0568) 
0.074 
(0.0639) 
-0.004 
(0.0566) 
0.165*** 
(0.0453) 
Exporter‘s GDP 0.697*** 
(0.0246) 
0.964*** 
(0.2788) 
0.858*** 
(0.0312) 
0.888*** 
(0.0322) 
0.832*** 
(0.0323) 
0.896*** 
(0.0285) 
0.871*** 
(0.0271) 
0.907*** 
(0.0424) 
Language -0.566*** 
(0.0673) 
0.227 
(0.1066) 
-0.356** 
(0.1117) 
0.033 
(0.1239) 
-0.022 
(0.1205) 
-0.280* 
(0.1152) 
-0.137 
(0.1097) 
0.364*** 
(0.1026) 
Adjacency -0.807*** 
(0.1643) 
2.388*** 
(0.3630) 
1.480*** 
(0.2505) 
2.753*** 
(0.3892) 
2.123*** 
(0.2982) 
1.368*** 
(0.1728) 
1.714*** 
(0.2406) 
-0.072 
(0.1336) 
Importer‘s Tariff -0.059 
(0.0547) 
0.031 
(0.0602) 
0.005 
(0.0713) 
0.015 
(0.0712) 
-0.017 
(0.0687) 
0.001 
(0.0652) 
-0.002 
(0.0582) 
-0.082 
(0.0719) 
Importer 
Landlocked 
-0.914*** 
(0.1152) 
0.113 
(0.0882) 
-0.054 
(0.0893) 
-0.058 
(0.0988) 
0.025 
(0.0918) 
0.192* 
(0.0862) 
0.169* 
(0.0817) 
-0.502** 
(0.1452) 
COMESA -0.213 
(0.2013) 
0.137 
(0.2078) 
-0.245 
(0.1909) 
-0.085 
(0.2496) 
0.013 
(0.1922) 
-0.594** 
(0.2047) 
-0.336 
(0.2055) 
0.409 
(0.2753) 
EAC 1.890*** 
(0.2969) 
1.903*** 
(0.4108) 
1.104*** 
(0.2832) 
1.989*** 
(0.4806) 
1.484*** 
(0.3526) 
1.331*** 
(0.2303) 
1.789*** 
(0.2669) 
4.139*** 
(0.3514) 
SACU -5.308*** 
(0.5598) 
-6.081*** 
(0.5300) 
-6.199*** 
(0.5191) 
-6.269*** 
(0.5353) 
-6.269*** 
(0.5267) 
-5.889*** 
(0.5304) 
-6.051*** 
(0.5182) 
-4.568*** 
(0.5767) 
SADC -0.949*** 
(0.2043) 
1.554*** 
(0.3784) 
0.889*** 
(0.2685) 
1.868*** 
(0.4113) 
1.298*** 
(0.3265) 
0.252 
(0.1790) 
0.894*** 
(0.2589) 
3.141*** 
(0.2177) 
Distance -1.00*** 
(0.0770) 
       
Transport Price  -0.747*** 
(0.0563) 
      
Transport Time   -1.141*** 
(0.0933) 
     
Variability in 
percent 
   -0.313*** 
(0.0571) 
    
Variability in 
hours 
    -0.459*** 
(0.0519) 
   
Cost 1       -1.220*** 
(0.0722) 
  
Cost 2        -1.204*** 
(0.0766) 
 
Hassle Index        0.923*** 
(0.1417) 
Constant 6.804*** 
(0.7249) 
2.317*** 
(0.6622) 
4.056*** 
(0.7017) 
-2.576*** 
(0.5537) 
0.137 
(0.6204) 
8.853*** 
(0.7085) 
8.491*** 
(0.8499) 
-8.899*** 
(1.0514) 
Number of Obs. 4620 3900 3900 3900 3900 3900 3900 4620 
Pseudo R-sq 0.971 0.866 0.8710 0.8476 0.8616 0.8788 0.8802 0.9647 
RESET  p-val. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0031 0.0296 0.2336 0.4650 
NO IMPORTER – FIXED EFFECT, NO EXPORTER – FIXED EFFECT and  NO TIME  FIXED EFFECT 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01 and ***p<0.001
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Table A3-2: Gravity model regression with Transport Price on Cross Section 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 2007 2008 
Importer‘s 
Population 
-1.437** 
(0.437) 
-0.502 
(0.798) 
1.472 
(8.679) 
0.423 
(1.323) 
-0.751 
(0.904) 
-0.744 
(0.961) 
-0.269 
(0.776) 
0.244 
(0.570) 
-0.126 
(0.490) 
0.427 
(0.567) 
Importer‘s GDP 1.744* 
(0.802) 
0.679 
(1.166) 
-2.863 
(14.97) 
-0.845 
(1.230) 
1.275 
(0.801) 
1.600 
(1.256) 
0.955 
(1.061) 
0.418 
(0.594) 
0.728 
(0.425) 
0.351 
(0.403) 
Exporter‘s 
Population 
-1.335 
(0.975) 
-1.413 
(0.799) 
6.066 
(6.660) 
0.353 
(0.892) 
-0.174 
(0.622) 
-0.740 
(0.760) 
-1.638* 
(0.738) 
-1.146* 
(0.532) 
-1.356* 
(0.559) 
-0.671 
(0.497) 
Exporter‘s GDP 1.480* 
(0.689) 
1.383 
(0.847) 
-12.14 
(12.01) 
-1.042 
(0.973) 
-0.224 
(0.553) 
0.259 
(1.185) 
0.990 
(0.653) 
0.786* 
(0.356) 
0.522 
(0.354) 
0.548* 
(0.266) 
Language -0.222 
(0.387) 
-0.253 
(0.332) 
0.322 
(0.406) 
0.0398 
(0.314) 
0.00826 
(0.375) 
0.107 
(0.367) 
0.00449 
(0.382) 
-0.0533 
(0.372) 
0.00205 
(0.355) 
0.053 
(0.294) 
Adjacency 0.893 
(0.473) 
1.765*** 
(0.492) 
1.767*** 
(0.502) 
2.032*** 
(0.431) 
2.106*** 
(0.421) 
1.918*** 
(0.435) 
1.841*** 
(0.529) 
2.012*** 
(0.570) 
1.926*** 
(0.484) 
1.853*** 
(0.474) 
Importer‘s Tariff 0.644 
(0.452) 
0.315 
(0.617) 
0.0173 
(0.356) 
-0.0966 
(0.514) 
-0.00213 
(0.314) 
0.0668 
(0.659) 
-0.325 
(0.532) 
1.173 
(0.893) 
-0.667 
(0.703) 
1.773* 
(0.903) 
Importer 
Landlocked 
0.230 
(0.468) 
0.344 
(0.886) 
-1.141 
(5.886) 
-0.341 
(0.474) 
0.448 
(0.391) 
0.581 
(0.502) 
0.456 
(0.441) 
0.392 
(0.304) 
0.301 
(0.295) 
0.364 
(0.250) 
COMESA 0.524 
(0.387) 
-0.0065 
(0.421) 
-0.305 
(0.455) 
0.112 
(0.425) 
0.400 
(0.429) 
0.136 
(0.397) 
0.620 
(0.626) 
0.296 
(0.625) 
-0.558 
(0.502) 
-0.666 
(0.510) 
EAC 2.979*** 
(0.756) 
2.214** 
(0.744) 
2.512*** 
(0.748) 
1.735* 
(0.703) 
1.390* 
(0.628) 
1.625* 
(0.707) 
1.630* 
(0.795) 
1.680* 
(0.818) 
2.049** 
(0.693) 
2.274** 
(0.746) 
SACU   -9.776*** 
(0.733) 
-6.734*** 
(1.302) 
-6.979*** 
(1.419) 
-6.833*** 
(1.308) 
-6.496*** 
(1.301) 
-6.656*** 
(1.326) 
-6.034*** 
(1.274) 
-5.185*** 
(1.285) 
SADC 0.240 
(0.508) 
-0.700 
(0.624) 
-0.0276 
(0.593) 
-0.415 
(0.531) 
-0.684 
(0.691) 
0.644 
(0.412) 
0.607 
(0.437) 
0.690 
(0.487) 
0.338 
(0.374) 
0.530 
(0.421) 
Transport Price -0.690*** 
(0.203) 
-0.591** 
(0.194) 
-0.659*** 
(0.175) 
-0.641*** 
(0.162) 
-0.718*** 
(0.168) 
-0.625*** 
(0.186) 
-0.791** 
(0.243) 
-0.742*** 
(0.223) 
-0.655** 
(0.249) 
-0.7688*** 
(0.190) 
Constant 7.292* 
(3.253) 
6.701 
(4.961) 
8.648 
(5.032) 
7.032* 
(3.305) 
7.232** 
(2.611) 
5.793 
(3.453) 
9.226* 
(4.012) 
3.568 
(4.516) 
9.775* 
(4.275) 
1.452 
(4.002) 
Number of Obs. 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
Pseudo R-sq 0.951 0.943 0.939 0.941 0.938 0.941 0.931 0.928 0.937 0.939 
IMPORTER – FIXED EFFECT, EXPORTER – FIXED EFFECT and  TIME  FIXED EFFECT 
The Null Hypothesis: Import value follows that same size of a regression coefficient across years (1999-2008) 
Chi2 = 3.71, Prob > Chi2 = 0.9294, and Fail to reject the null Hypothesis. 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01 and ***p<0.001  
3
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Table A3-3: Gravity model regression with Transport Time on Cross Section 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 2007 2008 
Importer‘s 
Population 
-1.543*** 
(0.319) 
-0.00935 
(0.837) 
-2.804 
(7.926) 
-0.198 
(1.219) 
-1.322 
(0.819) 
-1.328 
(0.899) 
-0.600 
(0.694) 
0.126 
(0.503) 
-0.243 
(0.401) 
0.307 
(0.456) 
Importer‘s GDP 1.393* 
(0.655) 
-0.0128 
(1.142) 
4.502 
(13.67) 
-0.208 
(1.167) 
1.819* 
(0.760) 
2.717* 
(1.166) 
1.698 
(1.083) 
0.898 
(0.534) 
1.120** 
(0.383) 
0.752* 
(0.306) 
Exporter‘s 
Population 
-1.339 
(0.934) 
-1.295 
(0.816) 
5.124 
(6.795) 
0.204 
(0.854) 
-0.337 
(0.625) 
-0.954 
(0.781) 
-1.500* 
(0.732) 
-1.129* 
(0.529) 
-1.175* 
(0.549) 
-0.622 
(0.488) 
Exporter‘s GDP 1.479* 
(0.732) 
1.215 
(0.884) 
-10.37 
(12.34) 
-0.893 
(0.984) 
0.190 
(0.625) 
0.562 
(1.257) 
1.409 
(0.737) 
0.955** 
(0.359) 
0.730* 
(0.336) 
0.681** 
(0.230) 
Language -0.824 
(0.511) 
-0.785* 
(0.381) 
-0.225 
(0.493) 
-0.576 
(0.362) 
-0.748 
(0.473) 
-0.386 
(0.434) 
-0.761 
(0.431) 
-0.710 
(0.407) 
-0.593 
(0.380) 
-0.517 
(0.297) 
Adjacency 0.248 
(0.442) 
1.190* 
(0.464) 
1.293** 
(0.481) 
1.514*** 
(0.394) 
1.677*** 
(0.369) 
1.750*** 
(0.425) 
1.563*** 
(0.462) 
1.679*** 
(0.480) 
1.542*** 
(0.416) 
1.272*** 
(0.383) 
Importer‘s Tariff 0.561 
(0.396) 
0.725 
(0.674) 
0.151 
(0.339) 
0.142 
(0.596) 
0.299 
(0.304) 
0.328 
(0.768) 
0.0226 
(0.480) 
1.312 
(0.850) 
-0.400 
(0.593) 
2.308* 
(0.924) 
Importer 
Landlocked 
-0.868* 
(0.353) 
-0.288 
(0.825) 
1.006 
(5.361) 
-0.921* 
(0.375) 
-0.236 
(0.338) 
0.341 
(0.439) 
-0.0439 
(0.418) 
-0.173 
(0.297) 
-0.213 
(0.235) 
-0.128 
(0.247) 
COMESA -0.0237 
(0.397) 
-0.471 
(0.445) 
-0.574 
(0.418) 
-0.247 
(0.416) 
-0.0269 
(0.419) 
-0.128 
(0.419) 
0.237 
(0.592) 
0.0167 
(0.548) 
-0.809* 
(0.403) 
-0.909* 
(0.402) 
EAC 2.752*** 
(0.515) 
2.023*** 
(0.532) 
2.169*** 
(0.554) 
1.470** 
(0.503) 
1.092* 
(0.527) 
1.049 
(0.621) 
0.877 
(0.744) 
0.875 
(0.811) 
1.263 
(0.671) 
1.469 
(0.777) 
SACU   -9.561*** 
(0.822) 
-6.614*** 
(1.327) 
-7.043*** 
(1.421) 
-6.918*** 
(1.324) 
-6.703*** 
(1.314) 
-6.823*** 
(1.334) 
-6.148*** 
(1.237) 
-5.229*** 
(1.238) 
SADC -0.0318 
(0.460) 
-0.836 
(0.575) 
-0.144 
(0.536) 
-0.526 
(0.479) 
-0.691 
(0.598) 
0.393 
(0.406) 
0.402 
(0.418) 
0.476 
(0.471) 
0.117 
(0.331) 
0.430 
(0.387) 
Transport Time -1.128*** 
(0.192) 
-1.008*** 
(0.199) 
-0.857*** 
(0.241) 
-0.948*** 
(0.187) 
-1.024*** 
(0.200) 
-0.776*** 
(0.217) 
-1.081*** 
(0.227) 
-1.104*** 
(0.232) 
-1.086*** 
(0.237) 
-1.308*** 
(0.184) 
Constant 10.72*** 
(2.585) 
7.394 
(4.805) 
6.598 
(4.549) 
8.505** 
(3.067) 
8.191*** 
(2.376) 
4.615 
(3.405) 
7.329* 
(3.544) 
3.269 
(3.829) 
9.389** 
(3.382) 
1.004 
(3.604) 
Number of Obs. 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
Pseudo R-sq 0.956 0.949 0.942 0.945 0.942 0.943 0.935 0.934 0.943 0.950 
IMPORTER – FIXED EFFECT, EXPORTER – FIXED EFFECT and  TIME  FIXED EFFECT 
The Null Hypothesis: Import value follows that same size of a regression coefficient across years (1999-2008) 
Chi2 = 5.22 , Prob > Chi2 = 0.8143 , and Fail to reject the null Hypothesis. 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01 and ***p<0.001  36 
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Table A3-4: Gravity model regression with Variability in percent on Cross Section 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 2007 2008 
Importer‘s 
Population 
-1.312** 
(0.465) 
-0.423 
(0.774) 
-0.951 
(9.211) 
0.132 
(1.394) 
-0.999 
(1.014) 
-0.839 
(1.129) 
-0.214 
(0.976) 
0.272 
(0.689) 
-0.0212 
(0.604) 
0.366 
(0.632) 
Importer‘s GDP 1.451 
(0.880) 
0.369 
(1.190) 
1.369 
(15.83) 
-0.628 
(1.281) 
1.404 
(0.829) 
1.752 
(1.404) 
0.857 
(1.370) 
0.342 
(0.732) 
0.648 
(0.514) 
0.377 
(0.451) 
Exporter‘s 
Population 
-1.275 
(0.858) 
-1.706** 
(0.644) 
5.505 
(6.267) 
0.280 
(0.913) 
-0.223 
(0.612) 
-0.700 
(0.836) 
-1.332 
(0.814) 
-1.183* 
(0.526) 
-1.115 
(0.598) 
-0.809 
(0.461) 
Exporter‘s GDP 1.305* 
(0.660) 
1.549* 
(0.751) 
-11.22 
(11.19) 
-1.254 
(0.935) 
-0.224 
(0.553) 
-0.0198 
(1.217) 
-0.895 
(0.769) 
0.708 
(0.392) 
0.492 
(0.357) 
-0.506* 
(0.250) 
Language -0.520 
(0.488) 
-0.508 
(0.384) 
-0.0421 
(0.486) 
-0.298 
(0.394) 
-0.411 
(0.482) 
-0.144 
(0.432) 
-0.493 
(0.432) 
-0.487 
(0.411) 
-0.450 
(0.375) 
-0.372 
(0.318) 
Adjacency 1.318** 
(0.439) 
2.046*** 
(0.468) 
2.181*** 
(0.486) 
2.325*** 
(0.425) 
2.459*** 
(0.430) 
2.251*** 
(0.476) 
2.334*** 
(0.560) 
2.479*** 
(0.585) 
2.337*** 
(0.490) 
2.256*** 
(0.464) 
Importer‘s Tariff 0.868 
(0.484) 
0.317 
(0.582) 
0.265 
(0.411) 
-0.0718 
(0.542) 
0.240 
(0.382) 
0.250 
(0.687) 
-0.0235 
(0.604) 
1.210 
(0.868) 
-0.297 
(0.781) 
1.524 
(0.830) 
Importer 
Landlocked 
-0.320 
(0.516) 
-0.170 
(0.875) 
0.0416 
(6.227) 
-0.758 
(0.503) 
-0.0642 
(0.423) 
0.202 
(0.539) 
-0.0309 
(0.528) 
-0.103 
(0.363) 
-0.0246 
(0.290) 
-0.00847 
(0.289) 
COMESA 0.399 
(0.474) 
-0.255 
(0.537) 
-0.580 
(0.599) 
-0.159 
(0.548) 
0.0437 
(0.581) 
-0.219 
(0.648) 
0.0644 
(0.851) 
-0.249 
(0.847) 
-1.008 
(0.676) 
-1.239 
(0.710) 
EAC 2.493** 
(0.850) 
2.073* 
(0.860) 
2.256* 
(0.908) 
1.587 
(0.857) 
1.263 
(0.806) 
1.580 
(0.859) 
1.640 
(1.014) 
1.725 
(1.028) 
2.212* 
(0.862) 
2.623** 
(0.878) 
SACU   -9.662*** 
(0.698) 
-6.651*** 
(1.283) 
-6.762*** 
(1.411) 
-6.807*** 
(1.297) 
-6.590*** 
(1.276) 
-6.716*** 
(1.301) 
-6.162*** 
(1.279) 
-5.239*** 
(1.266) 
SADC 0.0921 
(0.521) 
-0.711 
(0.601) 
-0.0849 
(0.608) 
-0.405 
(0.519) 
-0.765 
(0.715) 
0.672 
(0.448) 
0.611 
(0.502) 
0.673 
(0.512) 
0.345 
(0.445) 
0.564 
(0.456) 
Variability in 
percent 
-0.0526 
(0.159) 
-0.0505 
(0.170) 
0.0752 
(0.169) 
-0.0370 
(0.165) 
-0.0490 
(0.183) 
0.0115 
(0.181) 
0.0723 
(0.179) 
0.0642 
(0.180) 
0.169 
(0.193) 
0.0871 
(0.166) 
Constant 1.928 
(3.032) 
3.290 
(5.047) 
1.247 
(5.193) 
3.216 
(3.648) 
2.143 
(3.359) 
0.601 
(3.578) 
1.302 
(4.400) 
-2.345 
(4.384) 
1.903 
(4.533) 
-3.918 
(3.687) 
Number of Obs. 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
Pseudo R-sq 0.947 0.940 0.935 0.936 0.931 0.937 0.922 0.920 0.932 0.932 
IMPORTER – FIXED EFFECT, EXPORTER – FIXED EFFECT and  TIME  FIXED EFFECT 
The Null Hypothesis: Import value follows that same size of a regression coefficient across years (1999-2008) 
Chi2 = 2.33 , Prob > Chi2 = 0.9851 , and Fail to reject the null Hypothesis. 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01 and ***p<0.001  37
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Table A3-5: Gravity model regression with Variability in hours on Cross Section 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 2007 2008 
Importer‘s 
Population 
-1.623*** 
(0.399) 
-0.199 
(0.813) 
-1.152 
(8.469) 
-0.0724 
(1.281) 
-1.428 
(0.883) 
-1.291 
(0.989) 
-0.628 
(0.844) 
-0.0471 
(0.602) 
-0.308 
(0.528) 
0.214 
(0.534) 
Importer‘s GDP 1.580* 
(0.767) 
0.244 
(1.140) 
1.474 
(14.55) 
-0.531 
(1.197) 
1.676* 
(0.749) 
2.345 
(1.242) 
1.329 
(1.218) 
0.674 
(0.626) 
0.950* 
(0.456) 
0.670 
(0.379) 
Exporter‘s 
Population 
-1.682 
(0.938) 
-1.701* 
(0.749) 
5.927 
(7.062) 
0.246 
(0.938) 
-0.479 
(0.622) 
-0.996 
(0.823) 
-1.642* 
(0.807) 
-1.361* 
(0.546) 
-1.326* 
(0.618) 
-0.833 
(0.494) 
Exporter‘s GDP 1.709* 
(0.833) 
1.578 
(0.893) 
-12.08 
(12.65) 
-1.199 
(1.007) 
0.0135 
(0.603) 
0.334 
(1.237) 
1.173 
(0.783) 
0.875* 
(0.405) 
0.689 
(0.388) 
0.703** 
(0.265) 
Language -0.397 
(0.432) 
-0.369 
(0.331) 
0.090 
(0.452) 
-0.221 
(0.342) 
-0.332 
(0.425) 
-0.121 
(0.410) 
-0.374 
(0.395) 
-0.354 
(0.387) 
-0.270 
(0.352) 
-0.173 
(0.285) 
Adjacency 0.662 
(0.417) 
1.477** 
(0.475) 
1.695*** 
(0.509) 
1.749*** 
(0.416) 
1.900*** 
(0.407) 
1.935*** 
(0.432) 
1.906*** 
(0.495) 
1.977*** 
(0.530) 
1.941*** 
(0.473) 
1.764*** 
(0.426) 
Importer‘s Tariff 0.542 
(0.446) 
0.689 
(0.645) 
0.236 
(0.395) 
-0.00707 
(0.567) 
0.261 
(0.349) 
0.239 
(0.723) 
-0.0904 
(0.601) 
1.159 
(0.907) 
-0.339 
(0.812) 
1.757 
(0.923) 
Importer 
Landlocked 
-0.521 
(0.418) 
-0.0261 
(0.838) 
-0.0151 
(5.717) 
-0.876 
(0.448) 
-0.221 
(0.375) 
0.141 
(0.481) 
-0.357 
(0.511) 
-0.467 
(0.365) 
-0.317 
(0.312) 
-0.409 
(0.298) 
COMESA 0.242 
(0.397) 
-0.278 
(0.448) 
-0.488 
(0.490) 
-0.0936 
(0.433) 
0.0465 
(0.443) 
-0.266 
(0.499) 
0.0109 
(0.708) 
-0.302 
(0.691) 
-1.040 
(0.554) 
-1.300* 
(0.551) 
EAC 2.692*** 
(0.637) 
2.132*** 
(0.640) 
2.307** 
(0.723) 
1.617** 
(0.623) 
1.304* 
(0.578) 
1.480* 
(0.693) 
1.464 
(0.853) 
1.621 
(0.873) 
2.076** 
(0.724) 
2.404** 
(0.755) 
SACU   -9.558*** 
(0.777) 
-6.550*** 
(1.315) 
-6.777*** 
(1.422) 
-6.728*** 
(1.320) 
-6.465*** 
(1.301) 
-6.526*** 
(1.335) 
-5.949*** 
(1.263) 
-4.972*** 
(1.269) 
SADC 0.0259 
(0.459) 
-0.784 
(0.556) 
-0.112 
(0.548) 
-0.479 
(0.471) 
-0.731 
(0.589) 
0.558 
(0.398) 
0.552 
(0.424) 
0.660 
(0.478) 
0.396 
(0.378) 
0.764 
(0.428) 
Variability in 
hours 
0.539*** 
(0.157) 
-0.496** 
(0.155) 
-0.325 
(0.185) 
-0.478*** 
(0.145) 
-0.501** 
(0.165) 
-0.339 
(0.178) 
-0.420* 
(0.188) 
-0.453* 
(0.192) 
-0.339 
(0.199) 
-0.439** 
(0.148) 
Constant 7.729* 
(3.087) 
5.089 
(4.914) 
4.725 
(4.849) 
6.871* 
(3.426) 
6.845* 
(2.946) 
3.814 
(3.669) 
6.003 
(4.455) 
2.330 
(4.529) 
6.158 
(4.578) 
-1.019 
(3.785) 
Number of Obs. 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
Pseudo R-sq 0.951 0.945 0.937 0.941 0.937 0.939 0.926 0.925 0.934 0.937 
IMPORTER – FIXED EFFECT, EXPORTER – FIXED EFFECT and  TIME  FIXED EFFECT 
The Null Hypothesis: Import value follows that same size of a regression coefficient across years (1999-2008) 
Chi2 = 5.95 , Prob > Chi2 = 0.7452 , and Fail to reject the null Hypothesis. 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01 and ***p<0.001  3
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Table A3-6: Gravity model regression with Cost 1 on Cross Section 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 2007 2008 
Importer‘s 
Population 
-1.420*** 
(0.394) 
-0.242 
(0.822) 
-0.271 
(8.395) 
0.266 
(1.284) 
-0.915 
(0.877) 
-0.921 
(0.960) 
-0.349 
(0.744) 
0.140 
(0.546) 
-0.188 
(0.449) 
0.332 
(0.516) 
Importer‘s GDP 1.670* 
(0.728) 
0.450 
(1.131) 
0.161 
(14.47)1 
-0.658 
(1.204) 
1.425 
(0.792) 
1.940 
(1.243) 
1.095 
(1.047) 
0.538 
(0.569) 
0.806* 
(0.399) 
0.456 
(0.362) 
Exporter‘s 
Population 
-1.289 
(0.922) 
-1.353 
(0.768) 
6.479 
(6.205) 
0.451 
(0.816) 
-0.0934 
(0.563) 
-0.638 
(0.702) 
-1.343 
(0.688) 
-0.999* 
(0.485) 
-1.128* 
(0.523) 
-0.475 
(0.473) 
Exporter‘s GDP 1.574* 
(0.688) 
1.446 
(0.806) 
-12.80 
(11.23) 
-1.149 
(0.921) 
-0.172 
(0.533) 
0.0904 
(1.097) 
0.963 
(0.625) 
0.704* 
(0.317) 
0.473 
(0.304) 
0.490* 
(0.224) 
Language -0.629 
(0.529) 
-0.584 
(0.410) 
-0.0625 
(0.511) 
-0.359 
(0.399) 
-0.486 
(0.499) 
-0.208 
(0.439) 
-0.524 
(0.428) 
-0.515 
(0.410) 
-0.393 
(0.381) 
-0.319 
(0.301) 
Adjacency 0.719 
(0.425) 
1.577*** 
(0.469) 
1.744*** 
(0.488) 
1.942*** 
(0.417) 
2.047*** 
(0.409) 
1.965*** 
(0.442) 
1.751*** 
(0.493) 
1.887*** 
(0.530) 
1.731*** 
(0.454) 
1.527*** 
(0.425) 
Importer‘s Tariff 0.653 
(0.433) 
0.512 
(0.655) 
0.111 
(0.359) 
-0.00244 
(0.582) 
0.137 
(0.326) 
0.290 
(0.757) 
-0.141 
(0.490) 
1.175 
(0.884) 
-0.566 
(0.603) 
2.113* 
(0.931) 
Importer 
Landlocked 
-0.262 
(0.412) 
0.0681 
(0.840) 
-0.411 
(5.695) 
-0.713 
(0.433) 
0.00492 
(0.355) 
0.289 
(0.480) 
0.0356 
(0.395) 
-0.0659 
(0.265) 
-0.0735 
(0.197) 
-0.0036 
(0.210) 
COMESA 0.00302 
(0.403) 
-0.417 
(0.438) 
-0.590 
(0.458) 
-0.226 
(0.432) 
0.00390 
(0.441) 
-0.152 
(0.440) 
0.233 
(0.588) 
-0.00267 
(0.567) 
-0.813* 
(0.414) 
-0.921* 
(0.425) 
EAC 2.958*** 
(0.652) 
2.200*** 
(0.666) 
2.273** 
(0.711) 
1.576* 
(0.664) 
1.220* 
(0.602) 
1.332* 
(0.677) 
1.360 
(0.759) 
1.445 
(0.787) 
1.824** 
(0.639) 
2.228* 
(0.731) 
SACU   -9.580*** 
(0.732) 
-6.568*** 
(1.298) 
-6.812*** 
(1.407) 
-6.767*** 
(1.309) 
-6.415*** 
(1.292) 
-6.524*** 
|(0.492) 
0.264 
(0.356) 
0.584 
(0.426) 
SADC 0.141 
(0.474) 
-0.704 
(0.595) 
-0.0968 
(0.566) 
-0.457 
(0.512) 
-0.733 
(0.659) 
0.529 
(0.411) 
0.550 
(0.429) 
0.640 
(0.492) 
0.264 
(0.356) 
0.584 
(0.426) 
Cost 1 -1.138*** 
(0.201) 
-1.018*** 
(0.218) 
-0.761** 
(0.269) 
-0.875*** 
(0.203) 
-0.955*** 
(0.223) 
-0.744** 
(0.254) 
-1.145*** 
(0.267) 
-1.119*** 
(0.27) 
-1.138*** 
(0.296) 
-1.363*** 
(0.207) 
Constant 12.28*** 
(2.995) 
10.31* 
(4.983) 
9.275 
(5.144) 
9.891*** 
(3.356) 
10.11*** 
(2.864) 
6.980 
(3.956) 
12.34** 
(3.968) 
7.888 
(4.754) 
14.35*** 
(4.118) 
6.462 
(4.234) 
Number of Obs. 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
Pseudo R-sq 0.954 0.947 0.939 0.942 0.938 0.941 0.933 0.930 0.941 0.946 
IMPORTER – FIXED EFFECT, EXPORTER – FIXED EFFECT and  TIME  FIXED EFFECT 
The Null Hypothesis: Import value follows that same size of a regression coefficient across years (1999-2008) 
Chi2 = 5.95 , Prob > Chi2 = 0.7452, and Fail to reject the null Hypothesis. 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01 and ***p<0.001  
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Table A3-7: Gravity model regression with Cost 2 on Cross Section 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 2007 2008 
Importer‘s 
Population 
-1.621*** 
(0.382) 
-0.362 
(0.819) 
0.0574 
(8.186) 
0.192 
(1.251) 
-1.101 
(0.841) 
-1.107 
(0.908) 
-0.523 
(0.714) 
0.0311 
(0.521) 
-0.290 
(0.432) 
0.281 
(0.492) 
Importer‘s GDP 1.808* 
(0.702) 
0.525 
(1.110) 
-0.545 
(14.12) 
-0.682 
(1.178) 
1.512* 
(0.766) 
2.126 
(1.186) 
1.305 
(1.015) 
0.668 
(0.542) 
0.927* 
(0.380) 
0.569 
(0.349) 
Exporter‘s 
Population 
-1.449 
(0.960) 
-1.357 
(0.839) 
5.946 
(6.816) 
0.346 
(0.867) 
-0.274 
(0.603) 
-0.859 
(0.737) 
-1.588* 
(0.703) 
-1.153* 
(0.508) 
-1.314* 
(0.553) 
-0.587 
(0.496) 
Exporter‘s GDP 1.700* 
(0.761) 
1.393 
(0.907) 
-11.90 
(12.32) 
-1.043 
(0.995) 
-0.0268 
(0.583) 
0.373 
(1.171) 
1.171 
(0.663) 
0.854* 
(0.345) 
0.629 
(0.339) 
0.640* 
(0.253) 
Language -0.376 
(0.438) 
-0.373 
(0.346) 
0.103 
(0.455) 
-0.181 
(0.348) 
-0.255 
(0.422) 
-0.0752 
(0.398) 
-0.245 
(0.377) 
-0.259 
(0.377) 
-0.153 
(0.348) 
-0.0765 
(0.278) 
Adjacency 0.536 
(0.432) 
1.478** 
(0.473) 
1.605** 
(0.490) 
1.819*** 
(0.411) 
1.925*** 
(0.399) 
1.876*** 
(0.414) 
1.699*** 
(0.465) 
1.809*** 
(0.509) 
1.723*** 
(0.450) 
1.542*** 
(0.414) 
Importer‘s Tariff 0.561 
(0.419) 
0.529 
(0.658) 
0.123 
(0.357) 
-0.0563 
(0.561) 
0.140 
(0.318) 
0.192 
(0.736) 
-0.199 
(0.507) 
1.136 
(0.895) 
-0.585 
(0.662) 
1.952* 
(0.937) 
Importer 
Landlocked 
-0.146 
(0.379) 
0.187 
(0.833) 
-0.622 
(5.557) 
-0.657 
(0.424) 
0.0610 
(0.345) 
0.288 
(0.462) 
-0.0964 
(0.406) 
-0.173 
(0.266) 
-0.123 
(0.222) 
-0.292 
(0.238) 
COMESA 0.0522 
(0.413) 
-0.313 
(0.432) 
-0.515 
(0.437) 
-0.134 
(0.416) 
0.0654 
(0.417) 
-0.163 
(0.413) 
0.213 
(0.565) 
-0.0577 
(0.545) 
-0.811* 
(0.412) 
-1.022* 
(0.419) 
EAC 3.168*** 
(0.643) 
2.285*** 
(0.643) 
2.395*** 
(0.676) 
1.676** 
(0.622) 
1.341* 
(0.564) 
1.434* 
(0.653) 
1.391 
(0.732) 
1.527* 
(0.760) 
1.879** 
(0.622) 
2.202** 
(0.695) 
SACU   -9.606*** 
(0.771) 
-6.595*** 
(1.312) 
-6.879*** 
(1.416) 
-6.771*** 
(1.319) 
-6.453*** 
(1.318) 
-6.533*** 
(1.348) 
-5.956*** 
(1.277) 
-5.013*** 
(1.295) 
SADC 0.144 
(0.475) 
-0.745 
(0.594) 
-0.111 
(0.557) 
-0.483 
(0.503) 
-0.737 
(0.623) 
0.537 
(0.392) 
0.527 
(0.396) 
0.632 
(0.471) 
0.306 
(0.337) 
0.637 
(0.413) 
Cost 2 -1.127*** 
(0.227) 
-0.958*** 
(0.225) 
-0.781** 
(0.262) 
-0.869*** 
(0.208) 
-0.949*** 
(0.219) 
-0.744** 
(0.247) 
-1.050*** 
(0.262) 
-1.042*** 
(0.268) 
-0.976** 
(0.302) 
-1.181*** 
(0.215) 
Constant 12.97*** 
(3.278) 
9.997* 
(5.009) 
9.991 
(5.164) 
10.40** 
(3.377) 
10.78*** 
(2.911) 
7.682 
(4.002) 
12.26** 
(4.118) 
7.722 
(4.802) 
13.29** 
(4.472) 
5.583 
(4.346) 
Number of Obs. 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
Pseudo R-sq 0.954 0.947 0.940 0.943 0.939 0.941 0.934 0.931 0.940 0.944 
IMPORTER – FIXED EFFECT, EXPORTER – FIXED EFFECT and  TIME  FIXED EFFECT 
The Null Hypothesis: Import value follows that same size of a regression coefficient across years (1999-2008) 
Chi2 = 0.77, Prob > Chi2 = 0.9998  , and Fail to reject the null Hypothesis. 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01 and ***p<0.001  
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Table A3-8: Gravity model regression with Hassle Index on Cross Section 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 2007 2008 
Importer‘s 
Population 
-0.580 
(0.859) 
0.853 
(0.995) 
3.558 
(9.265) 
0.783 
(1.235) 
-0.343 
(1.005) 
0.0756 
(0.898) 
0.217 
(0.768) 
0.285 
(0.583) 
0.197 
(0.539) 
0.334 
(0.535) 
Importer‘s GDP 1.334 
(1.040) 
0.151 
(1.215) 
-6.474 
(16.34) 
-1.029 
(1.208) 
1.183 
(0.885) 
0.868 
(1.374) 
0.668 
(1.056) 
0.175 
(0.573) 
0.461 
(0.454) 
0.198 
(0.405) 
Exporter‘s 
Population 
-2.020 
(1.321) 
-1.518 
(0.995) 
12.78 
(7.650) 
0.951 
(1.213) 
0.185 
(0.913) 
0.226 
(0.899) 
-0.718 
(0.926) 
-0.873 
(0.676)1 
-0.482 
(0.650) 
-0.518 
(0.551) 
Exporter‘s GDP 2.381* 
(1.130) 
1.992 
(1.044) 
-24.56 
(13.66) 
-2.043 
(1.066) 
-0.960 
(0.681) 
-0.939 
(1.142) 
0.630 
(0.856) 
0.422 
(0.442) 
0.407 
(0.402) 
0.311 
(0.279) 
Language 0.424 
(0.218) 
0.305 
(0.212) 
0.477* 
(0.220) 
0.309 
(0.216) 
0.239 
(0.210) 
0.340 
(0.195) 
0.408* 
(0.177) 
0.430* 
(0.196) 
0.470* 
(0.196) 
0.520* 
(0.207) 
Adjacency 0.613 
(0.383) 
0.685 
(0.375) 
0.261 
(0.390) 
0.390 
(0.410) 
0.562 
(0.361) 
0.509 
(0.340) 
0.498 
(0.301) 
0.387 
(0.312) 
0.329 
(0.298) 
0.403 
(0.244) 
Importer‘s Tariff -0.299 
(0.666) 
0.783 
(0.528) 
-0.0995 
(0.463) 
0.0666 
(0.603) 
-0.221 
(0.360) 
0.271 
(0.355) 
0.154 
(0.619) 
-0.0908 
(0.833) 
0.434 
(0.712) 
-0.576 
(0.961) 
Importer 
Landlocked 
-0.181 
(0.600) 
0.425 
(0.763) 
-2.935 
(6.473) 
-0.683 
(0.557) 
0.025 
(0.479) 
0.152 
(0.589) 
0.0893 
(0.479) 
-0.0924 
(0.408) 
0.0248 
(0.366) 
-0.0608 
(0.362) 
COMESA 1.667* 
(0.735) 
1.480 
(0.838) 
0.844 
(0.827) 
1.362 
(0.777) 
2.324** 
(0.866) 
0.637 
(0.535) 
1.048 
(0.746) 
0.793 
(0.714) 
0.00288 
(0.607) 
-0.188 
(0.587) 
EAC 3.974*** 
(1.040) 
4.252*** 
(1.064) 
4.788*** 
(1.060) 
4.280*** 
(1.034) 
3.141** 
(1.012) 
4.463*** 
(0.712) 
4.072*** 
(0.862) 
4.081*** 
(0.822) 
4.839*** 
(0.739) 
4.825*** 
(0.702) 
SACU   -8.434*** 
(1.012) 
-5.512*** 
(1.474) 
-5.357*** 
(1.537) 
-5.989*** 
(1.401) 
-5.652*** 
(1.405) 
-5.448*** 
(1.408) 
-4.912*** 
(1.361) 
-3.976** 
(1.313) 
SADC 3.144*** 
(0.664) 
2.905*** 
(0.722) 
2.940*** 
(0.752) 
2.976*** 
(0.672) 
2.383** 
(0.851) 
3.837*** 
(0.445) 
3.458*** 
(0.501) 
3.295*** 
(0.515) 
3.238*** 
(0.497) 
3.173*** 
(0.439) 
Hassle Index 0.986 
(0.737) 
1.110 
(0.737) 
0.318 
(0.841) 
0.567 
(0.855) 
0.876 
(0.760) 
0.942 
(0.782) 
0.866 
(0.731) 
0.620 
(0.735) 
0.479 
(0.729) 
0.510 
(0.594) 
Constant -5.650 
(7.378) 
-12.58 
(7.856) 
0.671 
(9.840) 
-5.246 
(8.043) 
-6.327 
(6.962) 
-8.935 
(7.475) 
-8.089 
(6.898) 
-3.977 
(6.919) 
-5.820 
(6.497) 
-2.689 
(6.015) 
Number of Obs. 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 
Pseudo R-sq 0.983 0.983 0.982 0.980 0.981 0.983 0.983 0.982 0.983 0.985 
IMPORTER – FIXED EFFECT, EXPORTER – FIXED EFFECT and  TIME  FIXED EFFECT 
The Null Hypothesis: Import value follows that same size of a regression coefficient across years (1999-2008) 
Chi2 =  , Prob > Chi2 =    , and Fail to reject the null Hypothesis. 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01 and ***p<0.001 41
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Chapter 4 
International Trade and Regional Trade Agreement 
4.1 Introduction 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the WTO recognized 40 regional and bilateral agreements that 
were in force. Twenty years later, this number has grown to 202
25
. Of these 202 regional and 
bilateral trade agreements reported to the WTO, 109 are bilateral agreements; 57 are agreements 
between a country or a regional grouping with another regional grouping; and 36 are pure 
regional trade agreements (RTAs). This paper is intended to investigate the performance of the 
main RTAs in developing countries 
RTAs are forms of trade pacts between countries. They eliminate tariffs, quotas and other barriers 
for a number of goods traded among involved members. The aim of RTAs is to increase trade 
between member countries as a result of relaxing or removing existing institutional and economic 
barriers. However, it is important to note that RTAs can also be harmful, both to member 
countries and nonmember countries, especially when they are pursued not as a complement, but 
as a substitute for multilateral liberalization. In such cases, increased protection of vested interests 
can turn the agreements into closed blocs, discouraging multilateralism, and distorting the pattern 
of international trade (Tumbarello, 2007). 
The primary objective of this chapter is to investigate the effect of RTAs on intra- and extra-
regional trade flows by a comparison of trade patterns before and after the start of the RTA 
process in developing countries. This chapter considers not only intra-RTA trade but also the 
effect of RTAs on non-member trade. Ideally, we would like to include all possible RTAs in a 
single regression to avoid bias in the results. Unfortunately it requires more computational 
                                                          
25 (Updated October 2010) This number count only single RTA name for instance EC treaty started in 1957, enlarged to 
9 members in 1972, enlarged to 10 members, 12 members, 15 members, 25 members, 27 members in 1979, 1985, 
1994, 2004 and 2006 respectively. The total number of RTA in WTO record is 225. 
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capacity which is limited
26
. With these capacity limitations, we are able to study only certain 
large developing RTAs. However Hamilton and Winters (1992) gave an example that many small 
RTAs formed of low and middle income countries have little effect on world trade flows.  
In this chapter, we focus on 12 of the pure RTAs shown in table 4-1. These twelve RTAs are the 
major RTAs of developing countries and cover various regions. Individual member countries are 
listed in the appendix. 
Table 4-1: Selected RTAs in Developing Countries 
Agreement Type Region 
AFTA 
CAN 
CEMAC 
CIS 
EAC 
ECOWAS 
GCC 
MERCOSUR 
PAFTA 
SADC 
SAPTA 
WAEMU 
ASEAN Free Trade Area 
Andrean Community 
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
East African Community 
Economic Community of West Africa 
Gulf Cooperation Council 
Southern Common Market 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Area 
Southern African Development Community 
Southern Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement 
West African Economic and Monetary Union 
FTA 
CU 
CU 
FTA 
CU 
CU 
CU 
CU&EIA 
FTA 
FTA 
PTA 
CU 
South East Asia 
Western Hemisphere  
Sub-Saharan African  
Europe and Central Asian  
Sub-Saharan African 
Sub-Saharan African 
Middle East 
Western Hemisphere 
Middle East & North Africa  
Sub-Saharan African 
South Asia 
Sub-Saharan African 
Source: Authors‘ collected 
The chapter is organized as follows: the next section provides a literature review of RTA 
research. Section 4.3 describes the methodology and the gravity model of the impact of RTAs, 
while section 4.4 discusses the results and section 4.5 presents conclusions. 
  
                                                          
26 If we do not include exporter fixed effect, importer fixed effect and time fixed effect, we would be able to include 
more possible RTAs into single regression.  
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4.2 Review of the effects of RTAs 
The tools to assess the effects of RTA fall into two categories: ex post and ex ante. Ex ante 
analyses are based on computable general equilibrium models (CGE) and are used to predict the 
effects of a RTA before it is formed. Assessments of resource allocation effects and welfare 
changes are based on estimated parameters and data corresponding to the period preceding the 
formation of the RTA. Ex post analyses utilize data available after the RTA has been formed. 
These studies often focus on the effect of RTAs on the trade shares of members and nonmembers 
(Rivera-Batiz & Oliva, 2003).  
However each approach has an inherent weakness. CGE analyses suffer from a number of 
theoretical and practical difficulties such as assuming fixed terms of trade, assuming many 
elasticities of substitution, assuming comprehensive across-the-board elimination of tariffs and 
ignoring many of the potentially trade-restrictive non-tariff measures. By contrast, ex post 
studying based on econometric methods cannot establish welfare effects directly (Dee & Gali, 
2005). The gravity model, the economic model used in this chapter, is the key ex post technique 
for evaluation of the effects of RTAs. 
The debate over the welfare effects of RTAs and their likely impacts on the multilateral trading 
system can be divided into three categories. One school of thought views RTAs as reducing 
global welfare and creating ―stumbling blocks‖ to multilateral free trade ( (Bhagwati & Krueger, 
1995) (Bhagwati & Panagariya, 1996) (Srinivasan , 1998)). The other school of thought argues 
that RTAs are likely to raise global welfare and can act as ―building blocks‖ to multilateral free 
trade (Ethier, 1998). This can be thought of two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, RTA 
leads some to fear that regionalism corrupts and undermines progress toward global trade 
liberalization expounded by the WTO. On the other hand, any trade liberalization is good 
whatever its source and RTAs act as a second-best means of achieving trade liberalization when 
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multilateral progress is delayed. Another issue is that there are natural trading blocs among 
neighboring countries – low transportation costs contribute to welfare gains when these countries 
form a RTA (Krugman, 1993). Also there are some concerns associated with the proliferation of 
RTAs such as a costly hub-and-spoke structure of trades
27
 and spaghetti bowl phenomenon
28
.  
In order to minimize the risks that RTAs can have negative welfare effects, they should have a 
well-designed comprehensive framework. Best practice in designing RTAs should include low 
external barriers and a continued commitment to MFN liberalization. Open access to 
membership, consistency among different agreements and comprehensive coverage of goods with 
little exclusion all are important factors. In addition, symmetrical and simple rules of origin with 
transparent and consistent regulations, behind-the-border reforms to promote synergies and 
strengthen the supply response, and the establishment of dispute settlement provisions must to be 
included in the RTA framework as well (Bank, 2006).  
The welfare effects of RTAs have been assessed in terms of trade creation and trade diversion. 
Viner‘s (1950) classic analysis of custom union focus on the trade effects of exogenously 
determined external tariff structures in a perfect competition model with constant returns to scale. 
Trade creation takes place when the imports and exports of members of a preferential 
arrangement expand due to the elimination of internal trade barriers. High-price products that are 
produced locally at relatively high costs can be imported from low-cost members. Trade diversion 
occurs when trade shifts from outside trading partners to members of the preferential 
                                                          
27
 Such a structure can emerge when the largest RTA member (Hub) signs individual agreements with a wide range of 
peripheral countries (Spokes), among which market access remains restricted. Such arrangements can marginalize the 
spokes, where market access conditions are less advantageous than in the hub, which enjoys improved access to all of 
the spokes. Such a game may generate lower gain among the spoke members, which will accrue mainly to the hub 
country (Deltas, Desmet, & Facchini, 2006). 
28 ‗Spaghetti bowl phenomenon‘was first used by Jagdish Bhagwati in "U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free 
Trade Agreements" in Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne O. Krueger, The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements, 
AEI Press, 1995. This term refers to the potential problems arising from lack of coherence among different overlapping 
agreements. There has been little effort toward regulatory harmonization and consistency among agreements. As a 
result, restrictive and inconsistent rules of origin across agreements can complicate outsourcing decisions by firms and 
add fragility to the trading system. Furthermore, the outcome of a trade dispute between two members has the potential 
to spill over to other countries in the regional trade relations. In the absence of a regional dispute settlement 
mechanism, there is a potential risk of disruption in intra-regional trade (Tumbarello, 2007).  
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arrangement. A product that is available at a relatively low price from a more efficient outsider is 
produced at a higher cost and sold at a higher price within arrangement. Trade diversion induced 
inefficient production within the arrangement and lowers consumer surplus. The balance between 
trade diversion and trade creation is one of the key elements determining the net welfare effects 
of a preferential arrangement (Rivera-Batiz & Oliva, 2003).  
Viner‘s (1950) definition relates to price so the net trade effects from the gravity model cannot be 
used to access precisely the effects on economic welfare. The next section will show the gravity 
model approach to investigate the trade creation and the trade diversion effects of RTAs. 
4.3 Gravity model of the impact of RTAs 
The following is a brief review of gravity model approaches to study the impact of RTAs. The 
first extended gravity model‘s use of a regional dummy to capture the RTA‘s effect on intra trade 
initially was done by Aitken (1973). Later Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) and Frankel (1997) 
added a second dummy to test the RTA effect on the trade of bloc members with nonmembers. 
Recently Soloaga and Winters (2001) incorporated three dummy variables in order to offer a 
simple and clear distinction between the trade creation and trade diversion. The first dummy 
captures the trade creation. The second and the third dummy variables capture the import trade 
diversion and the export trade diversion, respectively. They argued that both are needed because 
bloc member‘s imports and exports could follow different patterns after the formation of a RTA. 
Here we follow the specification of Soloaga and Winters (2001) who separate dummies for 
member‘s imports from nonmembers and their exports to nonmembers.  
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     = f (   ,    ,    ,    ,       ,      ,      ,       ,       ,          ,           , 
          ) (4-1) 
where   
     is exports
29
 from country i to country j in year t,  
    is gross domestic product of country j in year t,  
    is gross domestic product of country i in year t, 
    is population size of country j in year t,  
    is population size of country i in year t, 
       is dummy variable for country i and country j that have a common language, 
      is dummy variable for country i and country j that have a common border, 
      is distance between country i and country j, 
       is real exchange rate  between country i and country j in year t, 
         is dummy variable for country i and j that are members of the same RTA k in year t. 
This variable represents intra-bloc trade regardless of the group under consideration. The positive 
coefficient for this variable indicates that the intra-bloc trade increase. 
           is dummy variable for country i that is not member of the group k of which 
country j is a member in year t. This variable represents extra-bloc imports of the member 
countries of regional groups. A negative coefficient for this variable displays that member 
countries have switched to importing from members rather than non-members. This effect is 
referred to as ‗import trade diversion (MTD).‘ 
                                                          
29
 Many gravity models estimate RTA effects using total bilateral trade flows as a dependent variable. However for a 
given pair of countries, with total bilateral trade one cannot distinguish between the impacts of RTA formation on 
exports from non-member to RTA members from that on exports from the RTA member to the non-member. 
Therefore, a constant level for the overall bilateral trade (exports and imports) may be the result of a reduction in 
imports from non-members and an increase in exports from RTAs to third countries. Therefore, using bilateral exports 
instead of total bilateral trade is crucial for the construction of a meaningful         dummy and         dummy 
(Cernat , 2001). In addition import data might be contaminated by the noise component of trade costs affected by 
movements in oil prices whereas export data are free of the volatility induced by transportation costs, thus giving us a 
clearer picture of global trade (Croce, Juan-Ramon, & Zhu, 2004). 
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           is a dummy variable for country i that is a member of the group k of which 
country j is not a member in year t. This variable represents extra-bloc exports of the member 
countries of regional groups. A negative coefficient for this variable indicates that the RTA has 
resulted in the member countries preferring to export to members rather than non-members. This 
effect is referred to as ‗export trade diversion (XTD).‘ 
RTA dummies equal one since the date of a country‘s entry into the RTA30. These three RTA 
variables will allow us to determine the trade creation and diversion effects imputable to the 
different groups and to see if they constitute building blocks or stumbling blocks to economic 
progress. Trotignon (2010) draws up a typology of trade creation and diversion and systematizes 
the summation of the three coefficients to all of the groups under examination as follows (Table 
4-2 and Table 4-3): 
Table 4-2: Typology of Trade Creation and Diversion 
Designation Effect of Regional Grouping 
Intra-bloc trade creation (ITC) Stimulating effect on trade between partners 
Export trade creation (XTC) Stimulating effect on exports to the rest of the world 
Import trade creation (MTC) Stimulating effect on imports from the rest of the world 
Import trade diversion (MTD) Imports from the rest of the world are replaced by intra-bloc 
trade 
Export trade diversion (XTD) Exports to the rest of the world are replaced by intra-bloc trade 
Source: Trotignon (2010), table 3, pp241 
  
                                                          
30
 Since the number of members in some RTAs was not constant over the sample period and since some countries 
acceded at a later stage, we had included in the three RTA dummies the countries according to the year when they 
joined the agreement. According to Dee and Gali (2005), our RTA dummies are defined in dynamic form. In contrast, 
antimonde form takes a nonzero value for all the years in the sample, irrespective of when the RTA was formed. Dee 
and Gali (2005) compared between dynamic form and antimonde and they found that dynamic form play an important 
role in their trade creation and trade diversion results.  
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Table 4-3: Trade Creations / Trade Diversions and the Typology of Blocs 
RTA2 RTAexp RTAimp Creation / Diversion Building / Stumbling 
Bloc 
+ + + ITC, XTC and MTC Building block 
+ + - If RTA2>        : ITC, XTC, MTD 
If          > RTA2: XTC, MTD  
Building block if    > 
      or stumbling block 
if       >     
+ - + If RTA2>         : ITC, XTC, MTD 
If          > RTA2: XTD, MTC 
Building block if    > 
      or stumbling block 
if       >    
+ - - If RTA2>               : ITC, 
XTD, MTD 
If                > RTA2: XTD 
and/or MTD 
Stumbling block 
Source: Trotignon (2010), table 4, pp242 
Table 4-2 shows the designation of each case of creation and diversion to the corresponding trade 
effects. Table 4-3 interprets the respective signs and values of the intra-bloc (RTA2) and extra-
bloc (RTAexp and RTAimp) coefficients. Again note that the definitions of the terms ‗import 
trade diversion‘ and ‗export trade diversion31‘, refer to the definitions in Johnson (1962, p.53) and 
Endoh (1999), respectively. These definitions differ from those given by Viner (1950, p.43). 
Thus, it is not possible to conclude that economic welfare of RTA members has increased based 
on the fact that estimates from the gravity model indicate that RTA has led to an increase in trade 
among its members. 
Now we provide a survey of the recent literature that is comparable with our research (Table 4-4). 
As regards the estimated intra-bloc trade creation, export trade creation/diversion, and import 
trade creation/diversion, the empirical literature could not reach any consensus. For instance the 
ASEAN trade bloc shows both intra-trade creation ( (Endoh, 2000) (Carrère, 2004) (Elliott & 
lkemoto, 2004) and intra-trade diversion (Soloaga & Winters, 2001) (Tumbarello, 2007)).   
  
                                                          
31 Endoh (1999) stated that this term had been introduced for the first time in his paper.  
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Table 4-4: A survey of the recent literature using three regional dummy variables 
Study Empirical 
Approach 
Period / # 
of 
countries 
RTAs and Results 
Endoh (1999) OLS 1960-1994 CMEA: RTA2=(+), RTAexp= (-), RTAimp= (-) 
EEC:     RTA2= (+), RTAexp= (+), RTAimp= (+) 
LAFTA:RTA2= (-), RTAexp= (-), RTAimp = (-) 
Endoh (2000) OLS 1995 ASEAN: RTA2 = (+), RTAexp= (+), RTAimp = (+) 
APEC 
EAEC    RTA2 = (+), RTAexp= (+), RTAimp = (+) 
Soloaga & Winters 
(2001) 
Tobit 1980-1996 
/ 58 
countries 
ANDEAN: RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(-), RTAimp=(-) 
ASEAN:     RTA2 =(-), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(+) 
CACM:      RTA2 =(+), RTAexp=(-), RTAimp=(-) 
EU:            RTA2=(-), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(+) 
EFTA:       RTA2=(n), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(+) 
GULFCOOP: RTA2=(+), RTAexp (-), RTAimp=(n) 
LAIA:         RTA2= (+), RTAexp=(-), RTAimp=(-) 
MERCOSUR:RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(n), RTAimp=(-) 
NAFTA:      RTA2=(n), RTAexp=(n), RTAimp=(+) 
Carrere (2004) Hausman-
Taylor 
1962-1996 ANDEAN:  RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(-), RTAimp (-) 
MERCOSUR:RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(-) 
ASEAN:    RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp = (+) 
CEMAC:   RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(-), RTAimp=(-) 
UEMOA:  RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(-), RTAimp=(-) 
ECOWAS: RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(-), RTAimp=(+) 
SADC:  RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(-) 
COMESA:  RTA2=(n), RTAexp=(-), RTAimp=(n) 
Croce, Juan-Ramon 
and Zhu (2004) 
Nonlinear 1978-2001 
/ 64 
countries 
ANDEAN:   RTA2=(n), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(n) 
CACM :  RTA2=(n), RTAexp (n), RTAimp=(-) 
MERCOSUR:RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(-), RTAimp=(-) 
NAFTA :    RTA2= (+), RTAexp=(-), RTAimp=(-) 
Elliott & lkemoto 
(2004) 
 1982-1999 ASEAN     RTA2 =(+), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(+) 
EU:            RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(+) 
NAFTA:   RTA2=(+), RTAexp= (-), RTAimp = (-) 
Kien & Hashimoto 
(2005) 
Hausman-
Taylor 
1988-2002 
/ 39 
countries 
AFTA:       RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(+) 
EU:            RTA2=(-), RTAexp=(n), RTAimp=(-) 
MERCOSUR:RTA2=(+), RTAexp =(-),RTAimp=(+) 
NAFTA:     RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(-), RTAimp=(+) 
Tumbarello (2007)  1984-2005 
/ 182 
countries 
ASEAN:    RTA2 =(-), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(+) 
APEC:       RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(+)          
CER:         RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(-) 
EU-15:      RTA2=(-), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(+) 
EAEC:      RTA2=(n), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(-) 
MERCOSUR:RTA2=(+), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(-) 
NAFTA:    RTA2=(n), RTAexp=(-), RTAimp=(n) 
SAPTA:    RTA2=(n), RTAexp=(+), RTAimp=(+) 
   = intra trade,    = export-extra trade,    = import-extra trade, (+) = positive and statistically 
significant, (-) = negative and statistically significant, (n) = not significant. 
AFTA = ASEAN Free Trade Area, ANDEAN = ANDEAN Pact, ASEAN = the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nation, APEC = the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, CACM = the Central 
American Common Market, CEMAC = the Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa, CER = the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relation, CMEA = the Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance, COMESA = the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 
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EAEC = East Asia Economic Caucus, EEC = the European Economic Community, ECOWAS = 
the Economic Community of West African States, EFTA = the European Free Trade Association, 
EU-15 = the European Union-comprising 15 members, GULFCOOP = Gulf Cooperation 
Council, LAIA = the Latin American Integration Association, LAFTA = the Latin American Free 
Trade Association,  MERCOSUR = the Southern Common Market, NAFTA = the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, SADC = the Southern African Development Community, 
SAPTA= the Agreement on South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Preferential 
Trading Arrangement, UEMOA = the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa,  
 
The equation (4-1) comprising the three RTA variables will allow us to give an overall evaluation 
of the process of regional integration vis-à-vis multilateral trade. We estimate two types of 
specifications of equation (4-1). The first estimate includes three RTA dummy variables for 12 
RTAs in a single regression in order to examine the effect of trade creation and the effect of trade 
diversion in the interdependent context with other FTAs in the world. The second estimates each 
RTA separately (12 separate regressions).  
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4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Trade Data:  The World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) – the World Bank. 
4.4.2 Data of Regional Integration: The Regional Trade Agreements Information System 
(RTA-IS) – the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
4.4.3 Data of Other Control Variables: The data on GDP, GDP per capita, and population 
size are from World Economic Outlook Database – IMF. Language data are from Wikipedia 
website (http://en .wikipedia.org/wiki). Data for tariffs is from United Nations TRANIS data, 
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) Database. Exchange rate is obtained from IFS-IMF. 
Note that ER is the exchange rate of the importer countries‘ currency measured by foreign 
currency per unit of domestic currency. Hence, an increase (decrease) in ER indicates 
appreciation (depreciation) of the domestic currency. 
We report the summary statistics for all variables in table 4-5 
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Table 4-5: Summary Statistics  
Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Exports in millions of $US. 201.7043 3,220.013 0 354,687 
Importer Population (millions) 
Importer GDP of $US (billions) 
Exporter Population (millions) 
Exporter GDP of $US (billions) 
46.16.341 
207.8676 
36.35258 
210.0203 
156.8944 
1,037.469 
130.7271 
909.7945 
0.041 
0.072 
0.04 
0.03 
1,328.02 
14,441 
1,328.02 
14,441 
Importer‘s Tariff 
Importer‘s Exchange Rate (Nati. per $US) 
Distance 
Contiguity  
Language 
14.5904 
0.46887 
8,084.103 
0.0184 
0.1608 
11.35392 
1.601 
4,469.764 
0.1344 
0.3673 
0 
0 
10.478 
0 
0 
106.5 
30.694 
19,904.45 
1 
1 
AFTA2 
AFTA_imp 
AFTA_exp 
0.0029 
0.0547 
0.0457 
0.0542 
0.2274 
0.2090 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
ADEAN2 
ADEAN_imp 
ADEAN_exp 
0.0009 
0.0370 
0.0271 
0.0308 
0.1888 
0.1624 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
CEMAC2 
CEMAC_imp 
CEMAC_exp 
0.0004 
0.0150 
0.0176 
0.0198 
0.1216 
0.1317 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
CIS2 
CIS_imp 
CIS_exp 
0.0024 
0.0359 
0.0510 
0.0486 
0.1859 
0.2200 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
EAC2 
EAC_imp 
EAC_exp 
0.0005 
0.0202 
0.0155 
0.0225 
0.1406 
0.1236 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
ECOWAS2 
ECOWAS_imp 
ECOWAS_exp 
0.0068 
0.0799 
0.0621 
0.0824 
0.2712 
0.2413 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
GCC2 
GCC_imp 
GCC_exp 
0.0004 
0.0141 
0.0114 
0.0211 
0.1177 
0.1059 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
MERCOSUR2 
MERCOSUR_imp 
MERCOSUR_exp 
0.0005 
0.0285 
0.0205 
0.0233 
0.1664 
0.1419 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
PAFTA2 
PAFTA_imp 
PAFTA_exp 
0.00566 
0.05813 
0.05406 
0.0750 
0.2339 
0.2261 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
SADC2 
SADC_imp 
SADC_exp 
0.00212 
0.03600 
0.02507 
0.0460 
0.1863 
0.1563 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
SAPTA2 
SAPTA_imp 
SAPTA_exp 
0.00125 
0.03800 
0.02647 
0.0353 
0.1912 
0.1605 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
WAEMU2 
WAEMU_imp 
WAEMU_exp 
0.00128 
0.03289 
0.02115 
0.0358 
0.1783 
0.1439 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
Number of OBS. 315,742 
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4.5 Results and Discussion 
The results of the thirteen estimates are presented in Table 4-6. The first regression includes all 
12 RTAs in a single pooled regression. The rest of the regression considers each RTA separately. 
Since there appear to be missing observations of many control variables, this provides an 
unbalanced panel. In the pooled estimation there are 315,742 observations containing 165 
exporters and 158 importers over the period 1981-2008.  
The model explains a high proportion –94 percent – of the total variation of world exports in the 
single pooled regression and – between 79 to 96 percent in the each RTA separated regression. 
Most of the basic variables of the gravity model – the level of GDP of exporter and importer, 
importer‘s tariff, importer‘s exchange rate, distance, contiguity and language—have the expected 
sign and are statistically significant. The coefficients of population for exporter and importer are 
mixed. The coefficient on exporter GDP and importer GDP for example, is generally between 0.4 
and 0.7, suggesting that trade increases as economic capacity grows. Distance variables and 
common border variable always show the traditional negative sign and a positive sign, 
respectively. 
The PPML result suggests that during 1981-2008, RTA regimes had not brought the same 
impacts in every regional trade grouping. Also PPML shows a different outcome for the pooled 
regression and individual regressions. This study focuses on the result from pooled regression 
because it examines the interrelationship among RTAs that allows comparing the trade impact of 
these RTAs. Also the result for the pooled regression on average has a lower standard error 
compared to the results for individual regressions.  
4.5.1 AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) 
Two dummies; AFTA2 and AFTA_imp are positive and statistically significant. This means that 
countries located within these regions give rise to intra-bloc trade creation and import trade 
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creation. Results show that the intra-regional trade for AFTA has increased to a higher level of 
0.53. This means that AFTA members have trade with each other that is about 69
32
 percent higher 
than without AFTA. This result shows that even though this study includes ASEAN new-comers 
Cambodia, Lao P.D.R., Myanmar, and Vietnam, AFTA still fostered trade flows among 
members. These new-comer members still have MFN tariff rates above those of other AFTA 
members and they have a low trade share in the region. 
A positive sign for the AFTA_imp variable suggests that AFTA members have not diverted their 
imports from non-members to members. One plausible explanation for this is the fact that AFTA 
members followed a long period of multilateral trade liberalization during the 1980s and 1990s. 
In other words regional integration efforts proceeded in parallel with multilateral liberalization. 
4.5.2 ANDEAN (Andean Community) 
The RTA among the five countries (i.e., Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) seems 
to have not significantly changed the trade pattern of their members during 1981-2008. This can 
be seen from the insignificant coefficient of the ANDEAN2 and ANDEAN_exp. Only 
ANDEAN_imp dummy is significant and negative. This implies import trade diversion.  
4.5.3 CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa) 
Only CEMAC_imp dummy is significant in this RTA. This implies that CEMAC is associated 
with import trade diversion. However, the CEMAC2-dummy is not significant in the pooled 
regression but is negative and significant in the CEMAC individual regression. This implies that 
under CEMAC there has been intra-trade diversion. 
4.5.4 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) 
The results suggest that CIS is associated with intra-bloc trade creation, export trade diversion 
and import trade diversion. PPML shows that the intra-regional trade has increased about 100 
percent. On the other hand, the results suggest that CIS members have preferred imports from 
their members and exports to their members. On balance, the sum of the coefficients of three 
                                                          
32 [(     -1)*100%] 
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dummy variables (1.008 + (-0.454) + (-0.416)) is equal to 0.138. This implies that CIS tends to 
generate more trade among its members than any non-CIS random country pairs. In sum, the 
results place CIS as a stumbling block to multilateral trade integration. 
4.5.5 EAC (East African Community) 
The results show that the EAC is related to intra-bloc trade creation, export trade diversion and 
import trade diversion. The EAC agreement seems to have increased trade among its members 
around 226 percent. This is shown by the positive and significant coefficient of the EAC2-
dummy. However EAC_import and EAC_export dummy are negative and significant. On 
balance, the sum of the coefficients of three dummy variable (2.267 + (-0.421) + (-0.445)) is 
equaled to 1.401. This indicates that EAC seems to have more intra-trade flows among its 
members than non EAC random country pairs. In sum the results identify EAC as favorable to 
trade regionalization.  
4.5.6 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West Africa) 
The results indicate that ECOWAS displays intra-bloc trade creation and import trade diversion. 
If two countries are the members of ECOWAS, trade between them is 128 percent more than 
without ECOWAS. Also ECOWAS appears to have 15.6 percent more imports among its 
members than without ECOWAS. These results are similar to those of Carrere (2004) who 
studied the period 1962-1996.  
4.5.7 GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) 
GCC appears to have intra-bloc trade diversion and import trade creation. If two countries are 
members of GCC, then trade flows between them average 112 percent less than two similar 
countries. However the coefficient of GCC_imp dummy can be interpreted to mean that the GCC 
agreement increases imports between its members and the rest of the world by approximately 
16.5 percent. Our result is consistent with Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000). They presented evidence 
that membership in GCC does not increase trade among member countries. 
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4.5.8 MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) 
The results indicate intra-bloc trade creation and import trade diversion. If two countries are 
members of MERCOSUR, then trade flows between them average 68 percent higher than two 
similar countries. On the other hand, the coefficient of MERCOSUR_imp dummy can be 
interpreted to mean that the MERCOSUR decreases imports between its members and the rest of 
the world by about 45 percent. Our result is consistent with Soloaga and Winters (2001) and 
Croce, Juan-Ramon and Zhu (2004). They also found that trade integration and trade diversion 
went hand in hand in MERCOSUR. 
4.5.9 PAFTA (Pan-Arab Free Trade Area) 
PAFTA appears to have intra-trade diversion and export trade creation. PPML indicates that if 
two countries are members of PAFTA, then trade flows between them are 42 percent lower than 
two similar countries.  
4.5.10 SADC (Southern Africa Development Community) 
SADC is the only RTA in this sample with three dummies (SADC2, SADC_exp and SADC_imp) 
that are positive and statistically significant in the pooled regression. This means that countries 
located within this region give rise to intra-bloc trade creation, import trade creation and export 
trade creation. The result shows that SADC members have traded with each other about 208 
percent higher than without the RTA.  
In sum, PPML places SADC as a building block, favorable to both regional integration and 
globalization. 
4.5.11 SAPTA (Southern Asian Preferential Trade Agreement) 
The result is associated with intra-bloc trade diversion and import trade diversion. SAPTA does 
not seem to have fostered trade flows among members to any greater extent than trade with 
nonmembers. PPML indicates that the intra-regional trade for SAPTA has decreased to a lower 
level of 0.55, implying that SAPTA members have traded with each other about 42 percent less 
than the level predicted in the benchmark context. Also SAPTA membership appears to have 
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been associated with import trade diversion. This can be seen from the negative coefficient of the 
SAPTA_imp dummy. Our result is consistent with the World Bank (2004) report on South Asia‘s 
trade. It argued that an RTA in South Asia would lead to substantial trade diversion rather than 
trade creation and considers an RTA in the region as a stumbling bloc to multilateral trade 
liberalization.  
The World Bank report (2004) provided the reasons for the minimal impact during the earlier 
years of the SAPTA as follow: (a) the extreme reluctance to make any meaningful concessions in 
the earlier years. (b) The political problems between India and Pakistan exemplified by Pakistan‘s 
short list of products that can be imported from India. This relationship has hamstrung SAPTA 
and led all the South Asian countries to look for bilateral trade agreements with each other. (c) 
India‘s import licensing system which continued to effectively ban imports of all consumer goods 
from all destinations. The ban was lifted for the SAPTA countries only in 1998. It finally 
disappeared for the rest of the world in April 2010. (d) The controls of India‘s agricultural 
parastatals over imports and exports of major primary commodities. 
4.5.12 WAEMU (West Africa Economic and Monetary Union) 
In the case of the MAEMU PPML identified only intra-bloc trade diversion. PPML indicates that 
the intra-regional trade for MAEMU has decreased to a lower level of 1.66, implying that SAPTA 
members have traded with each other about 81 percent lower the level predicted in the benchmark 
context. 
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Table 4-6: Intra and Extra-bloc Effects of Trade Agreement 
 All AFTA CAN CEMAC CIS EAC 
Exporter GDP 0.782*** 
(0.0506) 
0.585*** 
(0.0577) 
0.657*** 
(0.0850) 
0.854*** 
(0.100) 
0.076 
(0.0732 ) 
0.460*** 
(0.0126) 
Importer GDP 0.796** 
(0.00967) 
0.798*** 
(0.0715) 
0.971*** 
(0.0822) 
0.938*** 
(0.101) 
0.337*** 
(0.0758 ) 
0.449*** 
(0.0201) 
Exporter Pop. -0.0118*** 
(0.0437) 
-0.147 
(0.0854) 
2.330*** 
(0.3331) 
3.123*** 
(0.780) 
0.781 
(0.442) 
1.133*** 
(0.0276) 
Importer Pop. 0.0376** 
(0.0116) 
-0.230*** 
(0.0516) 
-0.0689 
(0.1043) 
0.327 
(0.266) 
0.219** 
(0.0736) 
0.276 
(0.0697) 
Importer Tariff -0.0847*** 
(0.0177) 
-0.235*** 
(0.0455) 
-0.180** 
(0.0684) 
-0.0245 
(0.147) 
-0.141** 
(0.0476) 
0.0407 
(0.0151) 
Exchange Rate 0.00929 
(0.00490) 
-0.0895* 
(0.0379) 
-0.00431 
(0.0091) 
-0.0464 
(0.0248) 
0.0314 
(0.0333) 
-0.0611*** 
(0.00361) 
Distance  -0.644*** 
(0.0115) 
-0.711*** 
(0.0292) 
-1.717*** 
(0.0910) 
0.257 
(0.202) 
-0.791*** 
(0.0559) 
-2.883*** 
(0.0352) 
Contiguity 0.855*** 
(0.0318) 
-0.0159 
(0.0512) 
0.120 
(0.1195) 
4.213*** 
(0.330) 
0.255*** 
(0.0670) 
-0.196 
(0.0267) 
Language 0.561*** 
(0.0220) 
0.133*** 
(0.0358) 
0.542* 
(0.2734) 
-0.280** 
(0.108) 
0.819*** 
(0.0979) 
0.0269 
(0.0106) 
AFTA2 0.529*** 
(0.0793) 
0.733*** 
(0.166) 
    
AFTA_exp 0.0214 
(0.0647) 
0.591*** 
(0.153) 
    
AFTA_imp 0.758*** 
(0.0352) 
0.389* 
(0.157) 
    
ADEAN2 0.363 
(0.209) 
 0.567* 
(0.2679) 
   
ADEAN_exp 0.0211 
(0.204) 
 0.295* 
(0.2679) 
   
ADEAN_imp -0.497*** 
(0.0271) 
 0.264 
(0.1357) 
   
CEMAC2 -0.608 
(0.355) 
  -2.116*** 
(0.382) 
  
CEMAC_exp 0.279 
(0.174) 
  -1.245*** 
(0.248) 
  
CEMAC_imp -0.533*** 
(0.0811) 
  -0.885*** 
(0.183) 
  
CIS2 1.008*** 
(0.172) 
   2.258*** 
(0.438) 
 
CIS_exp -0.454** 
(0.158) 
   1.219*** 
(0.224) 
 
CIS_imp -0.416*** 
(0.0546) 
   1.288*** 
(0.227) 
 
EAC2 2.267*** 
(0.154) 
    0.508* 
(0.0331) 
EAC_exp 
 
-0.421** 
(0.135) 
    0.361* 
(0.0307) 
EAC_imp -0.445*** 
(0.0560) 
    0.420** 
(0.0280) 
Standard errors in parentheses   *p<0.05   **p<0.01  ***p<0.001   
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Table 4-6: Intra and Extra-bloc Effects of Trade Agreement (Cont.2/3) 
 All  ECOWAS GCC MERCOSUR PAFTA SADC 
Exporter GDP  0.632*** 
(0.0754) 
0.599*** 
(0.898) 
0.456*** 
(0.0545) 
0.568*** 
(0.0692) 
0.537*** 
(0.122) 
Importer GDP  0.608*** 
(0.0417) 
1.163*** 
(0.503) 
0.932*** 
(0.029) 
1.152*** 
(0.0303) 
0.711*** 
(0.159) 
Exporter Pop.  1.273*** 
(0.274) 
0.302 
(0.192) 
0.631** 
(0.222) 
0.0718 
(0.121) 
0.653 
(0.438) 
Importer Pop.  0.291*** 
(0.0684) 
-0.113* 
(0.057) 
-0.253*** 
(0.0371) 
-0.399*** 
(0.0322) 
-0.728 
(0.419) 
Importer Tariff  0.00987 
(0.0860) 
0.269*** 
(0.046) 
0.163*** 
(0.0438) 
0.139*** 
(0.0405) 
0.125 
(0.0693) 
Exchange Rate  -0.0573*** 
(0.0156) 
-0.297*** 
(0.043) 
-0.012 
(0.0112) 
-0.178*** 
(0.0243) 
0.0152 
(0.0125) 
Distance   -0.0922 
(0.0592) 
-1.338*** 
(0.066) 
-0.470*** 
(0.0265) 
-1.096*** 
(0.0295) 
-0.481*** 
(0.122) 
Contiguity  0.888*** 
(0.117) 
-0.447*** 
(0.095) 
0.453*** 
(0.0818) 
-0.699*** 
(0.0775) 
1.606*** 
(0.176) 
Language  1.166*** 
(0.0495) 
0.353*** 
(0.067) 
0.107* 
(0.0518) 
0.344*** 
(0.0438) 
0.307** 
(0.114) 
ECOWAS2 1.284*** 
(0.208) 
1.713*** 
(0.206) 
    
ECOWAS_exp 0.0989 
(0.191) 
0.618 
(0.735) 
    
ECOWAS_imp -0.156** 
(0.0535) 
0.172 
(0.105) 
    
GCC2 -1.120*** 
(0.132) 
 -0.823*** 
(0.160) 
   
GCC_exp 0.0925 
(0.0977) 
 0.203 
(0.135) 
   
GCC_imp 0.165** 
(0.0558) 
 -0.352*** 
(0.101) 
   
MERCOSUR2 0.685*** 
(0.0962) 
  0.961*** 
(0.107) 
  
MERCOSUR_exp 0.0448 
(0.0679) 
  0.294** 
(0.0999) 
  
MERCOSUR_imp -0.452*** 
(0.0583) 
  0.583*** 
(0.0935) 
  
PAFTA2 -0.421*** 
(0.0937) 
   -0.271* 
(0.122) 
 
PAFTA_exp 0.258** 
(0.0928) 
   0.548*** 
(0.108) 
 
PAFTA_imp 0.0491 
(0.0351) 
   0.0346 
(0.0988) 
 
SADC2 2.087*** 
(0.180) 
    0.413 
(0.219) 
SADC_exp 0.717*** 
(0.132) 
    0.601*** 
(0.172) 
SADC_imp 0.130* 
(0.0618) 
    -0.0122 
(0.153) 
Standard errors in parentheses   *p<0.05   **p<0.01  ***p<0.001   
  
 
Table 4-6: Intra and Extra-bloc Effects of Trade Agreement (Cont.3/3) 
 All AFTA CAN CEMAC CIS EAC ECOWAS GCC MERCOSU
R 
PAFTA SADC SAPTA WAEMU 
Exporter GDP            0.774*** 
(0.0592) 
0.762*** 
(0.161) 
Importer GDP            0.824*** 
(0.121) 
0.565*** 
(0.0676) 
Exporter Pop.            -0.203* 
(0.0947) 
1.043** 
(0.357) 
Importer Pop.            0.236 
(0.186) 
-0.114 
(0.0664) 
Importer Tariff            -0.20*** 
(0.0603) 
-0.13* 
(0.0601) 
Exchange Rate            -0.115** 
(0.0359) 
-0.265*** 
(0.0422) 
Distance            -1.067*** 
(0.0306) 
-0.0907 
(0.0705) 
Contiguity            -0.322*** 
(0.0838) 
0.914*** 
(0.135) 
Language            -0.479*** 
(0.0661) 
0.599*** 
(0.107) 
SAPTA2 -0.555** 
(0.174) 
          -0.270** 
(0.0892) 
 
SAPTA_exp 0.0866 
(0.0796) 
          0.396*** 
(0.0739) 
 
SAPTA_imp -0.601*** 
(0.0435) 
          -0.0851 
(0.0549) 
 
WAEMU2 -1.668*** 
(0.162) 
           1.883*** 
(0.226) 
WAEMU_exp -0.0839 
(0.114) 
           0.779*** 
(0.187) 
WAEMU_imp -0.0893 
(0.0717) 
           1.239*** 
(0.165) 
Constant 2.226*** 
(0.233) 
4.455*** 
(0.704) 
-0.246 
(1.688) 
-24.30*** 
(4.610) 
0.743 
(2.191) 
15.26*** 
(0.478) 
-10.28*** 
(1.470) 
4.782*** 
(0.961) 
-2.241 
(1.230) 
5.993*** 
(0.629) 
-3.184 
(3.167) 
4.955*** 
() 
-10.23*** 
(1.930) 
All regressions include exporter fixed effect, importer fixed effect and time fixed. 
N 
Pseudo R-sq 
315,742 
0.941 
36,243 
0.960 
23,816 
0.949 
18,853 
0.877 
30,068 
0.953 
24,261 
0.877 
59,732 
0.888 
26,584 
0.923 
18,306 
0.963 
68,897 
0.880 
50,106 
0.882 
63,131 
0.936 
35,925 
0.798 
Standard errors in parentheses   *p<0.05   **p<0.01  ***p<0.001  
6
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4.6 Conclusion 
Using a modified gravity equation, this chapter investigates the effects of RTAs on world and 
regional trade patterns, concentrating on data for the 12 RTAs covering 1981-2008. The effects of 
RTAs are captured by dummies that reflect intra-bloc trade and import extra-bloc trade and export 
extra-bloc trade separately. Our first main finding is that not all of the RTAs succeed in giving rise 
to intra-bloc trade creation. Some RTAs namely SAPTA, GCC, PAFTA, and WAEMU are found 
to have negative intra-bloc effects. Our second finding is that of these 12 RTAs in the sample, 7 
show import trade diversion while most of the export extra-bloc trade dummies are not statistically 
significant. The third finding is that three of five African RTAs in the sample have generated intra-
bloc trade. Next, our finding is that the result for pooled regression and the result for individual 
regressions are different. Finally our result confirms that the basic variables of the gravity model 
show expected sign with high statistical significance (Table 4-7).  
Table 4-7: Summary of regression results 
Region RTA Type Regression Results 
South East Asia AFTA FTA RTA2= (+), RTAexp= (n), RTAimp= (+) 
South-Asia SAPTA PTA RTA2= (-), RTAexp= (n), RTAimp= (-) 
Western Hemisphere ANDEAN CU RTA2= (n), RTAexp= (n), RTAimp= (-) 
Western Hemisphere MERCOSUR CU & 
EIA 
RTA2= (+), RTAexp= (n), RTAimp= (-) 
Europe and Central Asian CIS FTA RTA2= (+), RTAexp= (-), RTAimp= (-) 
Middle East GCC CU RTA2= (-), RTAexp= (n), RTAimp= (+) 
Middle East & North Africa PAFTA FTA RTA2= (-), RTAexp= (+), RTAimp= (n) 
Sub-Saharan African CEMAC CU RTA2= (n), RTAexp= (n), RTAimp= (-) 
Sub-Saharan African EAC CU RTA2= (+), RTAexp= (-), RTAimp= (-) 
Sub-Saharan African ECOWAS CU RTA2= (+), RTAexp= (n), RTAimp= (-) 
Sub-Saharan African SADC FTA RTA2= (+), RTAexp= (+), RTAimp= (+) 
Sub-Saharan African WAEMU CU RTA2= (-), RTAexp= (n), RTAimp= (n) 
Source: Authors‘ results  
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4.7 Appendix 
Table A4-1: 12 Developing RTAs 
AFTA  
(ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement) 
ANDEAN 
(Andean Community ) 
CEMAC  
(Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa) 
Brunei Draussalam (1992) 
Indonesia (1992) 
Malaysia (1992) 
Philippines (1992) 
Singapore (1992) 
Thailand (1992) 
Vietnam (1995) 
Laos (1997) 
Myanmar (1997) 
Cambodia (1999) 
Bolivia (1988) 
Columbia (1988) 
Ecuador (1988) 
Peru (1988) 
Venezuela (1988) 
Cameroon (1999) 
Central of African Rep. (1999) 
Chad (1999) 
Congo, Republic of (1999) 
Equatorial Guinea (1999) 
Gabon (1999) 
CIS 
(Commonwealth of 
Independent States) 
EAC 
(East African Community) 
ECOWAS 
(Economic Community of 
West Africa) 
Armenia (1995) 
Azerbaijan (1995) 
Belarus (1995) 
Georgia (1995) 
Kazakhstan (1995) 
Kyrgyz Republic (1995) 
Moldova (1995) 
Russia (1995) 
Tajikistan (1995) 
Ukraine (1995) 
Uzbekistan (1995) 
Burundi (2000) 
Kenya (2000) 
Rwanda (2000) 
Tanzania (2000) 
Uganda (2000) 
Benin (1993) 
Burkina Faso (1993) 
Cape Verde (1993) 
Côte d'Ivoire (1993) 
Gambia (1993) 
Ghana (1993) 
Guinea (1993) 
Guinea-Bissau (1993) 
Liberia (1993) 
Mali (1993) 
Niger (1993) 
Nigeria (1993) 
Senegal (1993) 
Sierra Leone (1993) 
Togo (1993) 
Source: World Trade Organization  
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Table A4-1: 12 Developing RTAs (Cont.) 
GCC 
(Gulf Cooperation Council) 
MERCOSUR 
(Southern Common Market) 
PAFTA  
(Pan-Arab Free Trade Area) 
Bahrain (2003) 
Kuwait (2003) 
Oman (2003) 
Qatar (2003) 
Saudi Arabia (2003) 
United Arab Emirates (2003) 
Argentina (1991) (Dummy 
1992) 
Brazil (1991) 
Paraguay (1991) 
Uruguay (1991) 
Algeria (1998) 
Bahrain (1998) 
Egypt (1998) 
Iraq (1998) 
Jordan (1998) 
Kuwait (1998) 
Lebanon (1998) 
Libya (1998) 
Morocco (1998) 
Oman (1998) 
Qatar (1998) 
Saudi Arabia ( 1998) 
Syrian Arab Republic (1998) 
Tunisia (1998) 
United Arab Emirates (1998) 
SADC 
(Southern Africa Development 
Community) 
SAPTA 
(Southern Asian Preferential 
Trade Agreement) 
WAEMU 
(West Africa Economic and 
Monetary Union) 
Angola (2000) (Dummy 2001) 
Botswana (2000) 
Congo, Dem.Rep.of (2000) 
Lesotho (2000) 
Madagascar (2004) 
Malawi (2000) 
Mauritius (2000) 
Mozambique (2000) 
Seychelles (2001-2004, 2008) 
South Africa (2000) 
Swaziland (2000) 
Tanzania (2000) 
Zambia (2000) 
Zimbabwe (2000) 
Bangladesh (1995) (Dummy 1996) 
Bhutan (1995) 
India (1995) 
Maldives (1995) 
Nepal (1995) 
Pakistan (1995) 
Sri Lanka (1995) 
Benin (2000) 
Burkina Faso (2000) 
Côte d'Ivoire (2000) 
Guinea – Bissau (2000) 
Mali (2000) 
Niger (2000) 
Senegal (2000) 
Togo (2000) 
Source: World Trade Organization  
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Chapter 5 
Institutional Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN 
5.1 Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have grown faster than world income since the 1960s and 
have risen much faster than world trade since the mid 1970s. Over the last couple of decades 
worldwide FDI flows have increased by a factor of almost 10 while trade flows around the world 
only doubled during a similar period. World FDI inflows have about tripled from $341 billion in 
1995 to $973 billion in 2005 and world FDI inflows peaked at $1.38 trillion in 2000. These flows 
have been concentrated in the developed countries which have accounted for more than 60 percent 
of global FDI inflows, with the exception of 2004 when their share was 56 percent (Table 5-1).  
Among the developing countries, ASEAN
33
 has been an important recipient of FDI. As a 
percentage of World FDI, ASEAN in-flows jump from 1.7 percent in 2000 to 4.1 percent in 2005 
but these flows have dropped from their highs in 1995 when ASEAN accounted for about 8.3 
percent of world inflows
34
.  ASEAN is also one of the few developing-country areas that reports 
bilateral FDI flows that constitute the dependent variable in this study. 
  
                                                          
33 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967. The five original members in 1976 –
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – welcomed Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and 
Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. ASEAN started implementing intra-regional economic cooperation in 1976. 
In terms of an ASEAN economic integration, there are three pillars namely the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the 
ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) and the ASEAN Framework Agreements on Services (AFAS). ASEAN are widely 
different from each other: ranging from land-locked, poor, rural Laos to the developed island city-state of Singapore. In 
2009, the aggregate population was about 591 million growing at 1.2 percent annually. GDP for the region in 2009 was 
$1,499 billion, so per capita GDP was $2,533. But that masked extreme variation from about $419 in Myanmar to 
$36,631.2 in Singapore. (ASEAN Secretariat website, http://www.aseansec.org/19226.htm, accessed on January 01, 
2011) 
34
 One possible explanation is this downward trend might be related to the Asian crisis. This crisis began in Thailand 
with its currency crisis in 1997, which immediately had a great impact on other ASEAN countries. ASEAN countries 
faced serious problems including negative economic growth, demand decline and stagnant FDI. However this downward 
trend did not only affected ASEAN but also other region such as Africa, Central America, China and South Asia (Table 
5-1).  
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Table 5-1: Percentage of world FDI inflows in developing countries by region (%) 
Region 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 
World (US$) 341,189 705,330 1,381,675 629,675 734,892 973,329 
Total Developed Countries 64.8%  71.8% 80.9% 70.3% 56.4% 63.0% 
Total Developing Countries 34.0% 27.6% 18.9% 28.9% 40.7% 32.3% 
Africa
35
  1.7% 1.4% 0.7% 2.5% 3.0% 3.9% 
South America
36
  5.5% 7.5% 4.2% 4.5% 5.1% 4.6% 
Central America
37
 (8) 3.0% 2.3% 1.5% 4.1% 3.7% 2.6% 
Caribbean
38
 (23) 0.2% 2.3% 1.5% 0.8% 4.2% 0.7% 
China 10.6% 6.4% 2.9% 8.4% 8.3% 7.4% 
Hong Kong + Korea 
+Taiwan 
2.7% 2.8% 5.5% 2.3% 6.1% 4.3% 
South Asia
39
 (9) 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% 1.7% 1.4% 1.5% 
ASEAN
40
 (10) 8.3% 3.2% 1.7% 2.7% 4.8% 4.1% 
South-East Europe & the 
Common wealth of Independent 
States
41
 (20) 
1.2% 1.1% 0.5% 1.8% 4.1% 3.2% 
Source: UNCTAD (http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3277&lang=1) 
Note: Number in parenthesis is number of countries in each region 
For ASEAN member countries, FDI remains one of the important keys to development. ASEAN 
sought the deepening of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation and integration to attract FDI. Signed 
in 1998, the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) is a means of facilitating free flows of direct 
investment, technology and skilled labor. The AIA opened up to ASEAN investors in 2010 and is 
to be extended to all world investors by 2020. More recently, the AIA has been deepened through 
the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), which was implemented in 2007. 
                                                          
35 Africa (56) : Algeria, Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, 
Côte d' Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Togo, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Rep., Chad, Congo, Congo (Democratic Rep. of), Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mayotte, 
Reunion, Seychelles, Somalia, Uganda, United Rep. of Tanzania, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
36 South America (14): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French 
Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
37 Central America (8): Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama. 
38 Caribbean (23): Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Island, Cayman Islands, 
Cuba, Dominica, Dominica Rep., Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, 
St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, Turks & Caicos Islands. 
39 South Asia (9): Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.  
40 ASEAN (10): Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Timor-Leste, Vietnam. 
41 South-East Europe & the Common wealth of Independent States: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina., Croatia, Macedonia 
Yugoslavia, Serbia & Montenegro, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russian Fed., 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.  
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This agreement covers further steps towards liberalization, protection, facilitation and promotion 
of investments. Furthermore, it shortens the deadline to from 2020 to 2015 to achieve a free and 
open investment environment. The objective of ACIA is to boost FDI inflows as a means to foster 
economic growth through production and employment increases as well as spillover effects 
(Uttama & Peridy, 2009). 
Recently the literature has focused on the effects of institutions on FDI. There are several reasons 
why the quality of institutions may matter for attracting FDI. One is rooted in the results of the 
productivity and growth literature. Recent empirical evidence tends to confirm that cross-country 
differences in growth and productivity are related to differences in institutions (Talbott & Roll, 
2001). Good institutions may attract foreign investors. Another reason is based on studies by 
North. According to North (1987), the fundamental causes of economic growth are the institutions 
that lower transaction cost. Thus, poor institutions can bring additional transaction costs to FDI. A 
third reason is high sunk costs. The high sunk costs associated with investing offshore, along with 
weak enforcement of regulations and ineffective legal systems, has progressively forced 
multinational firms to be increasingly selective as to where they will invest (Mishra & Daly, 
2007). 
Given the importance of foreign investment for ASEAN economies and given the importance of 
institutions for attracting FDI, it is worthwhile studying the links between institutions and FDI. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we examine the role of 
institutions in ASEAN over the period 1995 – 2005 by estimating a gravity equation for bilateral 
FDI flows. Second I follow Santo Sila and Tenreyro (2006) and use a Poisson model pseudo – 
maximum – likelihood (PPML) estimation technique. This estimation technique is robust to 
different patterns of heteroskedasticity and provides a natural way to deal with zeros in the data. 
Third the model incorporates more detail on institutions by using a new database constructed by 
the French Ministry of Finance network in 51 foreign countries including ASEAN-6. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A brief review of the literature is presented in 
section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents the specification of the gravity model for FDI. Section 5.4 
describes the data. Section 5.5 discusses the econometric specification for the gravity model 
generated by the occurrence of zero FDI flows. Section 6 presents the empirical results and section 
7 concludes. 
5.2 Review of Literature 
Several recent studies have focused on the role of institutions in determining the location of FDI in 
this decade. Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) use data on bilateral FDI stocks from OECD countries 
and find that bureaucracy, low corruption, information, banking sector and legal institutions have a 
significant positive effect on FDI. They use the Institutional Profile database and the Fraser 
database on institutional variables. Mishra and Daly (2007) study the effect of the quality of 
institutions in the OECD and Asian host countries on outward FDI stocks of the OECD countries 
using the International Country Risk Guide database (ICRG). They find that legal systems, popular 
observance of law, strength and quality of bureaucracy and government stability in the host 
countries have an overall positive and significant effect on source countries‘ outward FDI stocks. 
Naude and Krugell (2007) use the World Bank database World Governance Indicators ( 
(Kaufman, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1999)) to study institutional effects on FDI in Africa. They 
find that political stability, accountability, regulatory burden and rule of law matter for FDI. 
Asiedu (2006) using the data from ICRG finds that good infrastructure promotes FDI in Africa. In 
contrast, corruption and political instability have the opposite effect. Aizenman and Mark M. 
Spiegel (2006) find that the share of FDI to gross fixed investment as well as the ratio of FDI to 
private domestic investment is negatively and significantly correlated with the level of corruption 
and FDI is more sensitive than domestic investment to the level of institutional quality. Globerman 
and Shapiro (2003) find that countries that fail to achieve a minimum threshold of effective 
governance are unlikely to receive any US FDI. They also find that given that a country is a 
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recipient of US FDI, governance infrastructure as well as the nature of the legal system is an 
important determinant of the amount received. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) use institutional 
data from the World Bank, UNDP and Environmental sustainability Index. Their results indicate 
that governance infrastructure is an important determinant of both FDI inflows and outflows. Stein 
and Daude (2002) use ICRG data find that inward FDI to be significantly influenced by political 
instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and graft.  
All in all, recent evidence surveyed in Table 5-2 confirms a straightforward picture. The quality of 
institutions is an important determinant of FDI activity. This suggests that institutional changes in 
ASEAN may have influenced the variance of FDI in ASEAN
42
. The next section therefore applies 
a gravity model of FDI with institutional variables and refined empirical techniques to check 
whether a robust result can be obtained for ASEAN. 
  
                                                          
42
 It is surprising that there is a lack of research on the institutional determinants of FDI in ASEAN. A search of the 
EconLit database typing ‗foreign direct investment‘ and ‗ASEAN‘ and ‗institutions‘ as keywords yielded zero journal 
articles the institutional determinants of FDI to ASEAN. 
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Table 5-2: Selected recent studies concerning institutions and FDI 
Study Empirical 
Approach 
Sample Data for 
Institution43 
Other Control Variables44 Conclusion 
Desbordes and 
Vicard (2009) 
Poisson , OLS OECD 
1991-2000 
ICRG, KEDS GDPH, GDPS, GDPCAPH, 
GDPCAPS, DIST, LANG, BIT 
Positive & sig. 
link b/w instit. 
& FDI 
Benassy-
Quere et al. 
(2007) 
Three step 
precedure 
OECD 
1985-2000 
IP and Fraser GDPH, GDPS, GDPCAPH, 
DIST, Contiguity, LANG 
Positive & sig. 
link b/w instit. 
& FDI 
Mishra and 
Daly (2007) 
2SLS OECD 
1991-2001 
ICRG SGDP, DIST, TRADE, 
ADIFSKILL 
Positive & sig. 
link b/w instit. 
& FDI 
Naude and 
Krugell (2007) 
GMM Africa 1970-
1990 
KKZL  Lag of (FDI/GDP) Negative & 
Positive & Sig.  
Asiedu (2006) FE Africa 22 
countries 
1984-2000 
ICRG NATEXP, GDP, INFLT, LIT, 
INFR, Political Risk 
Positive & sig. 
link b/w instit. 
& FDI 
Aizenman and 
Mark M. 
Spiegel (2006) 
Weighted least 
squares 
A cross 
country 
1990-99 
Business 
International‘s 
index 
GDP, DISTUS, DISTGERM, 
SKILL, SKILLGDP, INVC, 
PROT 
Positive & sig. 
link b/w instit. 
& FDI 
Globerman  
and Shapiro 
(2003) 
A two-stage 
estimation: 1st 
stage is probit 
and 2nd stage 
is OLS 
A cross 
country 
1995-1997 
KKZL  RGDP, HDI, FIXUS, DEXR, 
PROX 
Positive & sig. 
link b/w instit. 
& FDI 
Globerman  
and Shapiro 
(2002) 
OLS A cross 
country 
1995-97, 
FDI in. & 
FDI out. 
KKZL, HDI, 
ESI 
Lag GDP Positive & sig. 
link b/w instit. 
& FDI 
Stein and 
Daude (2002) 
OLS, 2SLS & 
Robustness 
(Poisson, 
Tobit) 
A cross 
country 
2002 
Outward 
FDI stock 
KKZL,  
ICRG, WBEC 
SGDP, SQDIFGDP, 
ADIFGDP*ADIFSKILL, 
ADIFSKILL, DIST, TARIFF, 
TARIFF*SQDIFSKILL 
Positive & sig. 
link b/w instit. 
& FDI 
Hausmann and 
Fernandez 
(2000) 
OLS A cross 
country 
1996-98 
KKLP, La 
Porta 
GDPCAP, GDP, TRADE2 Positive & sig. 
link b/w instit. 
& FDI 
 
                                                          
43
 Business International‘s Index from the Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) (http://www.transparency.org/), ESI = 
Environment Sustainability Index by the World Economic Forum in conjunction w/ Columbia and Yale Universities, 
Fraser = the Fraser Institute database, HDI = UN Human Development Index by the United Nation, ICRG = 
International Country Risk Guide, IP =the Institutional Profiles database, KEDS = the Kansas Events Data System by 
Gary King (http://gking.harvard.edu.), KKZL = Kaufmann et al. (1999a, b), La Porta = the La Porta et al. (1997, 1998a, 
1998b), WBEC = Business Environment Survey from the World Bank. 
44
 ADIFGDP = the absolute difference b/w the host country and the source country GDPs, ADIFSKILL = the absolute 
difference b/w the countries‘ endowments of skilled labor, DEXR = Exchange rate change, DIST = the distance b/w the 
capital of the host country and the source country, DISTUS and DISTGER = the log of distance from the US and 
Germany, respectively, FIXUS =countries with fixed exchange rate dummy,GDPH and GDPS = the log of the host 
country GDP and the source country GDP, respectively, GDPCAPH and GDPCAPS = the log of the host country and 
the source country GDP per cap, INVC =  investment costs and protectionism from Markusen and Maskus (2002) based 
on the World Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, INFLT = Inflation, INFR = the # of telephone 
main lines per 1,000, LIT= the % of adults who are literate, NATEXP = the share of minerals & oil in total exports, 
PROX = a dummy that equals 1 if the country is contiguous with the US, Political Risk = Coups Assassinations and 
Revolutions from the Cross-national Time Series Data Archive, RGDP = real GDP, SGDP = the sum of the logs of the 
host country and the source country GDPs ($), SKILL = the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in country i, SKILLGDP = 
the ratio of skilled labor w/ the size of the local economy, SQDIFGDP = the squared difference in the GDPs of the host 
and the source country, SQDIFSKILL = the squared difference b/w the countries‘ endowments of skilled labor, 
TRADEa = the ratio of trade to GDP, TRADEb = the ratio of export to GDP, TARIFF = average tariff 
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5.3 Gravity Model of FDI 
The empirical specifications of this paper are based on Kleinert and Toubal‘s (2010) gravity model 
of FDI and based on Blonigen (2005)‘s review of the empirical literature on FDI determinants. We 
add institutional variable (INST) into their models. The next two equations are the gravity model 
of FDI following Kleinert and Toubal‘s (2010) work. The further two equations are equation (5-1) 
and (5-2) that include Blonigen (2005) four variables. 
Equation (5-1) gives the standard gravity equation for FDI as derived from the horizontal 
models
45
.  
       = f(   ,    ,    ,       )        (5-1) 
where subscript i, j and t denotes home country, host country and time, respectively. Y indicates 
GDP and D indicate distance between home and host country. The horizontal models predict the 
coefficients of the home and host country GDP to be one. The distance coefficient β is predicted to 
be negative. The regression model derived from the vertical model is given by 
       = f(   ,    ,    ,       ,     +    ,       )      (5-2) 
where        = ((          ) / (          )), L denotes the factor price of low-skilled labor 
and S indicates the factor price of high-skilled labor. The vertical model predicts the coefficient ϑ 
of the sum of home and host countries GDP to be one, the coefficient ζ to be negative, and ξ to be 
positive. Additionally the distance coefficient β is predicted to be negative while the coefficient   
of the relative factor endowment RFE should be positive.  
                                                          
45
 Shatz and Venables (2000) distinguished between two main reasons why foreign direct investors would like to locate 
in a foreign country. The first one is to better serve the local market and is called ‗horizontal‘ or ‗market seeking‘ 
(market access motivation) since it implies a duplication of production plants. Here the main motivation is to economise 
on tariffs, transport costs and to tap a new market. FDI to establish a horizontal MNE is a substitute for international 
trade and is mainly driven by market size. The second reason is to have access to lower-cost inputs. This type of FDI is 
called ‗vertical‘ or ‗production cost-minimizing‘ (resource access motivation) since there is fragmentation. The 
motivation is to economise on production factors to maximize the profits on each part of the good production.  
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Blonigen (2005) reviews the empirical literature on FDI determinant and he concludes that 
exchange rate effects, taxes, institutions, trade protection, and trade effects matter for the firm‘s 
FDI decision. Thus, we include exchange rate (ER), trade openness (OP), average tariff (TARF), 
corporate income tax (TAX) into the equation (1) and equation (2), respectively.  
       = f(   ,    ,    ,       ,     ,     ,       ,      )    (5-3) 
       = f(   ,    ,    ,       ,     +    ,       ,     ,     ,       ,      )  (5-4) 
Accordingly, we use equation (5-3) and (5-4) to study the influence of institutions of FDI in 
ASEAN. Given the high degree of correlation among the institutional variables, we include them 
in the regressions one at a time in order to avoid problems of multicollinearity. The details of 
institutional variables are shown in the next section.  
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5.4 Data 
5.4.1 FDI Data 
We use bilateral FDI inflows into ASEAN countries from the Statistics of Foreign Direct 
Investment in ASEAN, Eighth Edition, (2006) covering the period from 1995 to 2005. To our 
knowledge, this is the only database that covers bilateral FDI inflows to all ASEAN countries and 
one of the few such databases extant among developing-country groups. The dataset covers 39 
source (home) countries
46
 and 9 host countries
47
 which include all ASEAN members. Since some 
host countries namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, and Lao PDR have not data on many control 
variable, this study can cover only ASEAN6, namely; Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. There also are the negative divestment figures (352 
observations). We treat them as zero observations. Thus, forty-two percent of the bilateral 
dependent-variable observations are zero FDI inflows.  
5.4.2 Institutional Data 
In order to assess the role of institutions as a determinant of the amount and the location of FDI, 
we primarily use a database called Institutional Profiles that describes both formal and informal 
institutions at a highly detailed level. The database was built by researchers from the French 
Ministry for the Economy, Industry and Employment (MINEIE), and the French Development 
Agency (AFD) and was constructed from a world survey conducted with MINEIE and AFD 
agencies present in the countries covered in the database.  
A total of 356 questions were asked concerning public institutions, good and services, capital 
markets, and labor markets. In each case, a set of questions were asked covering nine institutional 
                                                          
46 Source (Home) countries are Japan, USA, Canada, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, China, India, Pakistan, Republic of 
Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan (China), Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Panama. 
47 Host countries are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
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functions namely: (1) political institutions, (2) safety, law and order, (3) public governance, (4) 
market freedom, (5) investment on future, (6) ability to reform, (7) security of transaction and 
contracts, (8) regulation, and (9) openness and social cohesion. The responses to each question 
ranked 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4. Higher values indicate better institutions (0 very bad to 4 very good) 
(Meisel & Aoudia, 2007).  Table 5-3 shows the structure of the institutional field. 
We access the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) from the Centre D‘ etudes Prospective Et D‘ 
information Internationals (CEPII). The IPD is based on a survey conducted in 2001 and in 2006. 
The 2001 IPD covered 51 countries and 2006 IPD extended to 85 countries (including the 51 
countries in the 2001 IPD). Both IPD included ASEAN countries. We use 2001 IPD for FDI over 
the period 1995-2000 and use 2006 IPD for FDI over the period 2001-2005
48
. 
  
                                                          
48
 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/institutions.htm 
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Table 5-3: A summary of the database and its structure in 4 sectors and 9 themes 
Institutional themes 
in the columns 
Institutional 
environment 
Markets 
Institutional themes 
in the row 
-A- Public 
institutions, Civil 
society 
-B- Good and 
services 
-C- Capital 
market 
-D- Labor 
markets and 
social relations 
1. Political institutions Public rights and 
liberties 
  Trade union 
freedom and 
pluralism 
2. Safety, law and 
order 
Safety of persons 
and goods 
   
3. Public governance Transparency, 
corruption control, 
efficiency of 
administration, 
independence of 
the justice system 
Business start-ups   
4. Markets‘ operating 
freedom 
 Share of the 
private sector, 
privatization, 
price distortions 
introduced by the 
government 
Share of the 
private sector, 
freedom of 
interest rates, 
independence of 
the central bank 
Share of public-
sector, 
employment, 
flexibility of the 
formal labor 
market 
5. Technological 
environment, 
Expectations  
Innovations and 
the authorities‘ 
strategic vision 
Businesses‘ 
technological 
environment 
Venture-capital Vocational 
training 
 
6. Security of 
transactions and 
contracts 
Security of 
property rights 
and contracts, 
commercial 
justice, 
bankruptcy law 
Information on 
the quality of 
goods, the 
situation of firms, 
intellectual 
property 
Guarantee 
systems, 
obligation to 
provide 
information 
Respect for labor 
laws 
7. Regulations and 
corporate 
governance  
Regulation of 
competition 
Regulation of 
competition, 
corporate 
governance  
Regulation of 
competition, 
prudential rules, 
supervision 
Social dialogue 
8. Openness to the 
outside world 
Circulation of 
persons and 
information 
Trade openness  Financial 
openness 
Circulation of 
workers 
9. Social cohesion Social 
equilibrium, 
equality of 
treatment, social 
mobility, 
solidarity 
 Micro-leading Market 
segmentation and 
social mobility 
Source: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/institutions.htm 
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The advantages of this database consist of the following. First, the respondents are relatively 
homogenous since all of them are French civil servants working in each of the country surveyed 
(Benassy-Quere, Coupet, & Mayer, 2007). Second, the IP database is focused from the start on the 
issues of long-term growth and development
49
 (Meisel & Aoudia, 2007). Third, the IP database 
covers a large number of institutional aspects
50
. Here we work at the first level of aggregation, i.e. 
on 96 institutional variables. Since institution variables are often correlated with one another, it is 
generally not possible to include several institutions in the single equation. Thus here we introduce 
each of the 96 institution variables in estimation where the institutional variable is limited to only 
one variable – the institutional characteristic of the host country. 
5.4.3 Data on other control variables 
The nominal GDP and GDP per capita (GDPCAP) are in US dollars. OP is total trade as 
percentage of GDP. Data on GDP, GDPCAP and OP have been taken from the World 
Development Indicators database of the World Bank. Time-invariant bilateral characteristics 
(distance, contiguity and common language) are obtained from the Centre D‘ etudes Prospective 
Et D‘ information Internationals (CEPII). The labor (RFE) is given as the share of home country 
skilled labor in total skilled labor of the two countries,           , and the share of home‘s 
unskilled labor,           . These are obtained from the World Development Indicators data 
base of the World Bank. Exchange rate (ER) is obtained from International Financial Statistics of 
the International Monetary Fund. Average Applied Tariff Rates (TARF) is obtained from the 
World Bank
51
. Corporate income tax (TAX) is obtained from KPMG‘s Corporate Tax Rate 
Survey. Summary statistics are shown in Table 5-4. Note that ER is the exchange rate of the host 
                                                          
49
 Other databases have different focuses. For instance, the Freedom House provides an institutional database focusing 
on the evaluation of freedom in the world. See: http://www.freedomhouse.org. 
50
 Meisel and Aoudia (2007) compared the IPD to the six governance indicators used by the World Bank Institute 
(WBI), using two principal components analyses (PCAs). They shown that the IPD covers a much vaster institutional 
field of governance described by the WBI‘s indicators.  
51 Permanent URL for this page: http://go.worldbank.org/LGOXFTV550 
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countries currency measured by foreign currency per domestic currency. Hence, increase 
(decrease) in ER indicates appreciation (depreciation) of domestic currency. 
Table 5-4: Summary Statistics  
Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FDI inflow (millions $) 97.4001 371.2228 0 7921.7 
Home GDP ($) 
Host GDP ($) 
Distance  
Sum of GDP 
Relat. Factor Endow. 
1.23e+11 
2.46e+18 
8039.443 
2.46e+18 
1.10995 
5.15e+10 
1.51e+19 
5011.799 
1.51e+19 
.2363716 
6.52e+10 
1.28e+09 
315.5433 
6.65e+10 
.3841963 
2.86e+11 
1.21e+20 
19276.41 
1.21e+20 
1.628932 
Exchange Rate ($) 
Openness 
Tariff 
Cor.Tax 
.192495 
109.3162 
7.950982 
29.25455 
.2390435 
52.11392 
5.037481 
3.488309 
.000098 
52.26474 
0 
20 
.7092199 
220.4073 
19.8 
39 
a100 |    
a150    
a101 
a151 
a102 
2.534088    
2.181818     
2.279975     
2.090909     
2.073962     
.4473202  
.6944681   
.7612833   
.6450922          
1.017186           
1.831356     
1         
.7844934  
1          
 1           
3.31462 
3 
3.482011      
3 
4 
a103 
a104 
a200 
a201 
a250 
2.857187     
1.808739     
 2.677994      
3.30303     
1.742424     
1.113117   
.754306  
.764064    
.7583328  
.5855616           
1           
1         
1.724172   
2         
1                  
4 
3 
4 
4              
3            
a300 
a301 
a350 
a302 
a351 
2.301153     
2.670741  
2.666667     
1.97079     
1.914955      
.6404134    
.7265597  
.4714985     
1.007908          
.642332           
1.486292   
1           
2          
1          
0 
3.804364 
4 
3 
4 
2.55948               
a303 
a352 
a304 
a353 
a354 
2.035783     
2.257576     
1.905337    
1.65839      
2.515152       
.9468231           
.5855616          
1.069132          
.884989           
.49987           
1           
1           
1           
0    
2           
4 
3 
4 
3.416303 
3 
a305 
a307 
a355 
a356 
a510 
2.632386     
2.126225     
2     
1.603782     
2.827094       
.5699807    
.6610501           
.4264865           
.7803479   
.74874    
1.98194   
1    
1           
.5044457    
1.287388           
3.657241 
2.987386 
3 
3.011151 
4 
a511 
a512 
a513 
a515 
a600 
2.484349      
2.969697     
2.650331     
3.136364     
2.273547     
.678694           
.9371338          
.7893345    
.7957214          
1.257895           
1    
1           
1.321426           
2           
0           
3.369358 
4 
4 
4 
4 
a601 
a602 
a603 
a604 
a605 
2.834367     
3.056628     
2.724789     
3.106061     
2.384438     
.6694054   
.6812405           
.5778828          
.6000957          
.7761187           
1.760475           
2           
2    
2           
1    
4 
4 
3.724256 
4 
3.520639 
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Table 5-4: Summary Statistics (Cont.) 
Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
a606 
a607 
a650 
a800 
a803 
a900 
a901 
2.414379     
1.865376     
2.484848      
3.28475     
2.041404    
2.645441     
2.937086     
1.106463   
.6051027   
.49987          
.4539458   
.8179781   
.6944467   
.8457546    
.5001568           
1.321279    
2          
2.631551        
.3238837     
1.657739   
1.635442        
4 
3.006459 
3 
4 
3.676116 
3.663048 
4 
a902 
a903 
a904 
2.256295     
3.395547     
1.566359     
.9002647          
.2913632    
.6925173    
1    
2.91706           
.6156725    
3.556741 
4 
3.074262 
b300 
b400 
b403 
b451 
b452 
2.485392     
2.227273     
2.814514     
2.324815     
2.325502     
.7456693    
.5979804          
.7179933    
.5404238    
.5633388    
1.26435    
1          
1.821388          
1.247295   
1.351357           
3.650182 
3 
4 
3.251163 
3 
b500 
b600 
b602 
b603 
b604 
2.485392     
2.571295     
2.681818     
1.789318     
2.11881     
.7456693     
.7310437    
.8378965          
.9331637           
.9702582     
1.26435   
1.40037          1           
1          .869822           
3.650182 
4
4
4 
4 
b700 
b701 
b702 
b704 
b710 
2.513475     
2.712121     
1.166667       
2.84349     
2.5      
.7245253          
.9174442          
1.0674          
.7403552          
.857404           
1           
1           
0           
2           
1           
4 
4 
3 
4 
4 
b800 
c400 
c402 
c453 
c500 
3.330639     
2.575758     
2.536851     
1.201027     
2.333333     
.6681107   
.8716164           
.6660507   
.7769575          
1.034956           
1.536682           
1          
.9167659    
0    
1           
4 
4 
3.189826 
2.556332 
4 
c501 
c502 
c600 
c601 
c602 
1.893939    
2.110525     
2.670279     
2.969697     
2.791219      
1.338841           
.7809544   
.6751578          
8069574  
1.10792    
0           
.4433451    
1   .         
1          
.4894912           
4 
3.601135 
3.522806 
4 
4 
c603 
c700 
c702 
c703 
c704 
2.893939    
3.090909     
3.034074     
2.783178     
2.53363     
.8728013          
.8831338          
.8716067          
1.005175          
.9110422           
1           
1 
1           
1           
1           
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
c750 
c800 
c850 
c900 
d100 
2.523042     
1.843268     
2.541977     
1.777043     
1.920497     
.8330718          
.5777314  
.9208475          
1.042111          
.8023954    
1    
.7804589    
1           
0    
.9410718    
3.683491 
2.912283 
4 
3.546893 
3.777451 
d101 
d401 
d450 
d500 
d600 
2.681818     
3.415177     
.3378381     
2.132177     
2.128788     
1.316353          
.4063758   
.5510506          
.9328717          
.9018223           
1          
2.612047          
0    
1    
1           
4 
4 
1.513412 
3.549703 
4 
d601 
d602 
d603 
d700 
d701 
1.77248     
2.419554     
1.880171     
3.333333     
2.148489     
.9172066          
.5458017   
.9179229          
.7455046          
.7510727    
0     
1.698813    
0           
2 
.7702506    
3.55462 
3.395849 
3 
4 
3.420785 
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Table 5-4: Summary Statistics (Cont.) 
Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
d800 
d900 
d901 
d902 
d903 
d950 
2.54147     
2.648517     
2.637021     
3.046968     
2.590909     
.3973346     
.5210922   
.4501034   
.7113352   
.6995445   
1.124708          
.7317732           
1.461837   
1.671897   
1.461863          
1.629265    
1           
0 
3.494708 
3.280305 
4 
3.697942 
4 
2 
 
5.5 Results 
In order to avoid the problems of multicollinearity, we include institutional variables in the 
regressions one at a time. Estimates which are institutional coefficients and their standard errors 
are similar between specification (5-3) which derived from the horizontal FDI model and 
specification (5-4) which derived from the vertical FDI model. The results are reported in table 5-5 
for the total 34 best fits (out of 96 regressions). Note that all specifications include a full set of 
time, home, and host country fixed effects. The robust standard errors have been computed. The 
model explains a high proportion – approximately 70 percent – of the total variation of FDI inflow 
to ASEAN. In most cases, the coefficient of the institutional variables is significant at the one 
percent level and positive. Taking into account control variables in specification (5-3) and in 
specification (5-4), distance, corporate income tax, and home country GDP have a significant and 
expected sign. We present all detail of regression results. 
In most of 34 best fits, the estimates have the predicted sign. This means that good institutions in 
the host country have a positive impact on bilateral FDI in ASEAN. Variables namely political 
rights and functioning of political institutions, quality of local authorities, transparency of public 
action, lack of corruption, good government-citizen relations, effectiveness of public action, 
security of traditional property rights, law on bankruptcies, the security of transactions, , 
intellectual property, arrangements for fall into this category. Furthermore the results highlights 
the importance of share of public sector in GDP, the protection of intellectual property, 
competition between businesses: competition regulation arrangements, liberalize the credit sector, 
80 
 
 
dissemination of technology, innovation, lender guarantees, banking and financial supervision, the 
regulation of the financial system, reforms to make the formal labor market more flexible, labor 
legislation and measures, and labor inspectorate for inward FDI. These results confirm that good 
institutions promote inward FDI.  
The quality of some institutions in the host country has a sizable impact on inward FDI. In table 4-
6, we present the institutional data for our 34 best fits. For instance, host countries that had 
improvements in level of transparency of public action (A350) such as Indonesia and Thailand 
from in 2001 with a variable equal to 2 to in 2006 with a variable equal to 3, they are estimated to 
receive 38.13
52
 percent more FDI. On the other hand, host countries that had decline in level of 
transparency of public action such as Malaysia and Philippines from a variable equal to 3 in 2001 
to 2 in 2006, they are estimated to 27.60
53
 percent less FDI. For arrangements for the protection of 
intellectual property (B604), comparing Vietnam with a lowest level (a variable equal to 1) to 
Singapore with the highest level (a variable equal to 4), PPML leads to a 325 percent more FDI 
received if Vietnam are able to improve their level to Singapore level. 
In addition our results indicate that good institutions discourage FDI. The institutions that fall in 
this category consist of public freedoms and the autonomy of the civil society, internal public 
security, running of the customs administration, free movement of persons and information, 
implementation of the privatization program, openness of the privatization program, dissemination 
of technology, information on the structure of shareholdings in local firms, insurance companies, 
competition within the banking system, openness to foreign capital and loans, and rigidity of the 
formal labor market. However these results should not be interpreted to mean in order to attract 
FDI, ASEAN countries should reduce qualities of those institutions. They are able to interpret that 
there is no direct positive effect of those institutional variables on FDI.  
                                                          
52 38.13 percent = [exp(1*0.323)-1]*100% 
53
 -27.60 percent = [exp(-1*0.323)-1]*100% 
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Comparing our results to the other empirical studies, we find that there are only two studies that 
indicate a negative relation between institutions in the host country and FDI inflow
54
: Naude and 
Krugell (2007) and Benassy-Quere, Coupet and Mayer (2007). The latter use the same source of 
institutional variables as we do in this study. They found two cases having negative link between 
institutions and FDI inflow and those two cases are not significance in our study. In our 
regressions there are two cases having negative impact between institutions and inward FDI that 
shown positive relation in Benassy-Quere, Coupet and Mayer (2007). In Naude and Krugell 
(2007), they used KKZL data and found that political stability and accountability have a negative 
impact. However, they have no addition explanation for these relations.  
Finally in table 4-6 we summarize the results in framework of institutional themes. We found that 
security of transactions and contracts have strong relation to increase FDI inflow in ASEAN 
countries. In addition, public governance has a second rank of promoting FDI in ASEAN. 
                                                          
54
 As shown in our table 5-2, most of the recent studies indicated positive link between institutions and inward FDI. 
  
Table 5-5: Estimates of Equation (5-3) – Equation (5-4) with IP data  
 
Code Institutions 
Eq.(5-3) Eq.(5-4) 
Coeff. se R-sq Coeff. se R-sq 
1 A100 Political rights and functioning of political institutions 1.579*** (0.428) 0.739 1.582*** (0.433) 0.730 
2 A101 Public freedoms and the autonomy of the civil society -1.311* (0.616) 0.726 -1.292* (0.622) 0.727 
3 A103 Centralization - decentralization: devolution of local authorities 2.248*** (0.479) 0.732 2.334*** (0.481) 0.728 
4 A200 Internal public security -0.890* (0.395) 0.727 -0.952*  (0.392) 0.728 
5 A350 Evolution of transparency of public action in the past 3 years  0.323* (0.141) 0.727 0.362*  (0.142) 0.729 
6 A302 (Lack of) Corruption / Corruption  1.135*** (0.328) 0.730 1.226***  (0.326) 0.731 
7 A351 Evolution of petty and large-scale corruption in the past 3 years 0.574**  (0.211) 0.727 0.594** (0.209) 0.729 
8 A303 Government-citizen relations    0.302* (0.151) 0.727 
9 A304 Effectiveness of public action: tax system 0.994** (0.361) 0.728 1.102** (0.363) 0.730 
10 A305 Running of the customs administration -1.307*** (0.361) 0.730 -1.373*** (0.360) 0.731 
11 A600 Security of traditional property rights 0.814*** (0.233) 0.730 0.844*** (0.232) 0.731 
12 A606 Law on bankruptcies 0.544* (0.257) 0.726 0.541*  (0.257) 0.727 
13 A650 Evolution of the security of transactions in the past 3 years 0.536* (0.271) 0.726 0.584* (0.266) 0.727 
14 A800 Free movement of persons, information, etc -0.773* (0.316) 0.728 -0.847** (0.317) 0.729 
15 B400 Share of public sector in GDP    0.564* (0.262) 0.728 
16 B451 Implementation of the privatization program -1.113*** (0.311) 0.729 -1.131*** (0.310) 0.730 
17 B452 Openness of the privatization program -0.881* (0.412) 0.726 -0.880* (0.413) 0.727 
18 B500 Technological environment, dissemination of technology -0.967* (0.450) 0.726 -0.975* (0.449) 0.727 
  8
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Table 5-5: Estimates of Equation (5-3) – Equation (5-4) with IP data (Cont.) 
 
Code Institutions 
Eq.(5-3) Eq.(5-4) 
Coeff. se R-sq Coeff. se R-sq 
19 B603 Intellectual property 2.265*** (0.646) 0.729 2.351*** (0.642) 0.731 
20 B604 Arrangements for the protection of intellectual property    0.483* (0.223) 0.728 
21 B702 Competition between businesses: competition regulation 
arrangements 
0.561** (0.178) 0.728 0.561** (0.180) 0.729 
22 B710 Information on the structure of shareholdings in local firms -0.453* (0.223) 0.726 -0.489* (0.219) 0.727 
23 C453 Reforms to liberalize the credit sector in the past 3 years    0.251* (0.119) 0.727 
24 C500 Dissemination of technology, innovation 0.466* (0.194) 0.728 0.516** (0.196) 0.729 
25 C502 Insurance companies, pension funds -0.899** (0.326) 0.728 -0.975** (0.324) 0.729 
26 C602 Lender guarantees: banking system (mortgages etc) 0.393* (0.192) 0.726 0.408* (0.190) 0.727 
27 C700 Competition within the banking system -0.703** (0.258) 0.727 -0.707** (0.257) 0.728 
28 C703 Banking and financial supervision 0.319* (0.145) 0.727 0.358* (0.146) 0.729 
29 C750 Reforms of the regulation of the financial system in the past 3 
years 
0.559*  (0.190) 0.727 0.560** (0.191) 0.729 
30 C800 Openness to foreign capital and loans -0.876** (0.338) 0.727 -0.906** (0.334) 0.729 
31 D401 Rigidity of the formal labor market (private and public) -0.532** (0.185) 0.728 -0.572** (0.184) 0.730 
32 D450 Have there been reforms to make the formal labor market more 
flexible in the past 3 years 
0.609** (0.221) 0.727 0.606** (0.223) 0.728 
33 D601 Existence and observance of labor legislation and measures 0.720** (0.247) 0.728 0.771** (0.244) 0.729 
34 D603 Labor inspectorate, labor courts, etc 0.432** (0.143) 0.729 0.455** (0.142) 0.730 
Notes: All regressions include home country dummies, host country dummies and time dummies. The robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table 5-6: Institutional Data for 34 best fits  
Code Variables Themes 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam 
2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 
A100 Political rights and functioning of political institutions Political Instit. 2.24 3.32 3.00 3.19 2.39 2.41 2.45 2.85 2.62 2.41 1.83 1.85 
A101 Public freedoms and the autonomy of the civil society Political Instit. 2.67 2.03 2.34 2.16 2.48 3.23 2.52 2.05 2.39 2.63 0.92 0.78 
A103 Centralization – decentralization: devolution of local 
authorities 
Political Instit. 3.00 4.00 2.65 2.74 4.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 4.00 
A200 Internal public security  Safety, Law, Order 1.78 1.94 2.59 3.23 1.72 2.29 4.00 4.00 2.40 2.35 2.59 3.43 
A302 Corruption (corrupt.) Public Governance 1.00 1.48 2.51 2.00 2.00 1.00 4.00 4.00 1.51 1.52 1.48 1.00 
A303 Government-citizen relations Public Governance 1.00 1.49 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 3.49 4.00 1.00 2.00 1.49 2.00 
A304 Effectiveness of public action: tax system Public Governance 1.00 1.66 2.64 2.34 1.30 1.00 4.00 4.00 1.30 1.66 1.00 1.00 
A305 Running of the customs administration Public Governance 3.00 2.32 2.66 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.66 3.65 2.33 2.34 1.98 2.69 
A350 Evolution of transparency of public act. in the past 3 yrs Public Governance 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
A351 Evolution of petty & large-scale corrupt. in the past 3 yrs Public Governance 2.00 2.54 2.56 2.00 2.56 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.47 2.00 1.54 
A600 Security of traditional property rights Security of Transaction 
& contracts 
2.06 3.00 3.53 2.51 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 
A606 Law on bankruptcies Security of Transaction 
& contracts 
1.00 3.00 2.50 3.00 2.00 4.00 3.50 4.00 2.50 2.47 0.50 1.00 
A650 Evolution of the security of transactions in the past 3 yrs Security of Transaction 
& contracts 
2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 
A800 Free movement of persons, information Openness to the outside 
world 
3.81 3.17 2.89 3.12 3.82 4.00 3.23 2.94 3.82 3.15 2.63 2.74 
B400 Share of public sector in GDP Markets' Operating 
Freedom 
2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 
B451 Implementation of the privatization program Markets' Operating 
Freedom 
1.94 1.25 1.97 2.01 2.72 3.00 2.49 3.25 2.47 2.49 1.69 2.76 
B452 Openness of the privatization program Markets' Operating 
Freedom 
2.99 1.65 2.35 1.35 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.29 3.00 2.35 2.00 1.65 
B500 Technological environment, dissemination of technology Technological 
Environment 
2.26 2.28 2.64 3.28 2.26 2.91 3.63 3.65 1.64 2.63 1.26 1.63 
B603 Intellectual property Security of Transaction 
& contracts 
1.00 1.49 1.49 1.48 2.00 1.49 4.00 3.48 1.50 1.49 1.00 1.00 
B604 Arrangements for the protection of intellectual property Security of Transaction 
& contracts 
2.00 2.52 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 0.87 1.00 
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Table 5-6: Institutional Data for 34 best fits (cont.) 
Code Variables Themes 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam 
2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 
B702 Competition between businesses: competition regulation 
arrangements 
Regulations & Corporate 
Governance 
1.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
B710 Information on the structure of shareholdings in local 
firms 
Regulations & Corporate 
Governance 
4.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 
C453 Reforms to liberalize the credit sector in the past 3 yrs Markets' Operating 
Freedom 
0.00 0.84 1.54 1.08 1.73 1.00 1.35 0.00 0.39 2.56 2.21 1.70 
C500 Dissemination of technology, innovation Technological 
Environment 
1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 
C502 Insurance companies, pension funds Technological 
Environment 
2.00 2.00 2.44 3.20 2.44 3.60 1.89 2.39 2.00 2.00 0.44 1.19 
C602 Lender guarantees: banking system Security of Transaction 
and contracts 
1.00 3.00 3.00 3.457 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 0.489 2.00 
C700 Competition within the banking system Regulations and 
Corporate governance 
4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 1.00 2.00 
C703 Banking and financial supervision Regulations and 
Corporate governance 
1.34 3.00 3.00 2.67 3.34 3.37 4.00 4.00 2.34 4.00 1.00 1.68 
C750 Reforms of the regulation of the financial system in the 
past 3 yrs 
Regulations and 
Corporate governance 
2.00 3.00 3.68 3.00 2.52 1.00 3.37 2.35 3.63 2.00 2.00 1.31 
C800 Openness to foreign capital and loans Openness to the outside 
world 
2.09 1.77 1.66 2.09 2.66 2.40 1.44 2.91 1.44 1.40 0.78 1.68 
D401 Rigidity of the formal labor market (private and public) Markets' Operating 
Freedom 
3.71 2.61 3.32 3.62 3.29 4.00 3.39 3.38 3.61 2.62 3.39 4.00 
D450 Have there been reforms to make the formal labor 
market more flexible in the past 3 yrs 
Markets' Operating 
Freedom 
0.00 1.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 1.42 0.51 0.00 0.00 
D601 Existence and observance of labor legislation and 
measures 
Security of Transaction 
and contracts 
2.00 3.00 1.21 1.34 1.81 1.00 0.81 0.00 2.59 3.55 2.00 2.00 
D603 Labor inspectorate, labor courts Security of Transaction 
and contracts 
1.00 3.00 3.00 2.11 1.00 2.00 1.78 3.00 2.44 2.45 1.00 0.00 
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Table 5-7: A summary results in the database and its structure context 
Institutional 
themes in the 
columns 
Institutional 
environment 
Markets 
Institutional 
themes in the row 
-A- Public institutions, 
Civil society 
-B- Good and 
services 
-C- Capital market -D- Labor markets and 
social relations 
(1).Political 
institutions 
A100(+), A101(-), 
A151(-), A102 (-), 
A103(+) 
 
   
(2).Safety, law and 
order 
A200(-)    
(3).Public 
governance 
A350(+), A302(+), 
A351(+) 
A303(+), A304(+), 
A305(-) 
   
(4).Markets‘ 
operating freedom 
 B400(+), B451(-), 
B452(-) 
C453(+) D401(-), D450(+) 
(5).Technological 
environment, 
Expectations 
 B500(-)  C500(+), C502(-)  
(6).Security of 
transactions and 
contracts 
A600(+), A606(+), 
A650(+) 
B603(+), B604(+) C602(+) D601(+), D603(+) 
(7).Regulations 
and corporate 
governance  
 B702(+), B710(-) C700(-), C703(+), 
C750(+) 
 
(8).Openness to 
the outside world 
A800(-)  C800(-)  
(9).Social 
cohesion 
  C900(-)  
Note: (+) and (-) denote statistically significant and positive, and negative, respectively. 8
6
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5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we visit the impact of institutional ‗quality‘ on bilateral FDI in ASEAN during 
1995 - 2005. The detailed Institutional Profile database is used to highlight the main institutions 
that matter. We found that security of transactions and contracts have strong relation to increase 
FDI inflow in ASEAN countries. These categories of institutions consist of security of traditional 
property rights, law on bankruptcies, the security of transactions, the protection of intellectual 
property, lender guarantees: banking system (mortgages etc), existence and observance of labor 
legislation and measures, and labor inspectorate and labor courts. In addition, the results indicate 
that good public governance has a positive relationship with FDI inflows. This category of 
institutions covers transparency, corruption control, efficiency of administration, and 
independence of the justice system. However we also find a negative relationship between good 
institutions and FDI. These results do not imply that FDI flows would be increased by 
institutional inefficiency. They only show that there is no direct positive effect of those 
institutional variables on FDI. 
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5.7 Appendix 
Table A5-1: -A- Public institutions and civil society 
Code The Variable Names 
1.Political Institutions 
A100 Political rights and functioning of political institutions 
A150 Evolution of political rights in the past 3 years 
A101 Public freedoms and the autonomy of the civil society 
A151 Evolution of freedoms and civil society autonomy in the past 3 years 
A102 Concentration of the media 
A103 Centralization - decentralization: devolution of local authorities 
A104 Centralization - decentralization: autonomy in tax matters 
2.Safety, law and order 
A200 Internal public security 
A201 External public security 
A250 Evolution of the security in the past 3 years 
3.Public governance 
A300 Transparency of public action in the economic field 
A301 Transparency of economic policy (fiscal, taxation, monetary, exchange-rate, etc) 
A350 Evolution of transparency of public action in the past 3 years 
A302 Corruption / Corruption 
A351 Evolution of petty and large-scale corruption in the past 3 years 
A303 Government-citizen relations 
A352 Evolution in the effectiveness of public action as a whole in the past 3 years 
A304 Effectiveness of public action: tax system 
A353 Tax reforms in the past 3 years 
A354 Evolution of the efficiency of the tax system in the past 3 years 
A305 Running of the customs administration 
A307 Running of the justice system 
A355 Evolution of the independence and efficiency of the justice system in the past 3 
years 
A356 Public administration reforms in the past 3 years 
5.Technological environment 
A510 Capacity of the political authorities 
A511 Society's aptitude for adaptation and innovation 
A512 Long-term strategic vision of the authorities 
A513 The authorities' strategies 
A515 investment in the future of the population 
6.Security of transactions and contracts 
A600 Security of traditional property rights 
A601 Security of property rights: formal property rights 
A602 Form of contracts between private agents 
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A603 Security of contracts between private agents 
A604 Government respect for contracts 
A605 Settlement of economic disputes: justice in commercial matters 
A606 Law on bankruptcies 
A607 Application of law on bankruptcies 
A650 Evolution of the security of transactions in the past 3 years 
8.Openness to the outside world 
A800 Free movement of persons, information, etc 
A803 External pressure 
9.Social cohesion 
A900 equality of treatment: segregation based on traditions and beliefs 
A901 Access without discrimination to healthcare and public and private employment 
A902 Subsidies for primary products (social safety net)  
A903 Traditional forms of solidarity 
A904 Institutional solidarity 
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Table A5-2: -B- Goods and services 
Code The Variable Names 
3.Public governance 
B300 Administrative business start-up formalities 
4.Markets’ operating freedom 
B400 Share of public sector in GDP 
B403 Administered prices and market prices 
B451 Implementation of the privatisation programme 
B452 Openness of the privatisation programme 
5.Technological environment 
B500 Technological environment, dissemination of technology 
6.Security of transactions and contracts 
B600 Information on the situation of firms 
B602 Information on the quality of the goods: international norms and standards 
B603 Intellectual property 
B604 Arrangements for the protection of intellectual property 
7.Regulations and corporate governance 
B700 Competition: productive sector: ease of market entry for new firms 
B701 Competition in distribution (household consumption) 
B702 Competition between businesses: competition regulation arrangements 
B704 Interpenetration of local capital (private and/or public) 
B710 Information on the structure of shareholdings in local firms 
8.Openness to the outside world 
B800 Convertibility and WTO membership 
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Table A5-3: -C- Capital Market 
Code The Variable Names 
4.Markets’ operating freedom 
C400 Share of banking sector in private hands in 2001 
C402 Level of government intervention in allocation of leading 
C453 Reforms to liberalise the credit sector in the past 3 years 
5.Technological Environment 
C500 Dissemination of technology, innovation 
C501 Innovation: venture capital 
C502 Insurance companies, pension funds 
6.Security of Transactions and Contracts 
C600 Traditional credit systems (informal or quasi-informal) 
C601 Information on the situation of the banks 
C602 Lender guarantees: banking system (mortgages etc) 
C603 Compulsory publication of information by firms at the time of share issues 
7.Regulations and corporate governance 
C700 Competition within the banking system 
C702 Prudential rules: difference between local and international standards 
C703 Banking and financial supervision 
C704 Internal control of banks 
C750 Reforms of the regulation of the financial system in the past 3 years 
8.Openness to the outside world 
C800 Openness to foreign capital and loans 
C850 Reforms to open up the financial system in the past 3 years? 
9.Social cohesion 
C900 Micro-lending 
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Table A5-4: -D- Labor market and Social relations 
Code The Variable Names 
1.Political institutions 
D100 Freedom of association 
D101 Trade union plurality and autonomy 
4.Markets’ operating 
D401 Rigidity of the formal labor market (private and public) 
D450 Have there been reforms to make the formal labor market more flexible in the past 3 
years. 
5.Technological environment 
D500 Adult vocational training 
6.Security of transactions and contracts 
D600 Informal labor market 
D601 Existence and observance of labor legislation and measures 
D602 Employment contract protection 
D603 Labor inspectorate, labor courts, etc 
7.Regulations and corporate governance 
D700 Wage bargaining for non-managerial staff 
D701 Social dialogue 
8.Openness to the outside world 
D800 Openness to employment of foreign executives 
9.Social cohesion 
D900 Segmentation of the labor market 
D901 Social mobility: Recruitment and promotion in the public and private sector 
D902 Social mobility: Young graduates from higher education 
D903  Child labor 
D950 Have there been reforms aimed at de-segmentation of the labor market in the past 3 
yrs? 
  
Table A5-5: Estimates of Equation (5-3) with IP data  
 A100 A101 A103 A200 A350 A302 A351 A304 A305 A600 A606 A650 
Home 
GDP 
0.648 
(0.365) 
0.651 
(0.366) 
0.644 
(0.365) 
0.647 
(0.366) 
0.648 
(0.368) 
0.644 
(0.367) 
0.648 
(0.368) 
0.647 
(0.368) 
0.643 
(0.363) 
0.646 
(0.364) 
0.650 
(0.364) 
0.652 
(0.368) 
Host 
GDP 
-2.519* 
(1.012) 
-0.882 
(0.919) 
3.182*** 
(0.953) 
0.191 
(0.869) 
-0.443 
(0.842) 
-1.742 
(0.904) 
-2.082 
(1.155) 
-0.900 
(0.838) 
-0.696 
(0.769) 
-1.108 
(0.757) 
-0.0791 
(0.825) 
-0.829 
(0.912) 
Dist. 
-0.391** 
(0.125) 
-0.392** 
(0.125) 
-0.391** 
(0.121) 
-0.391** 
(0.120) 
-0.390** 
(0.120) 
-0.390** 
(0.120) 
-0.391** 
(0.125) 
-0.390** 
(0.119) 
-0.390*** 
(0.119) 
-0.391** 
(0.119) 
-0.391** 
(0.122) 
-0.391** 
(0.123) 
Ex. 
1.876** 
(0.648) 
0.915 
(0.598) 
2.393*** 
(0.615) 
0.534 
(0.545) 
0.752 
(0.542) 
1.520** 
(0.577) 
1.454* 
(0.690) 
1.042 
(0.539) 
1.223* 
(0.499) 
1.321** 
(0.491) 
0.626 
(0.521) 
0.757 
(0.569) 
Op. 
-0.512 
(0.486) 
-0.314 
(0.505) 
-0.933 
(0.501) 
-0.941 
(0.516) 
-1.336* 
(0.594) 
-1.530** 
(0.572) 
-1.370* 
(0.565) 
-1.399* 
(0.579) 
-0.655 
(0.504) 
-0.493 
(0.499) 
-0.0981 
(0.576) 
-1.030 
(0.539) 
Tariff 
0.369 
(0.450) 
0.835 
(0.439) 
0.121 
(0.430) 
0.359 
(0.393) 
0.279 
(0.402) 
-0.269 
(0.443) 
-0.394 
(0.542) 
0.208 
(0.402) 
0.557 
(0.395) 
1.050* 
(0.447) 
1.339* 
(0.592) 
0.588 
(0.424) 
Cor. 
Tax 
-3.568* 
(1.513) 
-2.613 
(1.416) 
-4.311** 
(1.540) 
-3.475* 
(1.484) 
-2.896* 
(1.393) 
-3.692* 
(1.478) 
-2.749 
(1.471) 
-3.232* 
(1.422) 
-4.656* 
(1.553) 
-3.777** 
(1.441) 
-2.860* 
(1.386) 
-2.060 
(1.410) 
Instit. 
1.579*** 
(0.428) 
-1.311* 
(0.616) 
2.248*** 
(0.479) 
-0.890* 
(0.395) 
0.323* 
(0.141) 
1.135*** 
(0.328) 
0.574*** 
(0.211) 
0.994** 
(0.361) 
-1.307*** 
(0.361) 
0.814*** 
(0.233) 
0.544* 
(0.257) 
0.536* 
(0.271) 
R-sq 0.729 0.726 0.732 0.727 0.727 0.730 0.727 0.728 0.730 0.730 0.726 0.726 
N 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 
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Table A5-5: Estimates of Equation (5-3) with IP data (Cont.) 
 A800 B451 B452 B500 B603 B702 B710 C500 C502 C602 C700 C703 
Home 
GDP 
0.647 
(0.367) 
0.644 
(0.363) 
0.649 
(0.367) 
0.652 
(0.367) 
0.646 
(0.368) 
0.650 
(0.366) 
0.651 
(0.369) 
0.648 
(0.367) 
0.646 
(0.367) 
0.652 
(0.367) 
0.646 
(0.362) 
0.648 
(0.367) 
Host 
GDP 
-0.277 
(0.830) 
-0.768 
(0.838) 
-1.189 
(1.161) 
-1.008 
(0.935) 
-2.821* 
(1.117) 
-1.819 
(0.933) 
-1.224 
(1.075) 
-0.487 
(0.805) 
-0.755 
(0.856) 
-0.713 
(0.855) 
0.463 
(0.905) 
-0.292 
(0.835) 
Dist. 
-0.390** 
(0.120) 
-0.391** 
(0.123) 
-0.392** 
(0.127) 
-0.392** 
(0.124) 
-0.391** 
(0.124) 
-0.392** 
(0.124) 
-0.391** 
(0.124) 
-0.391** 
(0.119) 
-0.390** 
(0.120) 
-0.391** 
(0.123) 
-0.391** 
(0.121) 
-0.390** 
(0.120) 
Ex. 
0.745 
(0.535) 
1.202* 
(0.548) 
1.104 
(0.729) 
0.887 
(0.592) 
1.919** 
(0.676) 
1.428* 
(0.599) 
0.928 
(0.633) 
0.791 
(0.518) 
0.978 
(0.553) 
0.740 
(0.553) 
0.546 
(0.528) 
0.682 
(0.538) 
Op. 
-1.217* 
(0.557) 
-0.277 
(0.522) 
-0.608 
(0.494) 
-0.677 
(0.486) 
-1.447** 
(0.548) 
-0.500 
(0.485) 
-1.211* 
(0.590) 
-1.107* 
(0.534) 
-1.376* 
(0.574) 
-0.738 
(0.489) 
0.0888 
(0.614) 
-1.263* 
(0.581) 
Tariff 
0.271 
(0.396) 
0.187 
(0.422) 
-0.0513 
(0.574) 
0.694 
(0.433) 
-0.480 
(0.506) 
0.659 
(0.434) 
0.219 
(0.476) 
0.709 
(0.412) 
-0.065 
(0.432) 
0.825 
(0.443) 
1.102* 
(0.498) 
0.382 
(0.395) 
Cor. 
Tax 
-3.305* 
(1.433) 
-4.934** 
(1.697) 
-3.112* 
(1.502) 
-2.260 
(1.415) 
-3.275* 
(1.516) 
-2.992* 
(1.460) 
-2.074 
(1.434) 
-2.860* 
(1.381) 
-3.404* 
(1.449) 
-2.176 
(1.399) 
-4.123** 
(1.580) 
-2.888* 
(1.388) 
Instit. 
-0.773* 
(0.316) 
-1.113*** 
(0.311) 
-0.881* 
(0.412) 
-0.967* 
(0.450) 
2.265*** 
(0.646) 
0.561** 
(0.178) 
-0.453* 
(0.223) 
0.466* 
(0.194) 
-0.899** 
(0.326) 
0.393* 
(0.192) 
-0.703** 
(0.258) 
0.319* 
(0.145) 
R-sq 0.728 0.729 0.726 0.726 0.729 0.728 0.726 0.728 0.728 0.726 0.727 0.727 
N 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 
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Table A5-5: Estimates of Equation (5-3) with IP data (Cont.) 
 C750 C800 D401 D450 D601 D603 
Home 
GDP 
0.650 
(0.367) 
0.646 
(0.363) 
0.645 
(0.366) 
0.650 
(0.366) 
0.646 
(0.367) 
0.646 
(0.364) 
Host GDP 
-2.108 
(1.093) 
0.499 
(0.901) 
-0.590 
(0.831) 
-1.500 
(0.942) 
-1.058 
(0.896) 
-0.305 
(0.778) 
Distance 
-0.392** 
(0.125) 
-0.391** 
(0.119) 
-0.390** 
(0.120) 
-0.392** 
(0.125) 
-0.390** 
(0.121) 
-0.390*** 
(0.118) 
Ex Rate 
1.506* 
(0.672) 
0.490 
(0.530) 
0.962 
(0.540) 
1.235* 
(0.605) 
1.110 
(0.575) 
0.923 
(0.490) 
Openness 
-0.738 
(0.489) 
-0.420 
(0.520) 
-1.222* 
(0.544) 
-0.454 
(0.486) 
-1.416* 
(0.572) 
-0.619 
(0.502) 
Tariff 
0.287 
(0.472) 
0.862 
(0.443) 
0.0288 
(0.414) 
0.700 
(0.435) 
-0.280 
(0.464) 
0.956* 
(0.441) 
Cor. Tax 
-2.843 
(1.478) 
-3.945* 
(1.535) 
-3.753* 
(1.487) 
-2.797 
(1.444) 
-3.401* 
(1.459) 
-3.861** 
(1.455) 
Instit. 
0.559** 
(0.190) 
-0.876** 
(0.338) 
-0.532** 
(0.185) 
0.609** 
(0.221) 
0.720* 
(0.247) 
0.432** 
(0.143) 
R-sq 0.727 0.727 0.728 0.727 0728 0.729 
N 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 
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Table A5-6: Estimates of Equation (5-4) with IP data  
 A100 A101 A103 A200 A350 A302 A351 A303 A304 A305 A600 A606 
Home GDP 1.246* 
(0.527) 
1.237* 
(0.532) 
1.266* 
(0.521) 
1.267* 
(0.525) 
1.274* 
(0.528) 
1.282* 
(0.525) 
1.264* 
(0.537) 
1.268* 
(0.532) 
1.278* 
(0.525) 
1.269* 
(0.514) 
1.256* 
(0.517) 
1.237* 
(0.524) 
Host GDP -2.354* 
(1.010) 
-0.717 
(0.914) 
-3.078** 
(0.953) 
0.387 
(0.866) 
-0.282 
(0.837) 
-1.642 
(0.895) 
-1.955 
(1.137) 
-0.00791 
(0.863) 
-0.765 
(0.833) 
-0.528 
(0.769) 
-0.937 
(0.762) 
0.0847 
(0.826) 
Distance -0.400*** 
(0.120) 
-0.399*** 
(0.120) 
-0.401*** 
(0.117) 
-0.400*** 
(0.115) 
-0.401*** 
(0.115) 
-0.401*** 
(0.116) 
-0.401*** 
(0.120) 
-0.401*** 
(0.116) 
-0.401*** 
(0.114) 
-0.400*** 
(0.114) 
-0.400*** 
(0.114) 
-0.399*** 
(0.117) 
Sum of 
GDP 
-0.627 
(0.399) 
-0.621 
(0.404) 
-0.631 
(0.393) 
-0.634 
(0.396) 
-0.627 
(0.398) 
-0.636 
(0.394) 
-0.634 
(0.404) 
-0.624 
(0.402) 
-0.628 
(0.396) 
-0.636 
(0.389) 
-0.622 
(0.392) 
-0.618 
(0.399) 
Relat. 
Factor 
Endow. 
0.557 
(0.700) 
0.423 
(0.699) 
1.036 
(0.684) 
0.916 
(0.669) 
1.216 
(0.676) 
1.270 
(0.678) 
0.818 
(0.698) 
1.109 
(0.679) 
1.313 
(0.675) 
1.021 
(0.659) 
0.956 
(0.660) 
0.524 
(0.686) 
Ex Rate 1.876** 
(0.642) 
0.905 
(0.590) 
2.467*** 
(0.615) 
0.545 
(0.539) 
0.797 
(0.536) 
1.608** 
(0.572) 
1.486* 
(0.681) 
0.564 
(0.553) 
1.113* 
(0.535) 
1.264* 
(0.492) 
1.351** 
(0.487) 
0.622 
(0.515) 
Openness -0.467 
(0.480) 
-0.290 
(0.498) 
-0.839 
(0.494) 
-0.879 
(0.513) 
-1.299* 
(0.586) 
-1.470** 
(0.562) 
-1.316* 
(0.551) 
-1.225* 
(0.611) 
-1.348* 
(0.571) 
-0.557 
(0.503) 
-0.391 
(496) 
-0.0574 
(0.564) 
Tariff 0.389 
(0.445) 
0.847 
(0.433) 
0.141 
(0.428) 
0.372 
(0.391) 
0.282 
(0.399) 
-0.289 
(0.440) 
-0.395 
(0.534) 
0.389 
(0.403) 
0.213 
(0.399) 
0.590 
(0.392) 
1.102* 
(0.441) 
1.354* 
(0.583) 
Cor. Tax -3.577* 
(1.495) 
-2.615 
(1.400) 
-4.404** 
(1.507) 
-3.631* 
(1.455) 
-3.043* 
(1.360) 
-3.860** 
(1.442) 
-2.784 
(1.451) 
-2.544 
(1.334) 
-3.405* 
(1.387) 
-4.850** 
(1.521) 
-3.871** 
(1.408) 
-2.877* 
(1.366) 
Instit. 1.582*** 
(0.433) 
-1.292* 
(0.622) 
2.334*** 
(0.481) 
-0.952* 
(0.392) 
0.362* 
(0.142) 
1.226*** 
(0.326) 
0.594** 
(0.209) 
0.302* 
(0.151) 
1.102** 
(0.363) 
-1.373*** 
(0.360) 
0.844*** 
(0.232) 
0.541* 
(0.257) 
R-sq 0.730 0.727 0.728 0.728 0.729 0.731 0.729 0.727 0.730 0.731 0.731 0.727 
N 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 
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Table A5-6: Estimates of Equation (5-4) with IP data (cont.) 
 A650 A800 B400 B451 B452 B500 B603 B604 B702 B710 C453 C500 
Home 
GDP 
1.255* 
(0.536) 
1.273* 
(0.525) 
1.269* 
(0.532) 
1.259* 
(0.521) 
1.249* 
(0.535) 
1.244* 
(0.535) 
1.270* 
(0.532) 
1.264* 
(0.528) 
1.242* 
(0.529) 
1.258* 
(0.539) 
1.266* 
(0.528) 
1.268* 
(0.525) 
Host 
GDP 
-0.710 
(0.908) 
-0.0962 
(0.826) 
-0.256 
(0.864) 
-0.630 
(0.833) 
-1.054 
(1.146) 
-0.840 
(0.932) 
-2.709* 
(1.102) 
0.0472 
(0.828) 
-1.647 
(0.932) 
-1.127 
(1.061) 
0.334 
(0.877) 
-0.316 
(0.804) 
Distanc
e 
-0.401*** 
(0.118) 
-0.400*** 
(0.115) 
-0.401*** 
(0.116) 
-0.399*** 
(0.119) 
-0.399** 
(0.123) 
-0.400*** 
(0.120) 
-0.401*** 
(0.120) 
-0.401*** 
(0.115) 
-0.400*** 
(0.120) 
-0.401*** 
(0.119) 
-0.400*** 
(0.116) 
-0.401*** 
(0.114) 
Sum of 
GDP 
-0.616 
(0.407) 
-0.631 
(0.396) 
-0.622 
(0.402) 
-0.648 
(0.394) 
-0.638 
(0.403) 
-0.618 
(0.406) 
-0.635 
(0.401) 
-0.619 
(0.400) 
-0.621 
(0.401) 
-0.621 
(0.408) 
-0.632 
(0.399) 
-0.620 
(0.397) 
Relat. 
Factor 
Endow. 
0.912 
(0.680) 
1.144 
(0.671) 
1.168 
(0.679) 
0.515 
(0.684) 
0.345 
(0.699) 
0.628 
(0.696) 
0.960 
(0.695) 
1.127 
(0.666) 
0.571 
(0.698) 
0.885 
(0.693) 
0.933 
(0.673) 
1.220 
(0.664) 
Ex Rate 
0.790 
(0.565) 
0.781 
(0.528) 
0.671 
(0.549) 
1.218* 
(0.539) 
1.106 
(0.714) 
0.889 
(0.587) 
1.972** 
(0.668) 
0.580 
(0.526) 
1.425* 
(0.593) 
0.970 
(0.628) 
0.493 
(0.554) 
0.835 
(0.511) 
Openne
ss 
-0.987 
(0.532) 
-1.162* 
(0.551) 
-1.282* 
(0.613) 
-0.235 
(0.517) 
-0.592 
(0.488) 
-0.622 
(0.482) 
-1.381* 
(0.537) 
-0.988 
(0.535) 
-0.453 
(0.479) 
-1.172* 
(0.577) 
-1.020 
(0.544) 
-1.033 
(0.529) 
Tariff 
0.618 
(0.420) 
0.278 
(0.394) 
0.395 
(0.403) 
0.195 
(0.418) 
-0.0415 
(0.565) 
0.718 
(0.427) 
-0.481 
(0.500) 
0.809 
(0.423) 
0.679 
(0.428) 
0.221 
(0.471) 
0.290 
(0.404) 
0.764 
(0.409) 
Cor. 
Tax 
-2.078 
(1.394) 
-3.482* 
(1.400) 
-2.474 
(1.341) 
-5.007** 
(1.677) 
-3.116* 
(1.489) 
-2.275 
(1.398) 
-3.330* 
(1.490) 
-2.634* 
(1.328) 
-3.001* 
(1.442) 
-2.089 
(1.421) 
-3.175* 
(1.399) 
-2.987* 
(1.348) 
Instit. 
0.584* 
(0.266) 
-0.847** 
(0.317) 
0.564* 
(0.262) 
-1.131*** 
(0.310) 
-0.880* 
(0.413) 
-0.975* 
(0.449) 
2.351*** 
(0.642) 
0.483* 
(0.223) 
0.561* 
(0.180) 
-0.489* 
(0.219) 
0.251* 
(0.119) 
0.516** 
(0.196) 
R-sq 0.727 0.727 0.728 0.730 0.727 0.727 0.731 0.728 0.729 0.727 0.727 0.729 
N 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 
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Table 5-5: Estimates of Equation (5-4) with IP data (cont.) 
 C502 C602 C700 C703 C750 C800 D401 D450 D601 D603 
Home 
GDP 
1.277* 
(0.526) 
1.247* 
(0.534) 
1.245* 
(0.519) 
1.272* 
(0.527) 
1.246* 
(0.534) 
1.257* 
(0.519) 
1.276* 
(0.523) 
1.240* 
(0.531) 
1.276* 
(0.528) 
1.262* 
(0.516) 
Host GDP 
-0.603 
(0.851) 
-0.554 
(0.857) 
0.611 
(0.899) 
-0.116 
(0.831) 
-1.940 
(1.085) 
0.691 
(0.898) 
-0.427 
(0.828) 
-1.329 
(0.940) 
-0.921 
(0.889) 
-0.112 
(0.780) 
Distance 
-0.401*** 
(0.115) 
-0.400*** 
(0.118) 
-0.398*** 
(0.116) 
-0.401*** 
(0.115) 
-0.400*** 
(0.121) 
-0.399*** 
(0.115) 
-0.400*** 
(0.115) 
-0.400*** 
(0.120) 
-0.401*** 
(0.117) 
-0.400*** 
(0.113) 
Sum of 
GDP 
-0.635 
(0.396) 
-0.616 
(0.405) 
-0.633 
(0.395) 
-0.626 
(0.398) 
-0.625 
(0.404) 
-0.633 
(0.394) 
-0.637 
(0.394) 
-0.621 
(0.403) 
-0.638 
(0.397) 
-0.626 
(0.391) 
Relat. 
Factor 
Endow. 
1.140 
(0.675) 
0.750 
(0.684) 
0.449 
(0.683) 
1.196 
(0.674) 
0.571 
(0.704) 
0.755 
(0.663) 
1.096 
(0.672) 
0.512 
(0.699) 
1.059 
(0.679) 
1.027 
(0.654) 
Ex Rate 
1.028 
(0.547) 
0.751 
(0.549) 
0.547 
(0.520) 
0.720 
(0.531) 
1.504* 
(0.665) 
0.493 
(0.523) 
1.004 
(0.534) 
1.229* 
(0.598) 
1.158* 
(0.568) 
0.949* 
(0.484) 
Openness 
-1.326* 
(0.565) 
-0.672 
(0.486) 
0.124 
(0.603) 
-1.221* 
(0.574) 
-0.692 
(0.483) 
-0.345 
(0.518) 
-1.161* 
(0.537) 
-0.415 
(0.481) 
-1.366* 
(0.561) 
-0.515 
(0.502) 
Tariff 
-0.0809 
(0.429) 
0.860* 
(0.436) 
1.119* 
(0.491) 
0.396 
(0.393) 
0.307 
(0.467) 
0.896* 
(0.438) 
0.0242 
(0.412) 
0.718 
(0.429) 
-0.301 
(0.459) 
1.012* 
(0.437) 
Cor. Tax 
-3.569* 
(1.416) 
-2.198 
(1.381) 
-4.159** 
(1.559) 
-3.035* 
(1.356) 
-2.850 
(1.460) 
-4.065** 
(1.506) 
-3.939** 
(1.454) 
-2.802* 
(1.427) 
-3.536* 
(1.426) 
-4.010** 
(1.422) 
Instit. 
-0.975** 
(0.324) 
0.408* 
(0.190) 
-0.707* 
(0.257) 
0.358* 
(0.146) 
0.560** 
(0.191) 
-0.906** 
(0.334) 
-0.572** 
(0.184) 
0.606** 
(0.223) 
0.771** 
(0.244) 
0.455** 
(0.142) 
R-sq 0.729 0.727 0.728 0.729 0.729 0.729 0.730 0.728 0.729 0.730 
N 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 
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